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IN THE

# Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1990

AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,

*Petitioner,*

v.

CHESTER A. WILK, D.C.,  
JAMES W. BRYDEN, D.C.,  
PATRICIA B. ARTHUR, D.C. and  
MICHAEL D. PEDIGO, D.C.,

*Respondents.*

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On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To  
The United States Court Of Appeals For The Seventh Circuit

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## PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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## QUESTIONS PRESENTED

This case presents two questions relating to the ability of professions to promote the quality of their services through ethical guidelines having no effect on price and to conduct public information and legislative campaigns to combat dangerous and deceptive practices:

(1) Whether, contrary to the holdings of the Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits, an ethical guideline against the use of an unscientific or unsafe practice can be invalidated under the Sherman Act when the primary purpose of the guideline was found to be promoting the quality of service, when there has been no showing of an adverse effect on price or output in any market, and when the guideline was shown, at most, to have had only incidental and indirect effects on the individual competitors who practice the unscientific or unsafe method; and

(2) Whether, contrary to the *Noerr-Pennington* doctrine and numerous courts of appeals decisions, the First Amendment permits a court to rely on informational and legislative activities in finding both a past antitrust violation and a sufficient risk of recurrence to justify an injunction.

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**PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI**

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The American Medical Association ("AMA")<sup>1</sup> respectfully submits this petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.

**OPINIONS BELOW**

The District Court's initial *Wilk I* judgment for the AMA is unreported (Appendix ("App.") 191a). The Seventh Circuit's *Wilk I* opinion vacating this judgment (App. 144a-190a) is reported at 719 F.2d 207. The District Court's *Wilk II* opinion and judgment on remand (App. 53a-143a) is reported at 671 F. Supp. 1465. The Seventh Circuit's *Wilk II* opinion affirming that judgment (App. 1a-51a) is reported at 895 F.2d 353.

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<sup>1</sup>Pursuant to Rule 29.1, the AMA states that it has no parent corporation and no subsidiaries that are not wholly-owned.

## JURISDICTION

The opinion and judgment of the Court of Appeals were entered on February 7, 1990. The Court of Appeals denied the AMA's timely petition for rehearing on April 27, 1990. *See* App. 52a. On July 16, 1990, Justice Stevens extended the AMA's time for filing its petition for certiorari to and including August 25, 1990. On August 15, 1990, Justice Stevens granted a further extension to and including September 24, 1990. This Court's jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

## STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

United States Constitution, Amendment I:

"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging freedom of speech . . . ."

Section One of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1:

"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal . . . ."

Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26:

"Any person . . . shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief . . . against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws . . . when and under the same conditions and principles as injunctive relief against threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage is granted by courts of equity, under the rules governing such proceedings . . . ."

## STATEMENT OF THE CASE

### Introduction

In this case, the Seventh Circuit has adopted an interpretation of the Sherman Act and the First Amendment that will prevent traditional activities of professions that are designed to enhance

the quality and reliability of their services, to promote public trust in them, and to prevent fraud and deception. The standard that the Seventh Circuit has adopted conflicts with the holdings of the Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits and with a number of prior decisions of this Court.

Specifically, the Seventh Circuit held that the AMA violated the Sherman Act between 1967 and 1980 because it (1) maintained a 125-year-old ethical guideline that physicians should use and promote only methods of healing having a scientific basis, and (2) made a series of public statements that one "method of healing" (chiropractic) is unscientific and dangerous. In so holding and in justifying an injunction, the Seventh Circuit further relied on the fact that the AMA had also conducted a public information campaign to "contain and ultimately eliminate" chiropractic through legislation.

The District Court found that the AMA's dominant motivation was to promote patient care and to enhance the quality and reliability of physicians' services. App. 86a. The District Court further found that chiropractic grew rapidly throughout the period of this "boycott" (App. 74a) and that the only effects of the AMA's conduct on chiropractors were that their costs were marginally higher and their incomes lower than they would have been if physicians had associated with chiropractors. App. 75a, 79a.

These findings would have foreclosed antitrust liability in the Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits. These courts hold that "concerted refusals to deal" that have no effect on price are not antitrust violations if their primary purpose is to promote product quality or safety, if they have not been shown to have adverse effects on overall output, and if they have only incidental effects on the individual competitors who are affected.<sup>2</sup> This is the rule

<sup>2</sup>See, e.g., *Neeld v. National Hockey League*, 594 F.2d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 1979); *Hatley v. American Quarter Horse Association*, 552 F.2d 646, 652-54 (5th Cir. 1977); *Tripoli Co. v. Wella Co.*, 425 F.2d 932 (3d Cir. 1970); pp. 21-23, *infra*.

of reason analysis that this Court's decisions require in cases dealing with such facially reasonable non-price "restraints."

However, the Seventh Circuit here held that the rule of reason has to be "modified" in such cases. App. 175a. It held that anti-trust liability can be imposed solely on the basis of (1) the District Court's finding that the AMA's conduct adversely affected "competition between medical doctors and chiropractors" by raising chiropractors' costs and reducing their incomes, and (2) the AMA's failure to meet the extraordinary burden of showing that the ethical guideline was the objectively reasonable alternative that was "least restrictive" of the businesses of the unscientific practitioners.

Unless reversed, this holding by the Seventh Circuit will severely inhibit, and likely prevent, professions from continuing their traditional activities that enhance the quality and reliability of physicians' services and prevent the long term erosion of public trust in the profession.

## **I. Chiropractic And The AMA's Ethical And Legislative Activities.**

1. **Chiropractic.** Plaintiffs in this case are four individual chiropractors who each subscribe to the basic doctrine of chiropractic. That doctrine maintains that an innate force flowing through nerves in the body assures health and that diseases are caused by slight misalignments in the spinal column (known as "subluxations") that disrupt the flow of this vital "nerve energy." See Seventh Circuit Joint Appendix ("R") 107-08, 135, 229-30, 259-60.

Medical science has proven that these chiropractic "subluxations" cannot exist. DX 21049. However, chiropractors are taught that diseases can be prevented and cured by periodically manipulating the spine to alleviate "subluxations." DX 21048. For example, one of the plaintiffs testified in this case that

he tells his patients not to have their children vaccinated against smallpox and polio, but to rely on periodic spinal manipulations to ward off these diseases. R. 233.

**2. American Medical Association.** The AMA is a national association of physicians who practice in all medical specialties. Membership in the AMA is voluntary. Approximately 50% of the nation's 600,000 physicians are AMA members. Tr. 414-15.

The purpose of the AMA is to advance medical science and education. Since its founding in 1847, the AMA has sought to further this goal by, *inter alia*, (1) disseminating scientific information to physicians and exhorting them to provide and promote only those methods of healing based in science, and (2) seeking to expose and, in extreme cases to prohibit through legislation, the practices of faith healers, sectarian physicians, and other quacks that defraud and endanger patients.

Between 1963 and 1974, the AMA engaged in both courses of conduct with respect to chiropractic. It maintained its longstanding ethical guidelines against association with unscientific practitioners—which is the unlawful “restraint of trade” that the Seventh Circuit found. In addition, the AMA engaged in a separate legislative and informational campaign against chiropractic—which the Seventh Circuit relied upon in justifying an injunction.

**3. The AMA's Pre-Goldfarb Ethical Guidelines.** The AMA ethical guideline at issue is Principle 3 of the AMA *Principles of Medical Ethics*. This Principle provided that a physician “should practice a method of healing founded on a scientific basis” and “should not voluntarily associate with anyone who violates this principle.” App. 3a n.1. This canon was indisputably not designed to determine what methods of healing are offered to the public. Because physicians do not control any essential facilities, they cannot prevent anyone from marketing health care services to the public. Only legislation can do that.

Indeed, the AMA guidelines expressly stated that patients may seek healing from whatever source they choose, be it "himself, his neighbor, chiropractic, naturopathy, or Christian Science." PX 505, p. 14. As the AMA made explicit long before chiropractic became a matter of special concern, the sole objective of Principle 3 was to enhance the quality and reliability of services that physicians themselves provide and to prevent the deception of patients that inherently results when physicians provide methods of healing that have no basis in science—or promote those unscientific methods through referral or other joint practice relationships with practitioners of them. *See* PX 504.

As the District Court found (App. 75a), these AMA ethical guidelines were never enforced against AMA members and were thus purely precatory. Indeed, they were disseminated in the hope that they would influence AMA members and non-members alike.

At all times relevant to this case, the AMA's ethical guidelines approved professional association with a number of providers of manipulative therapies who are not medical doctors, *e.g.*, physical therapists, osteopaths, and podiatrists. The AMA's ethical guidelines treated practitioners of chiropractic differently for one reason only: their "methods" had not ever been shown to have any scientific basis for treating any condition—as the District Court here found. *See* App. 84a-85a.

**4. The AMA's 1963-1974 Public Information And Legislative Campaign Against Chiropractic.** In the 1960s, the AMA became convinced that chiropractic had become such a unique threat to public health that the AMA also launched a public information campaign to "contain and ultimately eliminate" chiropractic in the only way possible—through legislation. Chiropractic had achieved some form of licensure in all but four states, and chiropractors were passing themselves off as "family doctors" who could use spinal manipulation to prevent, diagnose, treat, and

cure any condition—from polio, to tonsillitis, to heart disease, to diabetes, to high blood pressures, to the common cold. Virtually all chiropractors purported to treat these diseases.<sup>3</sup>

In 1963, the AMA formed a “Committee On Quackery” to investigate these matters, and in 1965, the AMA launched a public information and legislative campaign that was designed to “contain and ultimately to eliminate chiropractic.”<sup>4</sup> Although the AMA also prepared pamphlets to warn consumers about chiropractic, the critical document in the legislative and public information campaign was a 1965 resolution of the AMA’s House of Delegates. It declared that chiropractic is an “unscientific cult” whose members lack the education and training required to treat and diagnose diseases. DX 21208. It relied on the findings to this effect by then-District Judge J. Skelly Wright. *England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners*, 246 F. Supp. 993, 995 (E.D.La. 1965), *aff’d*, 384 U.S. 885 (1966).

The AMA was joined in this campaign by numerous economically disinterested groups. These included the Department of HEW, the AFL-CIO, the Consumer Federation of America, and *Consumer Reports* magazine. The AMA regarded this support as proof of the legitimacy of the AMA’s effort and as refuting the chiropractic argument that the campaign was based solely in economics. *See* App. 17a; App. 81a; PX 464.

<sup>3</sup>For example, a 1963 survey by the American Chiropractic Association reported that 93% of its members were treating high blood pressure, 89% were treating asthma, 70% were treating heart disease, 46% were treating diabetes, 67% were treating tonsillitis, 67% were treating dermatitis, and 47% were treating polio. DX 2003.

<sup>4</sup>The AMA set out to influence public opinion against chiropractic and to (1) dissuade patients from using these services by issuing pamphlets and other warnings, (2) lobby Congress against chiropractic’s inclusion in Medicare, and (3) lobby against licensure in the four states that then prohibited chiropractors. If these initial efforts were successful, the AMA ultimately planned to seek the delicensing or legislative restriction of chiropractic in other states.

However, the AMA's legislative campaign failed. Chiropractic received limited coverage under Medicare and licensure in the remaining four states. The AMA ended the campaign in December of 1974.

**5. Post-1977 Ethical Changes.** Following this Court's 1975 decision in *Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar*, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), the AMA ceased circulating its existing ethical opinions. Shortly thereafter, this case and three other chiropractic antitrust suits were brought against the AMA, including a class action in Pennsylvania, and a suit by the Attorney General of New York.

Over the next few years, the AMA took a series of steps that reversed its ethical ban against association with chiropractors. In 1977, the AMA issued new opinions that physicians may ethically associate professionally with "licensed limited practitioners," which is a category that includes chiropractors. DX 21231. In 1979, the AMA's House of Delegates adopted a new statement on chiropractic that qualified its earlier criticisms of chiropractic and made it explicit that physicians can ethically associate with any "licensed limited practitioner" when the physician believes that this will be in a patient's best interests. PX 7248. In 1980, the AMA adopted new principles of medical ethics that eliminated Principle 3. DX 21233.

The AMA made these changes both (1) to reduce its antitrust exposure after *Goldfarb*, and (2) to reflect the emergence of a small group of "reform" chiropractors that had renounced the traditional tenets of chiropractic and confined themselves to accepted physical therapy treatments.

In 1978 and 1982, the AMA settled the Pennsylvania class action and the New York Attorney General's antitrust action respectively by "legally binding" itself to maintain the revised ethical guidelines that permit physicians to associate with a chiropractor if the physician believes this to be in a patient's best

interests. DX 21215; DX 21216. *See also* DX 21217 (settling Iowa case on same ground). While the AMA has eliminated the ethical guidelines that allegedly restrain trade, the AMA has not changed its views that practices of traditional chiropractors like the four plaintiffs are improper. The AMA further continues to express its views in response to consumer requests for information or in forums where the AMA's views are germane.

## **II. The First Trial And The Seventh Circuit's *Wilk I* Opinion.**

Plaintiffs claimed in the District Court that the AMA's anti-chiropractic ethical guidelines and other activities between 1967 and 1976 violated Section One of the Sherman Act and that they had been injured because they allegedly would have "gained economically" if they had had professional relationships with physicians. App. 159a.<sup>5</sup> Because their complaint initially sought treble damages, these claims were the subject of an eight-week jury trial in 1980 and 1981.

**The District Court's Jury Instructions In *Wilk I*.** The case was submitted to the jury under rule of reason instructions that provided that the jury was to determine whether the purpose and overall effect of the AMA's ethical guidelines operated to promote or to restrain competition.

Specifically, the District Court instructed the jury that "[o]ne of the factors" it should consider was the effect of the AMA's practices "on competition, if any, that exists between chiroprac-

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<sup>5</sup>Plaintiffs claimed that the absence of these relationships increased their costs: e.g., by preventing chiropractors from using services of radiologists in those cases where chiropractors did not own their own x-ray machines. Although physicians concededly control no essential facilities, plaintiffs claimed that the lack of a physician's "stamp of approval" adversely affected their reputations and incomes. For these same reasons, plaintiffs argued that they had been severely harmed by the AMA's many derogatory statements about chiropractic.

tors generally and medical doctors.” App. 168a. The District Court further instructed the jury that it should also consider the way in which ethical guidelines “affect the conduct of one profession, such as medical doctors.” App. 169a. The District Court’s instructions stated that ethical canons can promote competition among physicians and “benefit the public by raising professional standards generally, and by helping to insure that the profession merits the trust that the public necessarily places in its members.” App. 169a.

The District Court thus instructed the jury to “consider the genuineness of the justification advanced in support of the standard, the reasonableness of the standard itself, the manner of its enforcement, and [its] effects.” App. 169a. The District Court stated that the fact that one profession’s guidelines have an “indirect effect on the activities of another profession, such as chiropractors” does not make it an unreasonable restraint of trade. App. 169a. The jury rendered a verdict for the AMA, and judgment was entered in the AMA’s favor. App. 191a.

**The Seventh Circuit’s Opinion In *Wilk I*.** The Seventh Circuit reversed the judgment for the AMA and remanded for a new trial, principally on the ground that the District Court’s rule of reason instructions were erroneous.<sup>6</sup>

Specifically, the Seventh Circuit held that the sole inquiry under the rule of reason should have been on the impact of the challenged practices on competition *between chiropractors and physicians* and that “raising professional standards generally and . . . helping to insure that the profession merits the trust that the public necessarily places in its members” are “values unrelated to free competition.” App. 172a.

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<sup>6</sup>The Seventh Circuit also held that the District Court committed reversible error in admitting certain evidence that was “relevant to the genuineness of the [AMA’s] belief that chiropractic is quackery” (App. 186a) but that could, in the Seventh Circuit’s view, be “addressed with a less extravagant volume of evidence, and with far less emphasis upon alleged financial greed.” App. 187a.

At the same time, the Seventh Circuit held that the rule of reason should be "modif[ied]" in cases involving professional ethical guidelines to permit limited consideration of these other values. App. 175a. Specifically, it required a two-part inquiry in which (1) plaintiffs make out a *prima facie* case by showing that the ethical guidelines impaired "competition between medical doctors and chiropractors," and (2) the burden then shifts to the defendant to show that its guidelines are necessary to promote "patient care" and that there is no way of achieving this goal that would be "less restrictive" of "competition" by chiropractors. App. 174a, 177a-178a.

Under this "modified" rule of reason, the burden is placed on defendants to establish the following four elements of a "patient care" defense (App. 177a-178a):

(1) that they genuinely entertained a concern for what they perceive as scientific method in the care of each person with whom they have entered into a doctor-patient relationship; (2) that this concern is objectively reasonable; (3) that this concern has been the dominant motivating factor in defendants' promulgation of Principle 3 and in the conduct intended to implement it; and (4) that this concern for scientific method in patient care could not have been adequately satisfied in a manner less restrictive of competition.

Because the Seventh Circuit's judgment also rested on evidentiary grounds (*see* p. 10 n.6, *supra*), the AMA did not then seek review of the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the Sherman Act by filing a petition for certiorari from this interlocutory decision.<sup>7</sup>

### III. The Second Trial And The Seventh Circuit's *Wilk II* Opinion.

On the eve of the 1987 retrial, plaintiffs abandoned their damages claims. They were permitted to try claims for injunctive

<sup>7</sup>After plaintiffs filed a petition for certiorari, the AMA filed a conditional cross-petition that was denied when the plaintiffs' petition was denied. *Wilk v. AMA*, 467 U.S. 1210 (1984).

relief to a district judge, despite the intervening antitrust settlements that are binding on the AMA. *See* pp. 8-9, *supra*. Following a 26-day bench trial, the District Court found that the AMA and its members had engaged in an unlawful "boycott" of the chiropractic profession and that an injunction should be entered to prevent future harm to plaintiffs. App. 62a-98a.

**The District Court's Opinion In *Wilk II*.** The District Court found that the AMA's ethical guidelines and its implementing conduct constituted a "boycott" and an unreasonable restraint of trade. The District Court acknowledged that there was no evidence that the AMA's conduct had had any adverse effect on price or output in any relevant market and that, to the contrary, it was undisputed that "the number of chiropractic schools, the number of chiropractors, and the number of patient visits to chiropractors grew during the boycott." App. 74a. However, the District Court found an unreasonable restraint because the AMA's conduct had raised the chiropractors' costs and reduced their incomes and because the District Court held that this constituted "actual proof of adverse effects" on competition that eliminated the need for other evidence. App. 76a.

Second, the District Court found that the AMA had not satisfied its burden of justifying its conduct under the Seventh Circuit's "patient care" defense or otherwise. It dismissed the evidence that Principle 3 was designed to promote physicians' reputations for quality on the ground that it was not supported by consumer surveys. App. 77a.

As to the "patient care defense," the District Court found that the AMA had proven two of the elements: (1) that it was genuinely concerned about the use of scientific method in patient care, and (2) that this was the dominant motivation in its anti-chiropractic conduct. App. 81a, 86a. However, although the District Court could not find chiropractic to be scientific and stated that

it could not endorse it (App. 86a), the District Court found that the AMA had not established the other two elements of the "patient care defense."

First, whereas the "boycott" was found objectively reasonable at its inception, the District Court found the AMA had not borne its burden of proving that its "boycott of the *entire* chiropractic profession was objectively reasonable throughout the *entire period* of the boycott." App. 86a (emphasis added). The District Court referred to the evidence that changes in one small element in the chiropractic profession had led to ethical changes in 1977, but that the "boycott," in its view, did not end until the AMA eliminated Principle 3 in 1980. App. 72a-73a. Second, the District Court found that the AMA had not shown that a consumer information or other public relations campaign could not have achieved its objectives in a manner "less restrictive" of the interests of chiropractors. App. 86a.

In all these regards, while stating that it could not rely on constitutionally protected activities (App. 63a n.2), the District Court found that the anticompetitive character of the AMA's conduct was established by the intent of its legislative campaign to contain and ultimately to eliminate chiropractic. App. 74a. The District Court's Opinion referred to this intent eleven times. *E.g.*, App. 62a-66a.

Finally, the District Court entered an injunction, despite the existence of three prior antitrust settlement that required the AMA to maintain the post-*Goldfarb* ethical guidelines that were found to satisfy the antitrust laws. The District Court relied on the facts that the AMA had not retracted its prior anti-chiropractic statements, that the tone of its ethical revisions was "begrudging," and that the AMA had continued to send out "anti-chiropractic literature" in response to requests for information by consumers and to urge more restrictive positions before accrediting bodies than chiropractors preferred. App. 95a-97a.

**The Seventh Circuit's Opinion In *Wilk II*.** The Seventh Circuit affirmed. It concluded that it was irrelevant both that the plaintiffs had failed to prove any adverse effects on price or output in a market and that output of chiropractic services had dramatically increased during the so-called boycott. It held that an adverse effect on competition is established by the findings that the AMA's conduct had raised chiropractors' costs, reduced the demand for chiropractic services, and reduced chiropractors' incomes and that a majority of physicians are AMA members. App. 20a-23a.

The Seventh Circuit similarly affirmed the District Court's findings that the AMA had not borne its burden of justifying these "anticompetitive effects" under the "patient care defense" or otherwise. It held that it was not sufficient that the AMA's ethical guidelines had no effect on price and were in fact motivated by a desire to improve the quality of physicians' services to benefit patients. The Seventh Circuit ruled that the evidence that health care consumers cannot evaluate the quality of health care services, and that they rely on physicians' reputations, was properly rejected because no consumer "study or data" was submitted to support this "speculative" theory. App. 15a. The Seventh Circuit further stated that because courts could not assess the scientific judgments underlying medical ethical guidelines, it could not approve them on this basis. App. 22a.

Like the District Court, the Seventh Circuit repeatedly relied on AMA conduct and documents that related only to its campaign to "contain and eliminate" chiropractic through legislation. See App. 19a. In particular, despite its holding that the District Court had misallocated the burden of proof by erroneously requiring defendants to prove that an injunction was not needed (App. 25a), the Seventh Circuit upheld the District Court's issuance of an injunction. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the District Court permissibly found that the "evidence" that the prior settlements "militat[ed] against the likelihood of recur-

rence" was "outweighed by [the] other evidence" that the AMA had not retracted its anti-chiropractic statements or repaired the damage to "chiropractors' reputations," but had continued to send out anti-chiropractic literature and had, in 1983, urged a more restrictive position before an accrediting body than had chiropractors. App. 27a-28a. These are activities that the AMA is free to engage in under the injunction. App. 136a.

### REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

This case presents vitally important issues under the Sherman Act and the First Amendment. Any professional ethical guideline, trade association rule, privately-adopted standard, or statement by such a body can be characterized as a "boycott." Whether it is an "agreement by screw manufacturers to standardize sizes" or an ethical guideline designed to prevent deception, each can be treated as a concerted "refus[al] to deal except upon stated terms" to the extent it affects primary conduct. R. Bork, *Antitrust Paradox*, p. 333 (1978).

But whatever label is used, such action often promotes efficiency and can be "essential to the effectiveness of many wholly beneficial economic activities." *Id.* at 332; L. Sullivan, *Antitrust*, pp. 275-82 (1976). As this Court has recognized, that is especially the case with purely precatory professional ethical guidelines that are in no way directed at the pricing of services but are designed to promote the quality, reliability, and safety of professional services and to prevent deception or fraud. *See* p. 17, *infra*.

However, the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the Sherman Act will severely inhibit the issuance of such professional ethical guidelines as well as any similar non-price "restraints" by trade associations, standard setting organizations, and others. Specifically, the Seventh Circuit rejected the rule in which a non-price restraint is valid if its primary purpose was to promote product safety and quality, if it had no adverse effect on price or output in any market, and if it had only incidental effects on the busi-

nesses of some individual competitors. Instead, the Seventh Circuit held that these incidental effects on individual competitors establish an antitrust violation unless the defendant bears an extraordinary burden of proof.

Further, in finding an antitrust violation and justifying an injunction, the Seventh Circuit has held that it is proper to consider pure speech: the dissemination of truthful information that did not constitute an ethical or other "restraint" on the conduct of physicians, but was designed to influence public opinion and to obtain legislation to contain and eliminate an unsafe or unscientific practice.

These holdings conflict with the prior decisions of this Court and of the Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits under both Section One of the Sherman Act and the First Amendment. Because the Seventh Circuit's holding deprives valuable, century-old professional activities of the "breathing room" that is essential to their continuation, the resolution of these conflicts in this case is a matter of paramount national importance.

#### **I. The Seventh Circuit's Interpretation Of Section One Of The Sherman Act Conflicts With Prior Decisions Of This Court And Other Courts Of Appeals.**

The Seventh Circuit held that the AMA's use of ethical standards to elevate the standards of physicians and to promote public trust in physicians' services involves "value[s] unrelated to free competition." App. 172a. It further held that the indirect effects of these guidelines on individual "competitors" violate the antitrust laws unless the AMA meets an extraordinary burden of proof.

However, the decisions of this Court and of at least three courts of appeals uniformly recognize that professional ethical guidelines like Principle 3 are classic examples of facially reasonable,

"nonprice" restraints. These cannot be held to violate the anti-trust laws unless the plaintiff shows that the defendant's primary purpose was predatory or that the guidelines nonetheless reduced output or increased price in the market as a whole.

1. This Court has squarely rejected the Seventh Circuit's holding that efforts to promote quality of professional services and prevent deception are "value[s] unrelated to free competition." App. 172a. The Court has stated that professional "[e]thical norms may serve to regulate and promote competition" and that "[c]ertainly, the problem of professional deception is a proper subject of an ethical canon." *National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States*, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978) (emphasis added). It has recognized that "[t]he community is concerned with the maintenance of professional standards which will insure . . . protection against . . . alluring promises of physical relief" that have no scientific basis. *Semler v. Oregon State Board of Dental Examiners*, 294 U.S. 608, 612 (1935).<sup>8</sup>

Ethical guidelines are subject to the same antitrust analysis, and same presumptions, that apply to all forms of concerted action. See P. Areeda, *Antitrust Law*, Vol. VII, ¶¶ 1500-1511 (1986). If a guideline involves a "naked restraint" on price and output, little analysis is required to condemn it, and the defendant has a substantial burden of justification. See *Professional Engi-*

<sup>8</sup>The Court has recognized that consumers lack the information required to assess professional services (*Dent v. West Virginia*, 129 U.S. 114, 122-23 (1889)), and that ethical guidelines can merely reflect the "consensus" of a profession on scientific questions involving the lack of efficacy of treatments (e.g., Laetrile) or deceptiveness of particular practices. *Semler*, 294 U.S. at 612.

This Court has thus taken judicial notice of these common sense propositions—as is proper in antitrust cases. See P. Areeda, *Antitrust Law*, Vol. VII, § 1507C (1986). Here, by contrast, the AMA introduced abundant evidence of the "informational asymmetry" that this Court has recognized in professional service markets, but the Seventh Circuit required the use of consumer studies to prove them. App. 15a.

neers (ethical rule against competitive bidding); *FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists*, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) (ethical rule against providing information relevant to reasonableness of price); *NCAA v. Board of Regents*, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (agreement to restrict price and output); see also *Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar*, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).

Conversely, plaintiffs have a significant burden if the guideline "facially appears" to promote quality, safety, or efficiency, to have no restrictive effect on price or output, and to have only incidental effects on any adversely affected parties. See *Broadcast Music v. CBS*, 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979); see also *Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing, Inc.*, 472 U.S. 284 (1985); P. Areeda, *Antitrust Law*, Vol. VII, ¶¶ 1507-08. In that event, the restriction is valid unless the plaintiff shows either (1) that the guideline is a "pretext"<sup>9</sup> and a "disguised naked restraint" because it was "aimed" not at creating efficiency, but at "destroying or coercing rivals by means that do not benefit consumers,"<sup>10</sup> or (2) that the guideline in fact operated to restrict output in the market as a whole, with the court to assess both the beneficial effects on "intra-brand" competition (among physicians)

<sup>9</sup>*Northwest Wholesale Stationers*, 472 U.S. at 296 n.7.

<sup>10</sup>R. Bork, *Antitrust Paradox*, p. 334; see *Hydrolevel Corp. v. American Society of Mechanical Engineers*, 635 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1980), *aff'd*, 456 U.S. 556 (1982); *Indian Head, Inc. v. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp.*, 817 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1987), *aff'd*, 486 U.S. 492 (1988)).

Indeed, where, as here, ethical guidelines facially rest on scientific judgment, this inquiry into the genuineness of the scientific judgment should represent the full extent of the judicial role. As the Seventh Circuit correctly recognized, courts cannot determine the questions of science underlying ethical guidelines. See App. 22a. This realization should have led the Seventh Circuit to limit the judicial examination to the *bona fides* of the underlying scientific judgment, whether it was in fact primarily based on concerns about quality, or whether the guideline was discriminatory. The Seventh Circuit, instead, launched an incursion into the "objective reasonableness" of *bona fide* scientific judgments and whether they are the "alternative" that is "least restrictive" of businesses of unscientific practitioners. App. 19a.

as well as any adverse effects on "interbrand" competition (between chiropractors and physicians).<sup>11</sup>

Contrary to the Seventh Circuit's decision, this Court's holdings establish that a restraint that has no unreasonable effect on competition is valid, whether or not it is the alternative that is "least restrictive" of the interests of the unscientific individual competitors.<sup>12</sup> It is the plaintiffs' burden to show unreasonableness.

The District Court instructed the jury under these standards in the first trial of this case, and it produced a jury verdict and initial judgment for the AMA. This analysis similarly requires the entry of judgment for the AMA now under the findings that the District Court made in the 1987 retrial.

The AMA's ethical guidelines were classic examples of "facially reasonable" and "non-price" restraints. On their face, the guidelines operated to assure the quality and reliability of the services that physicians either provide themselves or promote through referral or other joint practice relationships with non-physicians. All the guidelines did was exhort that these services be limited to methods of healing based on science (e.g., the manipulative therapies of physical therapists) and exclude methods that are unproven, worthless, or dangerous (e.g., claims that

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<sup>11</sup>*Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania*, 433 U.S. 36 (1977); see *NCAA v. Board of Regents*, 468 U.S. at 115 & n.55; *Northwestern Wholesale Stationers, Inc.*, 472 U.S. at 297-98.

<sup>12</sup>*Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.*, 433 U.S. at 58 n.29 (challenged conduct can satisfy the antitrust laws even though that conduct "was neither the least nor the most restrictive provision" available). See *Chicago Board of Trade v. United States*, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). See also P. Areeda, Vol. VII *Antitrust Law*, § 1505 & 1511.

Indeed, the invocation of the concept of "least restrictive" alternatives is otherwise ironic and improper. The concept was developed to assure adequate protection of First Amendment rights. Yet here the concept is being applied to inhibit socially valuable speech.

chiropractic cures disease). This further avoids the deception of patients that would result if physicians promoted treatments having no basis in science. The guideline was no different in principle than an agreement by manufacturers of screws to standardize sizes. See R. Bork, *Antitrust Paradox*, p. 333; L. Sullivan, *Antitrust*, pp. 175-82 (1976).

Further, as the Seventh Circuit acknowledged (App. 166a), the guidelines did not affect the relationships that chiropractors independently establish either with their patients or with suppliers of "inputs" that chiropractors need (e.g., x-ray machines), for physicians who complied with the guidelines imposed no economic coercion on third parties who deal with chiropractors. Compare App. 166a, with *Fashion Originators Guild of America v. FTC*, 312 U.S. 457 (1941). The AMA guidelines merely define the scientific services that physicians themselves offer or promote. Moreover, because physicians do not control any essential facilities and have no ability to prevent chiropractors from independently marketing their services to patients, chiropractic could, and did, grow during the period of the so-called "boycott"—as the District Court found. App. 74a. Any adverse effects on chiropractors were purely incidental.<sup>13</sup>

Against this background, antitrust liability should have been foreclosed (1) by the District Court's findings that the predominant purpose of the guidelines was to improve the quality of care that physicians provide patients and benefit consumers, and (2) by plaintiffs' failure to show, or even attempt to show, that the guidelines in fact operated to increase price or reduce overall output in any relevant health care market: i.e., the aggregate output of physicians, the physical therapists and other non-phy-

<sup>13</sup>Further, even these consequences were mitigated by the facts that the guidelines were never enforced against AMA members who associated with chiropractors and that, further, no physician needs to be an AMA member.

sicians to whom physicians referred patients under the former guidelines, as well as chiropractors.

Finally, this Court's decisions squarely foreclose the Seventh Circuit's holding that the unquantified increase in chiropractors' costs and reductions in their incomes constitute "adverse effects on competition." App. 12a (emphasis added). Rather, these epitomize the indirect and incidental effects on individual competitors that are inherent in any ancillary restraint. *See, e.g., Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc.*, 472 U.S. at 297. Because this Court has repeatedly held that the antitrust laws protect competition, not individual competitors (*see, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort*, 479 U.S. 104, 110 (1986)), these indirect effects cannot establish an antitrust violation.

2. The Seventh Circuit's interpretation also squarely conflicts with the holdings of the Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits. Each holds that concerted refusals to deal are lawful when, as here, their primary purpose is to promote safety and product quality, and when, as here, any adverse effects on individual competitors are indirect and incidental to these purposes.

The Ninth Circuit has so held in several cases. For example, in *Neeld v. National Hockey League*, 594 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1979), the Ninth Circuit upheld a by-law of the National Hockey League that excluded hockey players who have sight in only one eye. This rule adversely affected both the ability of "one-eyed players" to compete and their incomes. Yet the Court upheld the by-law because its "primary purpose" was found to be safety and because any "anticompetitive effect" was minimal and "incidental to the primary purpose of promoting safety." 594 F.2d at 1300. *Accord Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Association*, 358 F.2d 165, 170-71 (9th Cir. 1966); *see Neeld*, 594 F.2d at 1298-99 n.3 (collecting other such Ninth Circuit holdings). Thus, the Ninth Circuit has held that a professional ethical rule is valid if it "contribute[s]

directly to improving service to the public," even if it has incidental adverse effects on some individual competitors. *Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Association*, 549 F.2d 626, 632 (9th Cir. 1977).

Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has rejected the Seventh Circuit's approach in a series of decisions that hold that ethical guidelines that do not affect price and are designed to improve the quality of services are not violations of the Sherman Act. For example, *Hatley v. American Quarter Horse Association*, 552 F.2d 646 (5th Cir. 1977) rejected a claim that it was an unlawful "boycott" for defendants to exclude a quarter horse from racing because the horse had white markings beyond specified areas of its body. Despite the fact that the concerted refusal to deal had severely harmed the horse's owner, the court held the conduct was valid under the Sherman Act because defendants "sought to protect the industry and the general interest in improvement of the quarter horse breed" (*id.* at 653) and because their standards were not applied "in a discriminatory, arbitrary, or capricious fashion." *Id.* at 653-54.

Indeed, other Fifth Circuit decisions direct the very competitive inquiry that the District Court instructed the jury to follow in the first trial of this case, but that the Seventh Circuit held improper. In *Feminist Women's Health Center v. Mohammad*, 586 F.2d 530 (1978), the Fifth Circuit remanded a challenge to conduct implementing ethical standards for a determination of "the genuineness of the defendants' justification, the reasonableness of the standards themselves, and the manner of their enforcement." *Id.* at 547; *accord* App. 169a (quoting District Court's jury instructions).

Similarly, the Third Circuit has held that marketing restraints designed to promote product safety are valid. *See Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp.*, 425 F.2d 932 (3rd Cir. 1970) (*en banc*). The Court

cited this Third Circuit decision with approval in *Professional Engineers*, 435 U.S. at 696 n.22.<sup>14</sup>

Finally, other courts of appeals reject the Seventh Circuit's holding that a reasonable restraint is invalid unless it is the least restrictive alternative<sup>15</sup> and that the burden of proof can be shifted to defendant on any issue relevant to the antitrust calculus.<sup>16</sup> See also P. Areeda, Vol. VII, *Antitrust Law*, ¶¶ 1505 & 1511, p. 429 (burden is on plaintiff to prove the restraint is not "reasonably necessary" to advance a legitimate purpose and there is no requirement that the means be the "least restrictive" of the plaintiffs' interests).

3. The conflicts should be resolved in this case. Activities that are vitally "important in a profession's proper ordering" will be severely inhibited, and likely prevented, unless and until the Sev-

<sup>14</sup>These courts of appeals also squarely reject the Seventh Circuit's holding that the indirect and incidental effects on competitors' costs and incomes can constitute harm to competition. Indeed, because physicians control no essential facilities, the plaintiffs' claim of injury in this case was simply that they would look more attractive to patients, and make more money, if physicians promoted their services through referral relationships. However, as courts of appeals hold, "[a] plaintiff does not have a claim under the rule of reason simply because others refuse to promote [or] approve [his] products." *Consolidated Metal Products, Inc. v. American Petroleum Institute*, 846 F.2d 284, 293 (5th Cir. 1988); accord *Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst.*, 851 F.2d 478, 487 (1st Cir. 1988).

<sup>15</sup>*Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc.*, 792 F.2d 210, 229 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J.) ("Once it is clear that restraints can only be intended to enhance efficiency rather than to restrict output, the degree of restraint is a matter of business rather than legal judgment"); *American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc.*, 521 F.2d 1230, 1248-49 (3d Cir. 1975); *Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.*, 603 F.2d 263, 303 (2d Cir. 1979).

<sup>16</sup>*Betaseed, Inc. v. U & I, Inc.*, 681 F.2d 1203, 1228 (9th Cir. 1982) (burden of proof is on plaintiff to prove unreasonable purpose or effects); *Graphic Products Distributors, Inc. v. Itek Corp.*, 717 F.2d 1560 (11th Cir. 1983) (same).

enth Circuit's decision is reversed. *See Professional Engineers*, 435 U.S. at 700 (Blackmun, J., concurring).

Professions have adopted codes of ethics since the time of Hippocrates. Throughout its 143-year history, the AMA, like other professional associations, has disseminated ethical guidelines and scientific information to physicians in order to exhort them to act as fiduciaries, to serve the best interests of patients, and to refrain from conduct that would erode the professionalism and public trust that is essential to the efficient functioning of the health care market. These efforts reflect the fact that ethical canons are the most efficient way of disseminating important information that represents the "consensus" of the profession on fundamental matters of medical science and practice (*Semler v. Board of Dental Examiners*, 294 U.S. at 612), and a deeply held belief that the canons will, at the margins, influence all physicians (AMA members and non-members alike) in ways benefitting consumers and the profession alike.

The Seventh Circuit's analysis imposes a severe and impractical burden on this process. Any ethical norm or statement that counsels against an unscientific method of treatment can raise the costs, or reduce the incomes, of the practitioners of the unscientific method. Under the Seventh Circuit's holding, this fact alone will result in antitrust liability unless the defendant can bear the burden of persuading a court that the unquantifiable (albeit deeply felt) tendencies of such guidelines to promote quality outweigh the adverse effects of unscientific practitioners and are the "alternative" that is "least restrictive" of their interests. These risks are compounded by the Seventh Circuit's holding that, even when, as here, the guideline was found to be "objectively reasonable" at its inception, liability may be imposed unless the defendant proves its validity anew for each subsequent year or day that the "boycott" is deemed to be in effect. *See App. 19a; App. 84a.*

The magnitude of the burden that this holding imposes is vividly demonstrated by the Seventh Circuit's insistence on studies and consumer surveys to establish the proposition that consumers rely on physicians' referral recommendations and by the related requirement that "consumer education" programs should be attempted before professions attempt to use ethical guidelines directly to influence the conduct of the physicians upon whom consumers rely. App. 15a, 19a. The Seventh Circuit has required professions to pursue every imaginable alternative before adopting the most efficient means of promoting quality and preventing deception—and then satisfy a court that its choice was the objectively reasonable alternative that was "least restrictive." This burdens the process of formulating ethical norms to the point of near impossibility.

That is especially so because the antitrust liabilities that the profession risks are massive. Here, plaintiffs' claim for attorneys' fees alone is based on a "lodestar" of \$2.4 million, which they have inflated to a \$14 million claim. Because the potential liabilities are so great, socially valuable and pro-competitive professional self-regulation simply will not occur unless it is afforded the "breathing room" that the doctrine of ancillary restraints provides and that the Seventh Court's holding denies.

## **II. The Seventh Circuit's Reliance On Constitutionally Protected Speech In Finding Liability And Entering An Injunction Is Contrary To This Court's *Noerr-Pennington* Doctrine And To The Decisions Of A Number Of Courts Of Appeals.**

The beneficial professional activities that are at risk are not confined to promulgation of ethical codes. Here, in inferring the existence of a "conspiracy" between the AMA and its members and entering an injunction, the Seventh Circuit did not rely merely on the AMA's unenforced ethical guidelines. It also relied on activity that is pure speech and that has been repeatedly held

to promote competition: the publication (and non-retraction) of articles, pamphlets, and other statements that condemned chiropractic and were designed to influence public opinion and obtain legislation to contain and ultimately eliminate chiropractic.<sup>17</sup>

This is contrary to this Court's decisions in *Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.*, 365 U.S. 127 (1961), and its numerous progeny. For example, last term, in *FTC v. Superior Trial Court Lawyers Association*, 110 S.Ct. 768 (1990), this Court held that whereas a boycott designed to fix prices can be invalidated, an "association's efforts to publicize the boycott, to explain the merits of its cause, and to lobby . . . to enact favorable legislation . . . were activities that were fully protected by the First Amendment" and cannot be "condemned." *Id.* at 777.

Thus, courts of appeals hold that when an association is engaged in both protected speech and constitutionally unprotected ethical activities, a court must carefully distinguish one from the other. *Federal Prescription Services, Inc. v. American Pharmaceutical Corp.*, 663 F.2d 253, 261-68 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Inferences of anticompetitive conduct may not be drawn from prior constitutionally protected activity. *Greenwood Utilities Commission v. Mississippi Power Co.*, 751 F.2d 1484, 1503 (5th Cir. 1985).

However, the Seventh Circuit did exactly that. It relied extensively on the AMA's separate public informational and legislative

<sup>17</sup>See, e.g., *Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc.*, 486 U.S. 493, 500-01 (1988); *Maple Flooring Manufacturers Ass'n v. United States*, 268 U.S. 563, 583 (1925). Indeed, "it is an article of national faith that on balance the free flow of truth and reasoned opinion enhances competition." *Safecard Services, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co.*, 537 F. Supp. 1137, 1146 (E.D. Va. 1982) (emphasis in original), *aff'd mem.*, 705 F.2d 445 (4th Cir. 1983); see also *FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co.*, 386 U.S. 568, 603-04 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); *Consolidated Metal Products, Inc. v. American Petroleum Institute*, 846 F.2d 284, 296 (5th Cir. 1988).

campaign in condemning the AMA's ethical guidelines.<sup>18</sup> Most pertinently, the Seventh Circuit upheld an otherwise unjustifiable injunction on the basis of the AMA's dissemination of information that is constitutionally protected and pro-competitive.

Under Section 16 of the Clayton Act, injunctive relief may be entered only "against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws." A private plaintiff cannot obtain an injunction against discontinued conduct unless there is a "cognizable danger of recurrent violation"—i.e., "something more than the mere possibility which serves to keep the case alive." *United States v. W.T. Grant Co.*, 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953); see also *United States v. Oregon State Medical Society*, 343 U.S. 326 (1952) (denying anti-trust injunction against abandoned activities).

Here, a single fact should have foreclosed such an injunction. The AMA previously entered into three chiropractic antitrust settlements that prohibit any recurrence of the only conduct that could be found to violate the antitrust laws—its pre-1977 ethical guidelines—and that require the AMA to maintain the "current" position that was found to satisfy the antitrust laws. Indeed, because the 1981 settlement with the New York Attorney General explicitly so provides, there was no need for the 1987 retrial, much less for an injunction. "[T]he fact is that one [such] injunction is as effective as 100, and, concomitantly, that 100 injunctions are no more effective than one." *Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.*, 405 U.S. 251, 261 (1972).

However, while the Seventh Circuit held that the settlements are "evidence militating against the likelihood of recurrence," it

<sup>18</sup>For example, the Seventh Circuit expressly held that it was proper for the District Court to infer anticompetitive consequences from the AMA's success in enlisting economically disinterested groups such as HEW, the AFL-CIO, the Consumer Federation of America, and *Consumers Reports* in its legislative campaign against chiropractic and to rely on this fact in answering chiropractors' charges that the legislative campaign was based in economics. See App. 8a; 81a.

held that the District Court could find that this evidence was "outweighed" by "other evidence." App. 28a. But this "other evidence" is all constitutionally protected speech. It consists of "evidence" that the AMA had expressed certain views before an accrediting body in 1983, that it had continued to send out "anti-chiropractic literature" in response to consumer requests for information, that it had not "retracted" prior derogatory articles and statements, that it did not otherwise repair the "lingering effects" of the damage to "chiropractors' reputations" and incomes, and that the tone of its ethical changes was "begrudging." App. 26a-32a; App. 87a-98a. Because each of these items epitomizes conduct that the First Amendment protects, it was impermissible for the District Court to base an injunction on them.

Here, too, this error has profound consequences for activities of professional associations that benefit the public. A major part of the activities of the AMA and other professional associations consists of disseminating scientific information to physicians, pamphlets to consumers, and information to legislative and other government officials. If an unjustifiable injunction—and an award of attorneys' fees—can be predicated on such activities and on the AMA's *truthful* statements about chiropractic, it will profoundly inhibit efforts to disseminate information to consumers and legislatures alike.

# CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit should be granted.

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September 24, 1990

90-542

No. 90-

IN THE

# Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1990

AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,

*Petitioner,*

*v.*

CHESTER A. WILK, D.C.,  
JAMES W. BRYDEN, D.C.,  
PATRICIA B. ARTHUR, D.C. and  
MICHAEL D. PEDIGO, D.C.,

*Respondents.*

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To  
The United States Court Of Appeals For The Seventh Circuit

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
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IN THE  
**Supreme Court of the United States**

OCTOBER TERM, 1990

AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,

*Petitioner,*

v.

CHESTER A. WILK, D.C.,  
JAMES W. BRYDEN, D.C.,  
PATRICIA B. ARTHUR, D.C. and  
MICHAEL D. PEDIGO, D.C.,

*Respondents.*

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On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To  
The United States Court Of Appeals For The Seventh Circuit

**APPENDIX TO PETITION  
FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI**

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IN THE  
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

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Nos. 87-2672 & 87-2777

DR. CHESTER A. WILK, D.C.,  
DR. JAMES W. BRYDEN, D.C.,  
DR. PATRICIA B. ARTHUR, D.C., and  
DR. MICHAEL D. PEDIGO, D.C.

*Plaintiffs-Appellees,  
Cross-Appellants,*

*v.*

AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,

*Defendant-Appellant,  
Cross-Appellee.*

---

DR. CHESTER A. WILK, D.C.,  
DR. JAMES W. BRYDEN, D.C.,  
DR. PATRICIA B. ARTHUR, D.C., and  
DR. MICHAEL B. PEDIGO, D.C.,

*Plaintiffs-Cross-Appellants,*

*v.*

AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,  
JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION  
OF HOSPITALS, AMERICAN COLLEGE  
OF PHYSICIANS and AMERICAN ACADEMY  
OF ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS,

*Defendants-Cross-Appellees.*

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Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.  
No. 76 C 3777—**Susan Getzendanner**, Judge.

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ARGUED DECEMBER 1, 1988—DECIDED FEBRUARY 7, 1990

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Before WOOD, JR., RIPPLE, and MANION, *Circuit Judges*.

MANION, *Circuit Judge*. The district court held that the American Medical Association ("AMA") violated § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, by conducting an illegal boycott in restraint of trade directed at chiropractors generally, and the four plaintiffs in particular. The court granted an injunction under § 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26, requiring, among other things, wide publication of its order. The court held that two additional defendants, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals ("JCAH"), and the American College of Physicians ("ACP"), had acted independently of the AMA's boycott, and dismissed them from the case. *Wilk v. American Medical Association*, 671 F.Supp. 1465 (N.D. Ill. 1987). The AMA appeals the finding of liability, and contends that, in any event, injunctive relief is unnecessary. Plaintiffs cross-appeal against JCAH and ACP. We affirm.

## I.

We have observed before that "antitrust cases are notoriously extended." *Bali Memorial Hospital Inc. v. Mutual Hospital Insurance Inc.*, 784 F.2d 1325, 1333 (7th Cir. 1986). This case is no exception. Plaintiffs Chester A. Wilk, James W. Bryden, Patricia B. Arthur, and Michael D. Pedigo, are licensed chiropractors. Their complaint, originally filed in 1976, charged several defendants with violating §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2. It sought both damages and an injunction. (For a list of all the original defendants, see 671 F.Supp. at 1469-70. We discuss here only those relevant to this appeal.) At the first trial, plaintiffs' primary claim was that the defendants engaged in a conspiracy to eliminate the chiropractic profession by refusing to deal with plaintiffs and other chiropractors. Defendants accomplished this, plaintiffs claimed, by using former Principle 3 of the AMA's Principles of Medical Ethics, which prohibited medical physicians from associating professionally with

unscientific practitioners.<sup>1</sup> Plaintiffs contended that the AMA used Principle 3 to boycott chiropractors by labelling them "unscientific practitioners," and then advising its members, among others, that it was unethical for medical physicians to associate with chiropractors. According to the plaintiffs, the other defendants joined the AMA's boycott.

A jury returned a verdict for the defendants. An earlier panel of this court, however, reversed that judgment. *Wilk v. American Medical Association*, 719 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1983) (*Wilk I*). In reversing and ordering a new trial, we held that, in applying the rule of reason, the jury had been allowed to consider factors beyond the effect of the AMA's conduct on competition. The district court had improperly failed to confine the jury's consideration to the "patient care motive as contrasted with [the] generalized public interest motive." *Id.* at 229.

Just before the 1987 retrial, plaintiffs abandoned their damages claim and sought only injunctive relief. This shifted the case's focus from the past to the present regarding whether plaintiffs were entitled to an injunction under § 16 of the Clayton Act. After a lengthy bench trial, the district court concluded that the AMA, through former Principle 3, had unreasonably restrained trade in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. Because the district court adequately detailed the rather lengthy and complex facts of this case, we only briefly summarize them here. (The facts relevant to the claims against JCAH and ACP are set out in section IV of this opinion regarding plaintiffs' cross-appeal.)

In 1963 the AMA formed its Committee on Quackery ("Committee"). The Committee worked diligently to eliminate chiropractic. A primary method to achieve this goal

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<sup>1</sup> Former Principle 3 provided:

A physician should practice a method of healing founded on a scientific basis; and he should not voluntarily associate with anyone who violates this principle.

was to make it unethical for medical physicians to professionally associate with chiropractors. Under former Principle 3, it was unethical for medical physicians to associate with "unscientific practitioners." In 1966, the AMA's House of Delegates passed a resolution labelling chiropractic an unscientific cult.

The district court found the AMA's purpose in all of this was to prevent medical physicians from referring patients to chiropractors and from accepting referrals of patients from chiropractors, so as to prevent chiropractors from obtaining access to hospital diagnostic services and membership on hospital medical staffs, to prevent medical physicians from teaching at chiropractic colleges or engaging in any joint research, and to prevent any cooperation between the two groups in the delivery of health care services. Despite the Committee's efforts, chiropractic ultimately became licensed in all 50 states.

In 1977, the AMA's Judicial Council (now known as the Council on Judicial and Ethical Affairs, although we will use its previous name, as did the district court) adopted new opinions which permitted medical physicians to refer patients to chiropractors, as long as the physicians were confident that the services would be performed according to accepted scientific standards. In 1979, the AMA's House of Delegates begrudgingly adopted Report UU, stating that some things chiropractors did were not without therapeutic value; but even so, it stopped short of saying that these services were based on scientific standards. In 1980, the AMA revised its Principles of Medical Ethics, eliminating Principle 3. With this gesture, the district court found, the AMA's boycott ended. 671 F.Supp. at 1477. (We discuss plaintiffs' contention that the boycott continued until 1983 in the section addressing their cross-appeal against JCAH.)

At trial, the AMA raised the so-called "patient care defense" which this court had formulated in its earlier opinion in this case. *Wilk I*, 719 F.2d at 227. That defense required the AMA generally to show that it acted because

of a genuine, and reasonable, concern for scientific method in patient care and that it could not adequately satisfy this concern in a way that was less restrictive of competition. The district court rejected the defense. The court found the AMA failed to establish that throughout the relevant period (1966-1980) their concern for scientific methods in patient care had been objectively reasonable. The court also found the AMA similarly failed to show it could not adequately have satisfied its concern for scientific method in patient care in a manner less restrictive of competition than a nationwide conspiracy to eliminate a licensed profession. 671 F.Supp. at 1481-84.

The AMA settled three antitrust lawsuits in 1978, 1980, and 1986 brought by chiropractors, stipulating and agreeing that under the Judicial Council's current opinions, a medical physician could, without fear of discipline or sanction by the AMA, refer a patient to a licensed chiropractor when the physician believed that such a referral would benefit the patient. Similarly, physicians could also choose to accept or decline patients sent to them by chiropractors. The AMA also confirmed that physicians could teach at chiropractic colleges or seminars.

The AMA's present position regarding chiropractic is that it is ethical for a medical physician to professionally associate with chiropractors, if the physician believes that the association is in his patient's best interests. The district court found that the AMA had not previously communicated this position to its membership.

Based on these findings, the court held that the AMA and its members violated § 1 of the Sherman Act by unlawfully conspiring to restrain trade. According to the court, the AMA's boycott's purpose had been to eliminate chiropractic; the boycott had substantial anticompetitive effects; the boycott had no counterbalancing pro-competitive effects; and the AMA's unlawful conduct injured the plaintiffs.

Despite the fact that the district court found the conspiracy ended in 1980, it concluded that the illegal boy-

cott's "lingering effects" still threatened plaintiffs with current injury and ordered injunctive relief. The court concluded that the boycott caused injury to chiropractors' reputations which had not been repaired, and current economic injury to chiropractors. Further, the AMA never affirmatively acknowledged that there are no impediments to professional association and cooperation between chiropractors and medical physicians, except as provided by law. Thus, chiropractors continued to suffer because the boycott's negative effects (namely, inhibiting AMA members' individual decision-making in their relationships with chiropractors) still remained. The district court believed it was important that the AMA make its members aware of the present AMA position (i.e., it is ethical for medical physicians to professionally associate with chiropractors, if the physician believes it is in the patient's best interest) to eliminate the illegal boycott's lingering effects, and ordered an injunction designed to accomplish that result. 671 F.Supp. at 1507-08 (form of injunction).

## II.

### A. *Noerr-Pennington Doctrine*

The AMA complains that the district court relied almost entirely on AMA conduct that was protected under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine in finding that it illegally conspired to restrain trade. *Eastern Railroad Presidents' Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight Inc.*, 365 U.S. 127 (1961); *United Mineworkers v. Pennington*, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). See also *California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited*, 404 U.S. 508 (1972). The Noerr-Pennington doctrine protects businesses and other associations when they join to petition legislative bodies, administrative agencies, or courts for actions having anticompetitive consequences. *Id.* See also *Wilk I*, 719 F.2d at 229. The doctrine does not, however, protect purely private action, not genuinely aimed at prompting governmental action. See *Allied Tube and Conduit Corp. v. Indianhead, Inc.*, 486 U.S. 492 (1988).

The AMA contends that its statements regarding chiropractors were either statements about chiropractic's deficiencies or bona fide opinions on matters of public interest. The district court acknowledged the AMA's claim and, to the extent that the Committee's work regarding influencing legislation on the state and federal levels or in informational activities to inform the public on the nature of chiropractic was involved, it did not consider such conduct in reaching its decision. *Wilk*, 671 F. Supp. at 1473 n.2. But apart from the protected activity, the district court found substantial evidence of acts aimed at achieving the boycott's goals, not legislative action. *Id.* at 1473-77.

The court found that the AMA, through a resolution recommended by its Board of Trustees, and adopted by its House of Delegates, branded chiropractic "an unscientific cult." 671 F.Supp. at 1473. This implicitly invoked Principle 3's ethical proscription on professional association with chiropractors. Subsequent AMA action, *id.* at 1473-74, made clear the ethical bar on professional association (which included prohibiting medical physicians from referring patients to chiropractors, and from receiving referrals from chiropractors; providing diagnostic, laboratory, or radiology services for chiropractors; and from teaching chiropractors, or practicing together in any manner). The AMA widely circulated these documents. The court also found the Committee had regularly communicated with medical boards and associations, informing them that professional association between medical physicians and chiropractors was unethical. 671 F.Supp. at 1473.

We disagree with the AMA that the district court "repeatedly cite[d]" AMA documents which "focus[ed] entirely on the AMA's 'vigorous educational program' and on 'the necessity to move aggressively against chiropractic in the state legislatures.'" One such document the AMA points to is an internal AMA memorandum (PX 464, Jt. App. 776-77) from the Committee to the Board of Trustees, discussing the AMA's goal of "the containment of

chiropractic and, ultimately, the elimination of chiropractic." It expressly disavows any intention of using the document publicly. And while the document details some activity that was likely protected, it suggests that activity may have been done only "to minimize the chiropractic argument that the [AMA's] campaign is simply one of economics. . . ." (Jt. App. 777). Also falling outside of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine's protection is an AMA Judicial Council opinion, holding that it was unethical for medical physicians to professionally associate with chiropractors, which was circulated to AMA members and to 56 medical specialty boards (Jt. App. 801-03). Finally, in 1973, the AMA drafted "Standard X," which incorporated the unscientific practitioners' ethical bar into the JCAH accrediting standards. At the AMA's urging, JCAH adopted Standard X.

These activities were not aimed at obtaining legislative action. They were instead aimed at medical physicians and hospitals, cautioning them that it was unethical and indeed dangerous (the obvious inference from receiving health care from an unscientific cult) to associate professionally with chiropractors. In the face of the district court's specific findings on this issue, we cannot say it erred in relying on these activities.

#### B. *Unreasonable Restraint of Trade*

The central question in this case is whether the AMA's boycott constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade under § 1 of the Sherman Act. A restraint is unreasonable if it falls within the category of restraints held to be *per se* unreasonable, or if it violates what is known as the "Rule of Reason." *Federal Trade Commission v. Indiana Federation of Dentists*, 476 U.S. 447, 457-58 (1986); *NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma*, 468 U.S. 85, 103 (1984); *National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States*, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978). Restraints that are *per se* unreasonable include agreements whose nature and necessary effect are so plainly anti-competitive that no elaborate study of the industry or

restraint is needed to establish their illegality. *Nat'l Society of Professional Engineers*, 435 U.S. at 692. Concerted refusals to deal, described as group boycotts, typically are held unlawful *per se*. See *Indiana Federation of Dentists*, 476 U.S. at 458; *Consolidated Metal Products, Inc. v. American Petroleum Institute*, 846 F.2d 284, 290 (5th Cir. 1988). The *per se* rule avoids a burdensome inquiry into actual market conditions where the likelihood of anticompetitive effect is so obvious that the costs of determining whether the particular restraint at issue involves anticompetitive conduct is unwarranted. *Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde*, 466 U.S. 2, 15-16 n. 25 (1984). In contrast, the rule of reason category includes agreements whose competitive effect can only be evaluated by analyzing the facts peculiar to the business involved, the particular restraint's history, and the reasons it was imposed. *Nat'l Society of Professional Engineers*, 435 U.S. at 692. The test of legality under the rule of reason is whether the challenged conduct promotes or suppresses competition. *Id.* at 691; see also *Chicago Board of Trade v. United States*, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). The purpose of both approaches (*per se* or rule of reason) is to decide the restraint's competitive significance.

The Supreme Court historically has been slow to condemn rules adopted by professional associations as unreasonable *per se*. *Indiana Federation of Dentists*, 476 U.S. at 458. The Court is also reluctant to extend the *per se* rule to restraints imposed in the context of business relationships where a practice's economic impact is not immediately apparent. *Id.* Likewise, judicial inexperience with a particular arrangement cautions against extending the *per se* approach's reach insofar as judging the alleged restraint's lawfulness under the antitrust laws. *NCAA v. Board of Regents*, 468 U.S. at 100 n.21; see also *Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery and Printing Co.*, 472 U.S. 284, 294 (1985); *Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society*, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982); *Consolidated Metal Products*, 846 F.2d at 290. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has not refrained from applying

the *per se* approach solely on the grounds that the judiciary has little antitrust experience in the particular industry. See *Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society*, 457 U.S. at 349-51 (health care industry).

As a general rule, § 1 claims under the Sherman Act should be evaluated under the rule of reason unless the challenged action falls into the category of agreements which are deemed so harmful in their effect on competition so as to be conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and thus illegal without a detailed inquiry as to the precise harm they are alleged to have caused. *Northwest Wholesale Stationers*, 472 U.S. at 289-90; *Consolidated Metal Products*, 846 F.2d at 289-90. In this court's first go-round with this case, it held that the AMA's alleged boycott should be measured under the rule of reason. *Wilk I*, 719 F.2d at 221-22. We held that in the context of a learned profession, the nature and extent of the restraint's anticompetitive effect was too uncertain to warrant *per se* treatment. *Id.* at 221. Moreover, we looked to the Supreme Court's decisions involving professional associations (e.g., *Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society*, 457 U.S. 332; *Nat'l Society of Professional Engineers*, 435 U.S. 679; and *Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar*, 421 U.S. 773 (1975)), and noted the pains the Court had taken to carve out the possibility that a practice which might violate the Sherman Act in another context might not violate the Act when a learned profession was involved. *Wilk I*, 719 F.2d at 222. Thus, we concluded, "[a] canon of medical ethics purporting, surely not frivolously, to address the importance of scientific method gives rise to questions of sufficient delicacy and novelty at least to escape *per se* treatment." *Id.*

On appeal, plaintiffs urge that we change course and apply instead the *per se* rule. Plaintiffs claim that the Supreme Court's decisions in *Indiana Federation of Dentists* and *Northwest Wholesale Stationers* undercut our prior decision to treat this case under the rule of reason. But like the district court, we decline plaintiffs' invitation to revisit this issue. The Court in *Indiana Federation of Dentists* did not itself apply a *per se* rule. Nor

do we read either case as requiring us to employ the *per se* analysis on the facts of this case. And, in any event, even under the rule of reason, the boycott was unlawful. Cf. *Parts and Electric Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Electric, Inc.*, 826 F.2d 712, 720-21 (7th Cir. 1987) (because jury had concluded that the challenged action—an alleged tying arrangement—had unreasonably restrained competition, and had found liability under the rule of reason, it was unnecessary to decide the case under the *per se* inquiry).

The threshold issue in any rule of reason case is market power. *Schachar v. American Academy of Ophthalmology, Inc.*, 870 F.2d 397, 398 (7th Cir. 1989); *Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers Ltd.*, 822 F.2d 656, 666 (7th Cir. 1987) (*Valley II*). Market power is the ability to raise prices above the competitive level by restricting output. *NCAA v. Board of Regents*, 468 U.S. at 109 n.38; *Ball Memorial Hospital*, 784 F.2d at 1331. Whether market power exists in an appropriately defined market is a fact-bound question, and appellate courts normally defer to district court findings on that issue. *Jefferson Parish Hospital*, 466 U.S. at 42 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Here, the district court found the relevant market to be the provision of health care services to the American public nationwide, particularly care for the treatment of musculoskeletal problems. 671 F.Supp. at 1478. Several facts demonstrated the AMA's market power within the health care services market. AMA members constituted a substantial force in the provision of health care services in the United States and they constituted a majority of medical physicians. AMA members received a much greater portion of fees paid to medical physicians in the United States than non-AMA members. *Id.* The evidence showed that AMA members received approximately 50% of all fees paid to health care providers. Finally, according to plaintiffs' expert, the AMA enjoyed substantial market power. The district court also found there was substantial evidence that the boycott adversely affected competition, and that a showing of such adverse effects negated the need to

prove in any elaborate fashion market definition and market power, relying on *Indiana Federation of Dentists*, 476 U.S. at 460-62.

The AMA first contests the district court's finding of market power. It challenges the court's reliance on market share evidence as a basis to find market power and the district court's lumping together all AMA members as a group in assessing market share as a basis for its market power finding. We are not convinced the trial court erred. The district court properly relied on the AMA membership's substantial market share in finding market power. While we cautioned against relying solely on market share as a basis for inferring market power in *Ball Memorial Hospital*, 784 F.2d at 1336, we did not rule out that approach. *Id.* See also *Parts and Electric Motors*, 826 F.2d at 720 n. 7; *Valley II*, 822 F.2d at 666-67. This is especially so where there are barriers to entry and no substitutes from the consumer's perspective. *Ball Memorial Hospital*, 784 F.2d at 1336. Here the district court found the AMA membership was a substantial force in the American health care market, and that there were substantial barriers to the entry of new chiropractors into the field, such as substantial education requirements, 671 F.Supp. at 1479.

The district court also relied on substantial evidence of adverse effects on competition caused by the boycott to establish the AMA's market power. In *Indiana Federation of Dentists*, the Supreme Court explained that since "the purpose of the inquiries into market definition and market power is to determine whether an arrangement has the potential for genuine adverse effects on competition, 'proof of actual detrimental effects, such as reduction of output' can obviate the need for an inquiry into market power, which is but a 'surrogate for detrimental effects.'" 476 U.S. at 460-61, quoting 7 P. Areeda, *Anti-trust Law* ¶1511, p.429 (1986). See also, P. Areeda, *The Rule of Reason—A Catechism on Competition*, 55 Anti-trust Law Journal 571, 577 (1986). Thus, the district court recited the boycott's anticompetitive effects:

It is anticompetitive and it raises costs to interfere with the consumer's free choice to take the product of his liking; it is anticompetitive to prevent medical physicians from referring patients to a chiropractor; (Lynk—1427-28) it is anticompetitive to impose higher costs on chiropractors by forcing them to pay for their own x-ray equipment rather than obtaining x-rays from hospital radiology departments or radiologists in private practice; and it is anticompetitive to prevent chiropractors from improving their education in a professional setting by preventing medical physicians from teaching or lecturing to chiropractors. (Tr. 1409-22, 1424-31.)

671 F.Supp. at 1478-79. *See also Wilk I*, 719 F.2d at 214. These findings eliminated the need for an inquiry into market power.

The AMA's attempts to discredit the evidence the district court relied on to find anticompetitive effects are unavailing. The record does not show, as the AMA contends, that forcing chiropractors to purchase their own x-ray equipment had no adverse effect on chiropractors. And the district court did not clearly err in finding that former Principle 3 reduced demand for chiropractic services simply because there was evidence that a patient had seen a chiropractor before and after having seen a medical physician. Moving on, the AMA argues that even if market power existed, it escapes liability under the rule of reason because former Principle 3 had overriding pro-competitive effects. The AMA's argument is not unpersuasive in the abstract; but unfortunately it relies on evidence which the district court rejected as "speculative." 671 F.Supp. at 1479. Essentially, the AMA argues that the market for medical services is one where there is "information asymmetry." In other words, health care consumers almost invariably lack sufficient information needed to evaluate the quality of medical services. This increases the risk of fraud and deception on consumers by unscrupulous health care providers possibly causing what the AMA terms "market failure": consumers avoiding necessary

treatment (for fear of fraud), and accepting treatment with no expectation of assured quality. The AMA's conduct, the theory goes, ensured that physicians acquired reputations for quality (in part, by not associating with unscientific cultists), and thus allowed consumers to be assured that physicians would use only scientifically valid treatments. This in effect simultaneously provided consumers with essential information and protected competition.

Getting needed information to the market is a fine goal, but the district court found that the AMA was not motivated solely by such altruistic concerns. Indeed, the court found that the AMA intended to "destroy a competitor," namely, chiropractors. It is not enough to carry the day to argue that competition should be eliminated in the name of public safety. See *Nat'l Society of Professional Engineers*, 435 U.S. 679.

But the AMA persists in arguing that pro-competitive effects were achieved by the boycott through what its expert called "nonverbal communication." In rejecting this argument, the district court stated that the AMA's expert's

theory is that the boycott constituted nonverbal communication which informed consumers about the differences between medical physicians and chiropractors, and that this had a pro-competitive effect. (Tr. 1411-12.) I reject this opinion as speculative. (Tr. 1434-43.) Mr. Lynk [William J. Lynk, the AMA's expert] neither conducted nor read any studies regarding the efficacy of such nonverbal communications. *Id.* He neither conducted nor read any surveys of consumer opinion to determine whether consumers were confused about the differences between medical physicians and chiropractors. (*Id.*) I saw no evidence of any such confusion during the trial. Mr. Lynk's opinion does not accord with common sense. A nationwide conspiracy intended by its participants to contain and eliminate a licensed profession cannot be justified on the basis of Mr. Lynk's personal opinion

that it was pro-competitive, nonverbal communication to consumers.

671 F.Supp. at 1479. We find the district court's reasoning compelling.

The AMA, however, argues that the district court missed the boat in rejecting Mr. Lynk's theory. The relevant question, according to the AMA, is not whether consumers would perceive any differences between physicians and chiropractors today; rather, it is whether they would ever view a physician's *referral* of a patient to a chiropractor as a physician's endorsement of the chiropractor's practices. But the AMA misses the essence of the district court's ruling. The trial court rejected the AMA's theory as speculative because Lynk neither conducted nor read any studies regarding nonverbal communications; his views were only his "personal opinion." 671 F.Supp. at 1479. In fact, Lynk testified that an empirical study could not even be performed to determine the pro-competitive effects of Principle 3. (Jt. App. at 351-52.) Thus, even if the AMA is right in asserting that the relevant inquiry is how a physician's referral would be viewed by the consumer, there was no underlying study or data to support its theory.

Moreover, Lynk's testimony did not bear out the AMA's assertions regarding the "relevant question." The AMA says that it is irrelevant to its theory whether health care consumers perceive any differences between chiropractors and medical physicians, and that Lynk's testimony went to the role of reputation and information in health care service markets. But in testifying as to the pro-competitive function of standards generally, Lynk testified that they improve consumer information by making it possible for consumers to make more informed choices "about what it is they are getting from alternative sellers of the same or substitute products to the extent that it allows them to make better choices." (Jt. App. 343.) Lynk also testified that one of the interests served by former Principle 3 was that it would clarify the distinctions between the profession of medicine and alternative professions "that are not

based on medical science but which can create the appearance that they are." (Jt. App. 351.) This seems to go precisely to the perceived differences between chiropractors and medical physicians.

In sum, we agree with the district court that the AMA's boycott constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade under § 1 of the Sherman Act under the rule of reason. Therefore, the district court's findings that the AMA's boycott was anticompetitive, and was not counter-balanced by any pro-competitive effects were not erroneous. *Nat'l Society of Professional Engineers*, 435 U.S. at 691.

### C. Patient Care Defense

In the AMA's first appeal, we modified the rule of reason to allow the AMA to justify its boycott of chiropractors if it could show that it was motivated by a concern for "patient care." *Wilk I*, 719 F.2d at 227. We were persuaded that measuring former Principle 3's reasonableness required a more flexible approach than the traditional rule of reason inquiry provided. *Id.* at 226-27. Thus, we explained that if plaintiffs met their burden of persuasion on remand by showing that former Principle 3 and the implementing conduct had restricted competition rather than promoting it, the burden of persuasion would shift to the defendants to show:

(1) that they genuinely entertained a concern for what they perceive as scientific method in the care of each person with whom they have entered into a doctor-patient relationship; (2) that this concern is objectively reasonable; (3) that this concern has been the dominant motivating factor in defendants' promulgation of Principle 3 and in the conduct intended to implement it; and (4) that this concern for scientific method in patient care could not have been adequately satisfied in a manner less restrictive of competition.

*Id.* at 227.

In this appeal, plaintiffs ask us to reconsider the patient care defense, urging that three subsequent Supreme Court decisions have implicitly rejected it; see *Patrick v. Burget*, 486 U.S. 94, 104-05 (1988); *Indiana Federation of Dentists*, 476 U.S. at 458-60; and *Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2*, 466 U.S. at 25 n. 41. While these decisions may cast doubt on the patient care defense's continuing vitality, they did not address the specific issue of whether the patient care defense on the facts in this case would be allowed. While we acknowledge that there has been some academic criticism of the defense (see Kissam, *Antitrust Boycott Doctrine*, 69 Iowa L. Rev. 1165, 1214-16 (1984); Havighurst, *Doctors and Hospitals; An Antitrust Perspective on Traditional Relationships*, 1984 Duke L.J. 1071, 1103 n.101 (1984)), we need not revisit the issue because the district court's finding that the AMA did not satisfy its burden of persuasion under the defense was not clearly erroneous.

The district court held that the AMA failed to meet the defense's second and fourth elements: that its concern for scientific method in patient care was objectively reasonable, and that the concern for scientific method in patient care could not have been satisfied adequately in a manner less restrictive of competition, respectively. While only those two rulings are at issue, it is useful to summarize the district court's treatment of the entire defense.

Although doubting the AMA's genuineness regarding its concern for scientific method in patient care, the district court concluded that the AMA established that element. While it was attacking chiropractic as unscientific, the AMA simultaneously was attacking other unscientific methods of disease treatment (e.g., the Krebiozen treatment of cancer), and, as the district court noted, the existence of medical standards or guidelines against unscientific practice was relatively common. 671 F.Supp. at 1481. The court, however, found that the AMA failed to carry its burden of persuasion as to whether its concern for scientific method in patient care was objectively reasonable.

The court acknowledged that during the period that the Committee on Quackery was operating, there was plenty of material supporting the belief that all chiropractic was unscientific. But, according to the court (and this is unchallenged), at the same time, there was evidence before the Committee that chiropractic was effective, indeed more effective than the medical profession, in treating certain kinds of problems, such as back injuries. The Committee was also aware, the court found, that some medical physicians believed chiropractic could be effective and that chiropractors were better trained to deal with musculoskeletal problems than most medical physicians. Moreover, the AMA's own evidence suggested that at some point during its lengthy boycott, there was no longer an objectively reasonable concern that would support a boycott of the entire chiropractic profession. Also important was the fact that "it was very clear" that the Committee's members did not have open minds to pro-chiropractic arguments or evidence. 671 F.Supp. at 1481-83.

Next, the court found that the AMA met its burden in establishing that its concern about scientific method was the dominant motivating factor for promulgating former Principle 3, and in the conduct undertaken and intended to implement it. 671 F.Supp. at 1483. But even so, the court acknowledged there was evidence showing that the AMA was motivated by economic concerns, as well.

Finally, the court concluded that the AMA failed to meet its burden in demonstrating that its concern for scientific method in patient care could not have been satisfied adequately in a manner less restrictive of competition. The court stated that the AMA had presented no evidence of other methods of achieving their objectives such as public education or any other less restrictive approach. 671 F.Supp. at 1483.

The AMA attacks the district court's findings as to the second element (concern for scientific method as objectively reasonable), claiming that the court rewrote the element to require the AMA to show its concern with chi-

ropractic (rather than with scientific patient care) was objectively reasonable. *Wilk*, 671 F.Supp. at 1481. We disagree. The AMA's claim in passing that the court "misconceiv[ed]" the defense is barely explained in one of its 67 footnotes; but in any event, we think the district court was true to the defense and adequately supported its holding with several key factual determinations. It recited the evidence directly at odds with the AMA's belief that all chiropractic was unscientific. 671 F.Supp. at 1481-83. The AMA does not challenge the district court's findings, so those findings must stand. Beyond that, the AMA reads this element too rigidly. The issue here is whether its concern for scientific method in the care of patients was objectively reasonable. In the context of this particular case, then, the question is whether that concern justified a boycott of chiropractic. Based on the undisputed facts, it did not.

The AMA's challenge to the fourth element (concern for scientific method in patient care could not have been adequately satisfied in a manner less restrictive of competition) is equally unpersuasive. The AMA completely fails to offer any evidence to support its burden. Instead, it argues that its former guideline had at most a *de minimis* effect on chiropractors' costs, and thus could not be treated as an attempt to contain and eliminate the entire chiropractic profession. This, however, ignores the fact that the AMA's self-proclaimed and described "mission" was to contain, and ultimately eliminate chiropractic. (Jt. App. 776.) The AMA participated in a nationwide boycott and conspiracy designed to contain and eliminate a profession that was licensed in all fifty states at the time the Committee on Quackery was disbanded. As the district court held, it is "a difficult task" to argue that this was "the only way to satisfy the AMA's concern for the use of scientific method in patient care." 671 F.Supp. at 1483. Furthermore, we reject the AMA's attempts to minimize the effect its boycott had on competition. The district court found the boycott had several anticompetitive

effects, such as raising costs by interfering with consumers' free choice, which are unrefuted. 671 F.Supp. at 1478-79, 1480.<sup>2</sup>

#### D. Antitrust Injury

To seek an injunction under § 16 of the Clayton Act, a private plaintiff must allege "threatened loss or damage 'of the type the antitrust laws were designed to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful.'" *Cargill Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado Inc.*, 479 U.S. 104, 113 (1986) (quoting *Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.*, 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977)). Here, the district court concluded that plaintiffs had shown the kind of injury the antitrust laws were designed to prevent. 671 F.Supp. at 1479-80. Plaintiff's economic expert (Stano) compared chiropractors' incomes with podiatrists' and optometrists' incomes (comparable limited license practitioners) over the relevant period of time and concluded that chiropractors' incomes had been lower than both. This Styno viewed as consistent with plaintiffs' boycott theory.

<sup>2</sup> The AMA's assertion that former Principle 3 operated to prevent the "free-riding" that would have occurred if physicians had referred patients to chiropractors misses the mark. Apparently, the AMA believes that if physicians were forced to refer patients to chiropractors, chiropractors would benefit (the "free ride") from the physicians' reputation for providing quality medical service, without necessarily deserving that reputation themselves. But neither this court nor the district court would require the AMA to endorse chiropractic, nor do we mandate that there be referrals. We simply speak to the restraint on professional association, and say that physicians, hospitals, and other institutions must be free to make their own uncoerced decisions on whether to professionally associate with chiropractors. We do not compel medical physicians to praise or sponsor chiropractors' work. See *Schachar v. American Academy of Ophthalmology*, 870 F.2d 397, 399 (7th Cir. 1989). We do not even require "cooperation or friendliness." *Id.* We also note that the AMA apparently misconceives the role of the free-riding analysis in antitrust law. See *Premier Electrical Construction Co. v. National Electrical Contractors Ass'n Inc.*, 814 F.2d 358, 368-70 (7th Cir. 1987) (explaining the concept).

He also concluded that a jump in chiropractors' incomes during the 1978-1980 period was consistent with the acknowledged lessening of the boycott by the AMA during that time. Lynk, the AMA's economic expert, though he faulted the data plaintiffs' expert relied upon, agreed that if he were to compare chiropractors' incomes to comparable groups, he also would include podiatrists and optometrists (although he stated he would seek further explanations for differences between the groups' incomes). In the district court's view, further support for plaintiffs' theory of harm was the "very strong evidence of a pervasive, nationwide, effective conspiracy which by its very nature would have affected the demand curve for chiropractic services and adversely affected the income of chiropractors." 671 F.Supp. at 1480. Finally, the district court added, there was evidence of injury to reputation suffered by chiropractors. (Both economic experts, according to the court, believed that injury to reputation would constitute an anticompetitive effect of the boycott.)

The AMA argues that plaintiffs failed to establish an antitrust injury. Essentially the argument goes somewhat like this. This case is not a class action; rather, it involves only the four named plaintiffs. The only harm here would have been to "scientific" chiropractors. Because, according to the AMA (but not the district court), plaintiffs were not and are not "scientific practitioners," they could not have suffered any injury from former Principle 3. If any chiropractors could establish antitrust injury, it would be those who have "renounced the theory of subluxations and limit their practices to conservative physical therapy modalities." The AMA's argument thus hinges on its lengthy assertion that the four plaintiffs are "unscientific practitioners." The problem with this approach, however, is that the district court did not agree with the AMA that the plaintiffs were "unscientific" practitioners. Although the court acknowledged that there was some evidence that the plaintiffs did not use common methods in treating common symptoms, and that the treatment of patients appeared to be undertaken on an ad hoc rather than on a

scientific basis, it did not go so far as the AMA believes, and establish or find that the plaintiffs in this case were “unscientific practitioners.” Indeed, it expressly held that no one involved in the case, including the plaintiffs, believed that chiropractic treatment should be used for treatment of diseases such as cancer, diabetes, heart disease, high blood pressure, and infections. 671 F.Supp. at 1482. Regardless, neither the district court, nor this court is equipped to determine whether chiropractic is “scientific” or not. So the AMA’s argument must fail in any event. We see the AMA’s argument here as yet another invitation to tackle the question of whether chiropractic is “either good or bad, efficacious or deleterious, quackery or science.” 671 F.Supp. at 1481. The district court repeatedly stated it was not deciding whether chiropractic was scientific. 671 F.Supp. 1482 n. 8, 1482-83, 1506-07. Yet both sides (below it was plaintiffs, 671 F.Supp. at 1482; here, it is the AMA) continue to color their arguments with how they view their own, or the other side’s, profession. Like the district court, we do not see our task as deciding whether or not chiropractic is scientific.

The AMA also quibbles with the evidence of antitrust injury. The district court rejected the same arguments. 671 F.Supp. at 1480. We too are unpersuaded. The AMA offers no good reason why we should accept its expert’s opinion over that of the plaintiffs’, and we decline to do so. But beyond that, the district court relied on more than just plaintiffs’ expert in determining there was an antitrust injury. It also relied on the evidence of the “pervasive, nationwide, effective conspiracy which by its very nature would have affected the demand curve for chiropractic services and therefore adversely affected income of chiropractors.” 671 F.Supp. at 1480. (Further, we also note that the AMA is far too generous in its characterization of plaintiffs’ expert’s “concession” that the AMA’s conduct was “lawful and pro-competitive.”)

The evidence established that all chiropractors’ incomes were lower than those of comparable limited license practitioners. And the evidence was that all chiropractors suf-

ferred an injury to their reputation. 671 F.Supp. at 1480. Indeed, the district court found that the individual plaintiffs suffered rejections and lost opportunities and that "the individual plaintiffs have been personally harmed, and continue to be personally threatened, by a lack of association with members of the AMA caused by the boycott and the lingering effects of the boycott." 671 F.Supp. at 1486. Moreover, the court stated that "[t]he activities of the AMA undoubtedly have injured the reputation of chiropractors generally. This kind of injury more likely than not was sustained by the four plaintiffs." *Id.* This directly refutes the AMA's contention that there was nothing but a showing of "classwide injury."<sup>3</sup>

### III.

#### *Entitlement To Injunctive Relief*

Section 16 of the Clayton Act provides that:

Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief . . . against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws . . . when and under the same conditions and principles as injunctive relief against threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage is granted by courts of equity, under the rules governing such proceedings . . . .

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<sup>3</sup> The AMA cites *United States v. Borden Co.*, 347 U.S. 514 (1954), for the proposition that a showing of classwide injury is insufficient to support injunctive relief for an individual plaintiff. While that might be true, *Borden* does not say so. There, the Supreme Court held that in light of the differences in the interests sought to be vindicated by the government and by private litigants in actions under the Clayton Act, the government was not precluded from obtaining injunctive relief against price discrimination simply because, in an earlier private action, a decree enjoined the conduct in question. At any rate, the trial court here relied on more than evidence of "classwide injury" in finding that these four plaintiffs were injured by the AMA's unlawful boycott.

15 U.S.C. § 26. Although the district court concluded that the AMA's boycott ended in 1980 (when former Principle 3 was eliminated), it held that an injunction nevertheless was necessary in this case.

The trial court concluded there were lingering effects of the AMA's conspiracy; that the AMA never acknowledged the lawlessness of its past conduct, and in fact continued to maintain that it had always been in compliance with the antitrust laws; that the AMA had never affirmatively stated that it was ethical for medical physicians to professionally associate with chiropractors; that the AMA had never publicly stated to its members the admissions made in the trial court about chiropractic's improved nature, despite the fact that the AMA currently claims that it made changes in its policy in recognition of chiropractic's change and improvement; that the AMA never publicly retracted articles such as "The Right and Duty of Hospitals to Deny Chiropractor Access to Hospitals"; that a medical physician had to read very carefully the current AMA Judicial Council opinions to realize that there had been a change in the treatment of chiropractors; and, finally, that the AMA's systematic, long-term wrongdoing and long-term intent to destroy chiropractic "suggest[ed]" that an injunction was appropriate. 671 F.Supp. at 1488. The court believed that it was important to make AMA members aware of the AMA's present position—that it is ethical for medical physicians to professionally associate with chiropractors, if the physician believes it is in his patient's best interest—to eliminate the unlawful boycott's lingering effects. The injunction, then, is to "assure that the AMA does not interfere with the right of a physician, hospital or other institution to make an individual decision on the question of professional association." 671 F.Supp. at 1507.

The injunction requires the AMA to arrange publication of the district court's order in the *Journal of the American Medical Association*, mail the order to each of the AMA's members, and revise the current opinions of

the AMA's Council on Judicial and Ethical Affairs (formerly the Judicial Council) so that it states the AMA's present position on chiropractic in a separate provision, with a heading and index references referring to chiropractors. 671 F.Supp. at 1507-08.

The AMA correctly points out that the district court wrongly placed the burden of proof on the AMA in deciding whether injunctive relief was appropriate in this case. But the AMA does not argue how, if at all, the court's error prejudiced it. We do not think the AMA was prejudiced.

The district court treated the AMA's argument in this respect as an argument that the claim for injunction was moot instead of an argument that no injunctive relief was necessary. Although these concepts are similar, they are analytically distinct, and a court could find that a case is not moot yet deny injunctive relief. See *United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Association, Inc.*, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968); *W.T. Grant*, 345 U.S. at 633; *TRW, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission*, 647 F.2d 942, 953-54 (9th Cir. 1981); *SCM Corporation v. Federal Trade Commission*, 565 F.2d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1977). There are practical differences between the concepts, as well. The mootness burden is a heavy one, and the *defendant* must show that there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated. By contrast, the burden for showing whether injunctive relief is necessary is on the *moving party*; here plaintiffs. The district court wrongly placed the burden of persuasion on the AMA. 671 F.Supp. at 1484. But no matter which party bore the burden on this issue, the district court's ultimate findings leave no doubt that injunctive relief was appropriate.

A party moving for an injunction must show some cognizable danger of recurrent violation, that is, something more than the mere possibility which serves to keep the case alive. *W.T. Grant*, 345 U.S. at 633. "To be considered are the bona fides of the expressed intent to comply, the effectiveness of the discontinuance and, in some cases, the

character of the past violations.” *Id.* Courts require “clear proof” that an unlawful practice has been abandoned, and must guard against attempts to avoid injunctive relief “by protestations of repentance and reform, especially when abandonment seems timed to anticipate suit, and there is a probability of resumption.” *Oregon State Medical Society*, 343 U.S. at 333. These issues are committed to the trial court’s discretion. *Id.* at 634; *see also U.S. v. Concentrated Phosphate*, 393 U.S. at 203-04. Thus, we will not substitute our judgment for the district court’s. The question is not how we would rule if we were addressing the question in the first instance. Rather, the question is whether the district court’s decision was reasonable. *See United States v. United States Currency in the Amount of \$103,387.27*, 863 F.2d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1988).

We believe the court’s decision was reasonable. It found a cognizable danger of recurrent violations, was unimpressed with the AMA’s expressed intent to comply with antitrust laws, was unpersuaded by the effectiveness of the AMA’s discontinuance of its boycott, and properly considered the systematic and long-term nature of the boycott. *W.T. Grant*, 345 U.S. at 633.

The AMA characterizes many of its challenges to the district court’s decision to order an injunction as attacks on the court’s findings of fact. Thus, for example, the AMA argues that the district court “erroneously found a risk of recurrence.” But the facts are relatively undisputed. The AMA is really challenging the district court’s decision that those facts supported an injunction.

In this regard, the district court found that the AMA’s behavior in connection with the 1983 revision of the JCAH accreditation standards for hospitals indicated the AMA’s likelihood of returning to its old (anti-chiropractic) ways. (The facts surrounding the 1983 revisions are set out more fully in section IV below, in connection with plaintiffs’ cross appeal against JCAH.) The AMA’s original position toward those standards was favorable to chiropractors in that it supported the JCAH position that each hospital

be permitted to decide for itself, under applicable state law, which licensed health care providers would be allowed hospital privileges and membership on the medical staff. However, after an outcry from its membership the AMA was forced to change its original position to satisfy its constituents, namely, medical physicians; it thus sought to have JCAH approve a more restrictive accreditation standard which would ensure medical and osteopathic physicians control of the medical staff and patient care in hospitals. 671 F.Supp. at 1476, 1488. This incident led the trial court to conclude that the AMA's "present assurances [were] good only until the next chiropractic battle." *Id.* at 1488.

The facts surrounding the 1983 JCAH revisions are not in dispute. Even so, the AMA terms the district court's reliance on this incident as "baffling." Thus, it contends that even under the district court's injunction order it will still be allowed to urge restrictions on chiropractors before recognized accrediting bodies, and that its conduct regarding the JCAH standards would be consistent with that mandate. The AMA also argues that the district court's conclusion that the JCAH's 1983 revision was reasonable, indeed proper, validates the AMA's call to action to ensure medical and osteopathic physician control of medical staff and patient care. We disagree.

While the AMA, under the district court's order, may in the future be free to urge restrictions or take positions with respect to chiropractic, the AMA's action with respect to the 1983 JCAH revisions must be viewed in the context in which it occurred. It came on the heels of a lengthy illegal boycott of chiropractors. And although the AMA believed the JCAH's initial standards were consistent with the then current antitrust legal climate, it was unable to maintain its position in the face of a barrage of criticism from its members. 671 F.Supp. at 1476-77. That coupled with the fact that the district court found the AMA even through the date of trial continued to respond to requests for information on chiropractic by sending out anti-chiropractic literature, *id.*, was enough for the

district court properly to conclude that there was evidence that suggests a possible return to the AMA's former policies. Finally, the JCAH's action in 1983, although found reasonable and proper, is wholly distinct from the AMA's action. JCAH was an independent body, motivated by completely different concerns. Thus, while the AMA was attempting to contain and eliminate competitors (i.e., chiropractic), JCAH was acting only to assure that responsibility for patient care in acute care hospitals remained in the hands of medical and osteopathic physicians, the only practitioners who could perform that acute care.

In challenging the need for an injunction, the AMA also contends that it is legally bound by settlements in three separate chiropractic antitrust lawsuits to the position that chiropractors are licensed limited practitioners and that no form of professional association with chiropractors is unethical. These settlements, according to the AMA, eliminate any threat that the boycott will recur. Again, we disagree. Although the settlements may be some evidence militating against the likelihood of recurrence, it is not so strong as to reverse the district court's determination. The trial court considered this evidence, 671 F.Supp. at 1487-88, but found it was outweighed by other evidence (recited above in connection with the JCAH 1983 revisions) of a risk of a return to the AMA's former policies. *Id.* at 1488. Notably, the district court found it relevant that in all of the settlements, there was no admission of liability.

The AMA additionally argues that the permanence of its post-1977 guidelines (and hence the unlikelihood of a return to its old ways) is emphasized by the "fact" that they were undertaken entirely independently of this lawsuit. However, the district court never found this "fact"; and the district court could properly be skeptical of the AMA's "protestations of repentance and reform," *Oregon State Medical Society*, 343 U.S. at 333, especially since the AMA's change of position occurred not too long after this suit was filed in 1976.

Another factor supporting the injunction is that the AMA still vigorously maintains that its boycott activity was lawful, and has never acknowledged its past conduct's lawlessness. This coupled with the AMA's begrudging statement on professional association with chiropractors was sufficient for the district court to doubt (1) the AMA's intent to comply with the antitrust laws in the future absent an injunction, and (2) the effectiveness of the discontinuation of its illegal conduct. Importantly, the district court found that even as of the trial date, the AMA continued to respond to requests for information on chiropractic by sending outdated anti-chiropractic literature. Further, none of the AMA's policies contain any affirmative statement that the boycott is over. An example of the AMA's begrudging and ineffective removal of the ethical bar to professional association is Opinion 3.01 of its Judicial Council. The AMA cites Opinion 3.01 as evidence that its revised guideline has eliminated the prior guidelines on chiropractic, and removed any negative references to specific licensed limited practitioners. But as the district court noted, Opinion 3.01 is entitled "Nonscientific Practitioners."<sup>4</sup> Thus, the AMA member still must look under

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<sup>4</sup> In 1980, the AMA adopted a new set of "Principles of Medical Ethics" that replaced the former "Principles" that had been in place since 1957. The 1980 "Principles" provide in part:

**3.00 OPINIONS ON INTERPROFESSIONAL RELATIONS**

**3.01. NONSCIENTIFIC PRACTITIONERS.** It is wrong to engage in or to aid and abet in treatment which has no scientific basis and is dangerous, is calculated to deceive the patient by giving him false hope, or which may cause the patient to delay in seeking proper care until his condition becomes irreversible.

Physicians should also be mindful of state laws which prohibit a physician from aiding and abetting an unlicensed person in the practice of medicine, aiding or abetting a person with a limited license in providing services beyond the scope of his license, or undertaking the joint medical treatment of patients under the foregoing circumstances.

(Footnote continued on following page)

the heading "Nonscientific Practitioners" to discover that it is now permissible to associate with chiropractors. Any beneficial effect of Opinion 3.01 likely is lost because it is buried in a category almost certain to conjure up the ethical prohibitions of the past.

Yet another factor supporting an injunction is what the district court termed the boycott's "lingering effects." The court found not only that plaintiffs had been personally harmed by the boycott, but that they continued to be personally harmed and threatened by a lack of association with members of the AMA as a result of the boycott and its lingering effects. 671 F.Supp. at 1486. The boycott, while it was in full bloom, "more likely than not affected

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<sup>4</sup> *continued*

A physician is otherwise free to accept or decline to serve anyone who seeks his services, regardless of who has recommended that the individual see the physician.

**3.02 OPTOMETRY.** It is not unethical for an ophthalmologist to employ an optometrist as ancillary personnel to assist him provided the optometrist is identified to patients as an optometrist. A physician may send his patient to a qualified and ethical optometrist for optometric services. The physician would be ethically remiss, of course, if before doing so he did not insure that there was an absence of any medical reason for his patient's complaint, and he would be equally remiss if he sent a patient without having made a medical evaluation of the patient's condition.

Physicians may teach in recognized schools of optometry for the purpose of improving the quality of optometric education. The scope of this teaching may embrace subjects within the legitimate scope of optometry which are designed to prepare students to engage in optometry within the limits prescribed by law.

(Jt. App. 1416.) Compare the treatment of optometrists and chiropractors. One has to look in the category of "nonscientific practitioners" to learn that it is ethical to associate with chiropractors. But there is a separate section devoted to optometrists, about whom the AMA at one time had some very negative things to say. 671 F.Supp. at 1487.

individual decision-making by AMA members and other medical physicians in their relationship with chiropractors;" and until AMA members learn that the AMA's policies in fact have changed, AMA members' decision-making with respect to professional association with chiropractors will continue to be affected, according to the trial court. The evidence amply supported this conclusion. It is based not only on the lengthy and successful boycott, but on the begrudging nature of the AMA's more recent and lawful changes.

The district court also found a continuing injury to chiropractors' reputation as a result of the boycott. Because the AMA has never made any attempt to publicly repair that damage, the court found that chiropractors will continue to suffer injury to reputation from the boycott. 671 F.Supp. at 1486-87. The AMA's publication of its changes and its settlements were not enough, in the eyes of the district court, to overcome these harmful effects. The AMA has not convinced us that the district court was wrong in this assessment.

The AMA's strongest challenge comes to the district court's findings with respect to the lingering effects on chiropractors' incomes. The court found that the injury to chiropractors' incomes threatened to continue through the date of trial. 671 F.Supp. at 1487. For this it relied on plaintiffs' expert's analysis regarding chiropractic income levels through 1986. (Jt. App. 57.) The court found this continuing harm existed, even though plaintiffs' expert's last data point showed that chiropractors' income in 1984 exceeded that of podiatrists and optometrists—the comparable professions. 671 F.Supp. at 1487. The court did not, however, "find," as the AMA contends, that chiropractors' incomes had actually increased in 1984; rather, it only acknowledged the expert's data in this regard. *Id.* Obviously, given its finding regarding 1986 income levels (i.e., that chiropractors' incomes continued to suffer), the court was more persuaded by the expert's income projections into 1986 regarding the lagging of chiropractors' income, than by the 1984 data. The AMA's

assertion that there is no basis for the district court to rely on the projection of chiropractors' income is baseless. There was testimony that chiropractors' incomes would still have suffered in 1986 as a result of the boycott. (Jt. App. 57.) But even without the lingering effects on chiropractors' income, there still remain the effects on professional association and reputation, which by themselves may be sufficient to show continuing harm from the boycott.

In sum, even though the district court wrongly allocated the burden of proof in deciding whether injunctive relief was necessary, its ultimate findings regarding the risk of a return to the unlawful policies, the effectiveness of the AMA's discontinuance or voluntary cessation, and the character of the past violations, without question satisfy the proper standard. *W.T. Grant*, 345 U.S. at 633. None of the objections the AMA raises on appeal undercuts the district court's decision to grant an injunction. That the AMA feels an injunction is not necessary (or for that matter, that even we may have felt the same had we considered the case as an original matter), is not the appropriate test. That call was for the district court to make. *Id.* Because the district court did not abuse its discretion, we uphold its decision to award injunctive relief.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Based on the language in section 16 that equitable relief is available "when and under the same conditions and principles as injunctive relief . . . is granted by courts of equity. . . .," the AMA makes a passing argument, buried in two of its 67 footnotes (two footnotes, incidentally, that are separated by seven pages of text) that the district court erred by not requiring the plaintiffs to meet all the requirements for an injunction that traditional equity jurisprudence imposes. The AMA does not bother to say what those traditional equitable requirements are, in the case of a permanent injunction, except to say that the plaintiffs had to show they had no adequate remedy at law. Nor does the AMA cite any cases concerning the propriety of a permanent injunction under § 16.

The Supreme Court has stated § 16 invokes "traditional equitable principles." *Zenth Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.*,

(Footnote continued on following page)

Anticipating this negative (for it) result, the AMA makes a last-ditch perfunctory argument. It attacks the injunction, arguing that it is unnecessarily overbroad, purports to award classwide relief in a case that was never certified as a class action, and “implicate[s] the AMA’s rights under the First Amendment.” None of these arguments are convincing.

True enough, as the AMA observes, an injunction in a private antitrust suit should award a plaintiff injunctive relief “only to the extent necessary to protect it from future damage likely to occur if the defendant continues the unlawful antitrust conduct.” *Ohio-Sealey Mattress Manufacturing Co. v. Sealey, Inc.*, 669 F.2d 490, 495 (7th Cir. 1982). But beyond this general principle, the AMA

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<sup>5</sup> *continued*

395 U.S. 100, 130 (1969); see also *Roland Machinery Co. v. Dresser Industries, Inc.*, 749 F.2d 380, 386 (7th Cir. 1984). Scholarly comment has echoed this theme. *E.g.*, 2 P. Areeda and D. Turner, *Antitrust Law* § 312d (1978); Easterbrook and Fischel, *Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender Offers*, 80 Mich. L. Rev. 1155, 1168-69 (1982). Section 16’s language indicates that traditional equity principles should apply. But while it is true that the district court stated that the plaintiffs did not have to meet all the traditional equitable requirements for an injunction, we are not convinced that this misstatement affected the court’s analysis. The important point is that equitable relief is discretionary, and not automatically available to an injured plaintiff. See Areeda & Turner, *supra*, § 312d at 39. The district court did exercise discretion and did not automatically grant the plaintiffs an injunction. The court carefully weighed the AMA’s conduct, the likelihood it would recur, the harm it caused and might in the future cause, and we believe, implicitly in all this, the relative hardships to the parties of granting an injunction. See 671 F.Supp. at 1484-88.

It is true that the district court did not specifically find that the plaintiffs had no adequate remedy at law. The AMA baldly asserts that damages would have been adequate, but does not mention how. At any rate, at this stage in the case, we are not inclined to reverse the district court’s careful decision based on an underdeveloped argument that the AMA did not even deem worthy of including under a separate heading in the text of its brief.

does not make any genuine argument that the injunction is overbroad. Instead, it simply asserts that the primary beneficiaries of the district court's order, insofar as it requires the order to be mailed to every AMA member, that it be published in the *Journal of the American Medical Association*, and that the AMA revise a national ethical publication, are the some 30,000 chiropractors in the nation as a whole who were not parties to this case. Doubtless, these other chiropractors may benefit from the mass mailing and publication required by the district court's order. But this does not necessarily make the injunction overbroad.

The AMA's suggestion that the publications and mailings should have been limited to the four communities in which the individual plaintiffs practiced unnecessarily limits the relief, and ignores the public interest served by private antitrust suits. Such suits can effectively open competition to a market that was previously closed by illegal restraints. *National Society of Professional Engineers*, 435 U.S. at 698; see also *International Salt Co. v. United States*, 332 U.S. 392, 401 (1947). Relief here is provided not only to the plaintiff chiropractors, but also in a sense to all consumers of health care services. Ensuring that medical physicians and hospitals are free to professionally associate with chiropractors (e.g., by the publication and mailing of the order to AMA members), likely will eliminate such anticompetitive effects of the boycott as interfering with consumers' free choice in choosing a product (health care provider) of their liking. In this way competition is served by the injunction. In short, the injunction, as designed by Judge Getzendanner, reasonably attempts to eliminate the consequences of the AMA's boycott, and we will not disturb it. *National Society of Professional Engineers*, 435 U.S. at 698.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> For the same reason, we do not view the district court's injunction as improperly awarding classwide relief where no class was certified. The AMA's argument in this regard is just a rephrasing of its argument that the injunction is overbroad.

Finally, we reject the AMA's hint ("argument" seems too generous when the AMA's claim comprises but one paragraph of a 77-page brief, *Max M. v. New Trier High School District No. 203*, 859 F.2d 1297, 1300 (7th Cir. 1988)) that the district court's order somehow infringes on the AMA's First Amendment rights. We think the injunction as written is sufficiently tailored to avoid constitutional objection. As the Supreme Court has stated:

[w]hile the resulting order may curtail the exercise of liberties that the [defendants] might enjoy, that is a necessary and, in cases such as this, unavoidable consequence of the violation. . . . The First Amendment does not 'make it . . . impossible ever to enforce laws against agreements in restraint of trade . . . .' *Giboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Co.*, 336 U.S. 490, 502. In fashioning a remedy, the District Court may, of course, consider the fact that its injunction may impinge upon rights that would otherwise be constitutionally protected, but those protections do not prevent it from remedying the antitrust violations.

*National Society of Professional Engineers* at 697-98. That the injunction requires the AMA to publicize and mail copies of the order to AMA members, among other things, does not render it unconstitutional. The district court's form of injunction and method of ensuring its publication (and thus its efficacy) was a reasonable attempt at eliminating the consequences of the AMA's lengthy, systematic, successful, and unlawful boycott.

#### IV.

##### *Plaintiffs' Cross-Appeal*

Plaintiffs filed a cross-appeal challenging the judgments for defendants JCAH and ACP. With respect to JCAH, plaintiffs advance two separate theories of liability. First, they allege that JCAH unlawfully conspired with the AMA and participated in the AMA's boycott of chiroprac-

tors. Second, plaintiffs contend that JCAH, as a membership-trade association, acted as a conspiracy each time it promulgated industry standards, and thus violated the antitrust laws in its own right. As to the latter theory of liability, plaintiffs assert that they raised it before the trial court, but that the court never ruled on it. JCAH does not contest this summarization of the events in the district court, and we accept it. Plaintiffs' theory against ACP also is two-fold. They first contend that ACP also participated in the AMA's boycott. Second, they charge that ACP is a member of the "continuing conspiracy that is the JCAH." None of plaintiffs' arguments are persuasive.

Following the first trial in this case, JCAH and ACP appealed the denial of their motions for a directed verdict. We affirmed the denial of those motions, explaining that the evidence was sufficient to permit, but not require, a jury (or, as it turned out, the trial court) to conclude that the defendants JCAH and ACP knew that concerted action in a scheme was contemplated and invited, and that both acquiesced and participated in that scheme. *Wilk I*, 719 F.2d at 233. This would have permitted a finding of liability, we reasoned, citing *Theater Enterprises Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp.*, 346 U.S. 537, 540 (1954); *Interstate Circuit Inc. v. United States*, 306 U.S. 208, 226-27 (1939).

Following *Wilk I*, the Supreme Court decided two cases, which the district court in the second trial held clarified and limited the cases relied upon in *Wilk I*. These cases were *Monsanto v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.*, 465 U.S. 752 (1984), and *Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.*, 475 U.S. 574 (1986). In *Monsanto*, the Court held that, to survive a summary judgment motion, an anti-trust plaintiff needed evidence tending to "exclude the possibility" that the alleged conspirators were acting independently, *id.* at 764, and that the plaintiff must present "direct or circumstantial evidence that reasonably tends to prove" that the alleged conspirators "'had a conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to

achieve an unlawful objective.' " *Id.*, quoting *Edward J. Sweeney & Sons v. Texaco, Inc.*, 637 F.2d 105, 111 (3d Cir. 1980), *cert. denied*, 451 U.S. 911 (1981). *Matsushita* reaffirmed that holding. There, the Court stated "conduct that is as consistent with permissible competition as with illegal conspiracy does not, without more, support an inference of conspiracy." 475 U.S. at 597 n.21.

Applying *Monsanto* and *Matsushita*, the district court analyzed plaintiffs' claims to determine whether or not each defendant's own conduct showed membership in the AMA's conspiracy. 671 F.Supp. at 1489.<sup>7</sup> We review each defendant separately. Again, because the district court adequately set forth the facts, we only summarize them here.

#### A. JCAH

JCAH is a not-for-profit corporation established for the purpose of setting standards and conducting health care accreditation programs in conjunction with those standards. JCAH's members include the AMA, ACP, the American College of Surgeons, the American Hospital Association, and the American Dental Association. It is governed by a board of commissioners. Twenty-one commissioners are appointed by the various members, who then appoint one public commissioner. The AMA is one of JCAH's two "dominant members" (this characterization being based solely on the number of commissioners each member is allotted).

Participation by hospitals in the JCAH's accreditation program was voluntary. Nevertheless, accreditation was

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<sup>7</sup> The district court also held that even if JCAH were acting independently of the AMA boycott, its members (e.g., the AMA) were not responsible for the actions of JCAH. 671 F.Supp. at 1491-92. On appeal, plaintiffs tell us that this was unnecessary, and actually confused their asserted theory that JCAH was an unlawful conspiracy in its own right. Thus, we do not pass on the propriety of the district court's ruling in this regard.

important to a hospital and “loss of accreditation would be devastating.” *Id.* at 1490. Since before 1958, JCAH had standards providing that hospital medical staffs were to be limited to fully licensed physicians (this was liberalized in 1970 to include dentists). *Id.*

In 1964, JCAH’s director stated, in a national newsletter, that JCAH viewed chiropractors as cultists, and that hospitals that encouraged such cultists to use their facilities in any way would “very probably be severely criticized and lose [their] accreditation.” Despite the similarity of this statement to later AMA efforts, the district court found there was no direct evidence that JCAH was acting in concert with the AMA with regard to this statement or its distribution; thus, it concluded this action was independent.

In 1970, JCAH completed a revision of its standards and published an accreditation manual for hospitals. The manual included “Standard X” (which was drafted by the AMA). Standard X provided that the governing board of each hospital had to assure that medical staff members practiced in an ethical manner. The accreditation manual included a source reference to the AMA’s Principles. The district court found that the uncontradicted testimony was that JCAH’s board of commissioners never discussed the subject of chiropractic in connection with the accreditation manual. It further found that no chiropractor participated in the accreditation manual’s revision process despite the opportunity to participate. *Id.* Based on these findings, the court concluded there was no evidence that JCAH adopted Standard X in connection with chiropractors or to further the AMA’s boycott. And while JCAH letters responding to inquiries from hospitals about the role of chiropractors throughout the 1970s did indicate that JCAH would withdraw accreditation of a hospital that had chiropractors on its medical staff or that granted privileges to chiropractors, the district court found these letters were completely consistent with the then-existing accreditation standards, and were “not convincing evi-

dence that JCAH had joined the conspiracy against chiropractors." *Id.*

Finally, in 1977, JCAH revised its standards to provide that medical staff membership was to be limited "unless otherwise provided by law" to fully licensed physicians and dentists. References to the AMA's Principles were deleted. So from 1977 on, JCAH's position on chiropractors was that, as limited licensed practitioners, they could be included on medical staffs, if permitted under local law. In 1980, JCAH amended the accreditation manual by deleting Standard X.

Based on these findings, the district court found that all JCAH undertook all action from 1964 through 1980 independently of the AMA boycott. Further support for its conclusion was the fact that JCAH's standards were largely consistent with federal law. *Id.*

Likewise, the district court found that the 1983 revisions of the JCAH standards were independent of the AMA boycott, and that the 1983 revisions were not evidence that the conspiracy against chiropractors continued into 1983. Ultimately, JCAH standards were liberalized regarding admission to medical staffs and allowance of hospital privileges to limited licensed practitioners, including chiropractors. But the standard also required that each accredited hospital's medical staff have an executive committee, the majority of which had to be medical and osteopathic physicians. (This, according to plaintiffs, is evidence that the conspiracy against chiropractors continued into 1983.)

In 1983 the AMA participated in the JCAH standards revision process. That process began in 1982 with recommendations from JCAH staff and the JCAH standard-survey procedures committee. The early recommendations were that each hospital be permitted to decide for itself, under applicable state law, which licensed health care providers would be allowed hospital privileges and medical staff membership. After initially supporting this approach, AMA members and other medical societies which wanted

to ensure medical and osteopathic physician control of the medical staff and patient care in hospitals criticized the AMA. Feeling the heat of their members' criticism, the AMA changed its position and supported revisions which would ensure such control. In late 1983, JCAH adopted new standards which included the mandatory, medical physician-dominated executive committee concept.

According to the district court, the evidence supported the conclusion that JCAH members were acting to ensure that the responsibility for patient care in acute care hospitals remained in the hands of medical and osteopathic physicians, and that this was an appropriate goal for JCAH. Patients in acute care hospitals are generally the very sick or in need of surgery. They are patients who require treatment with drugs or surgery—i.e., treatment by fully licensed physicians (that chiropractors may not perform). This led the court to conclude that “[t]he evidence supports no conclusion other than that patient care in acute care hospitals, and the medical staffs of acute care hospitals, ought to be under the control of fully licensed physicians rather than limited licensed practitioners. I am persuaded that the JCAH members were not acting to prevent chiropractors from being admitted to hospitals or obtaining hospital privileges.” 671 F.Supp. at 1493.<sup>8</sup>

Because the court found that JCAH's acts before the 1983 revisions were independent of the AMA boycott, and that the 1983 revisions were not evidence that the conspiracy against chiropractors continued into 1983, it concluded that plaintiffs failed to prove that JCAH was a member of the conspiracy. *Id.* at 1494.

<sup>8</sup> The court went on to observe that under current JCAH standards, hospitals could grant chiropractors medical staff membership, clinical privileges, admission privileges, and access to diagnostic services without fearing loss of JCAH accreditation. Authority for making individual medical staff appointments now rests with the individual hospital's governing board.

### 1. JCAH as Conspiracy

Plaintiffs' first theory on appeal is that JCAH, as a trade association, "acts as a conspiracy or combination every time it promulgates industry standards [which unreasonably restrain competition]." But a trade association is not, just because it involves collective action by competitors, a "walking conspiracy." *Consolidated Metal Products, Inc.*, 846 F.2d at 293-94. There is no evidence that JCAH's accreditation program "is merely a ploy to obscure a conspiracy" against chiropractors. *Id.* at 294. And plaintiffs' arguments for a separate antitrust violation with respect to JCAH standing alone are unpersuasive.

The most serious problem with plaintiffs' theory is that they did not prove any actual or threatened antitrust injury directly traceable to the alleged antitrust violation which would be redressed by the issuance of an injunction against JCAH. See *Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado Inc.*, 479 U.S. at 122. Thus, even if this particular claim was not expressly addressed by the district court, plaintiffs' claim still must fail. In support of their contention that they suffered actual injury, plaintiffs offer "evidence" of examples of when each plaintiff was denied privileges or medical staff membership at certain hospitals. But after thoroughly reviewing the record, we conclude these examples do not show any connection to JCAH or its Standard X. (Jt. App. 13-14; 15-17; 89-100; 181; 182-87; 190-91; 380-81; 420; 672-81; 773-74; 851; and 934-35.) Because we find no antitrust injury occurred as a result of the 1970 Standard X, we necessarily conclude that there was no continuing JCAH boycott as a result of the revisions in 1983.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Plaintiffs claim, for the first time in their reply brief, that the 1983 standards themselves violate the antitrust laws. The district court, however, stated that plaintiffs were not claiming that the 1983 JCAH standards violated the antitrust laws. 671 F.Supp. at 1492. Whether they did or did not raise the issue in the district court, there is no question that the plaintiffs' initial appellate brief

(Footnote continued on following page)

## 2. JCAH as Member of the AMA Boycott

Plaintiffs' second theory of antitrust liability against JCAH contends that JCAH was a member of the AMA's boycott. In this regard, plaintiffs contend that JCAH knew the AMA boycott was contemplated and that it acquiesced and participated in that scheme. As stated above, the *Monsanto* and *Matsushita* cases hold that to establish liability under this theory, there must be evidence that at least tends to exclude the possibility that the alleged conspirators were acting independently, rather than pursuant to " 'conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective'," *Monsanto*, 465 U.S. at 764, quoting *Edward J. Sweeney & Sons*, 637 F.2d at 111. Plaintiffs, however, argue that *Monsanto* and *Matsushita* are inapplicable to this case because here we are dealing with a horizontal combination, and because there is "direct evidence" of a conspiracy in this case. We agree with the district court, however, that this case should be governed under the standards set forth in *Monsanto* and *Matsushita*. We have stated before, "[t]he actual label placed on the conspiracy is a 'pedantic distinction,' as the Monsanto standard applies regardless of which label is attached." *Valley II*, 822 F.2d at 660 n. 5. And plaintiffs point to no "direct evidence" of the conspiracy.

At best, plaintiffs make only a perfunctory argument that JCAH knowingly adhered to and participated in the AMA's unlawful boycott. Nowhere do they attempt to show just how the district court made erroneous findings of fact. Rather, they point to the fact that JCAH adopted

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### <sup>9</sup> continued

did not raise this issue. Rather, plaintiffs argued that "The JCAH 1983 Revisions Continue[d] The Boycott." In this regard they stated, "only one conclusion is possible: the JCAH M.D. domination standard *perpetuates* the boycott" (emphasis added). We think it plain that plaintiffs made their claim that the 1983 revisions themselves were unlawful for the first time on reply. We thus will not address the argument. See *Gold v. Wolpert*, 876 F.2d 1327, 1331 n. 6 (7th Cir. 1989).

Standard X (after being manipulated by the AMA in doing so) to establish JCAH's participation in the boycott. But the district court found that JCAH's board of commissioners never discussed the subject of chiropractic, and that the subject was never raised in connection with the 1970 revisions of the accreditation manual. It also found that no chiropractor participated in the revision process despite having an "extensive opportunity" to do so. Thus, the court held "[t]here was no evidence that JCAH adopted Standard X in connection with chiropractors or in furtherance of the AMA boycott." 671 F.Supp. at 1490. Plaintiffs' urgings to the contrary are nothing but a bald invitation to substitute our judgment for the district court's. Consistent with our prior treatment of this issue in *Wilk I*, 719 F.2d at 233, the evidence may have been sufficient to find that JCAH participated in the conspiracy, but it did not require such a finding. The district court was entirely within its right to find no conspiracy between JCAH and the AMA.

As evidence of JCAH's participation in the conspiracy, plaintiffs also point to the district court's finding that JCAH cooperated with the AMA in connection with the distribution of an article titled "The Right and Duty of Hospitals to Exclude Chiropractors from Hospitals." Apparently, they believe this carries the day in establishing JCAH's participation in the boycott. We disagree. As the district court found, the JCAH's use of the cited article was in connection with inquiries from hospitals about the role of chiropractors in hospitals. 671 F.Supp. at 1490. The court also found that the JCAH letters were "completely consistent with the then-existing accreditation standards." *Id.* We thus agree with the district court that this was "not convincing evidence" that JCAH participated or joined in the AMA's conspiracy against chiropractors. *Id.* Cf. *Monsanto*, 465 U.S. at 762 (communication about prices and marketing strategy does not alone show

that distributors are not making independent pricing decisions).<sup>10</sup>

## B. ACP

The analysis and outcome would be much the same for ACP as for JCAH, at least so far as its alleged participation in the AMA's boycott is concerned. ACP's alleged membership or participation in the AMA's unlawful boycott, for example, is also judged under the *Matsushita* and *Monsanto* standards. Here, though, we must digress briefly to address a problem with plaintiffs' argument. Their claims in this respect seem at best to be confused. In their opening brief, they refer to the ACP's participation in "the boycott," and argue that the district court's finding that the ACP did not participate in any boycott of chiropractors is clearly erroneous. The district court's findings in this regard concern whether or not ACP was a member of or participated in the AMA's conspiracy. 671 F.Supp. at 1471, 1489, 1494-96. It is obvious from the district court's opinion, and from plaintiffs' opening brief, that "the boycott" referred to is the AMA's unlawful boycott. But in their reply brief, plaintiffs say it is "irrelevant" whether or not ACP conspired with the AMA. In other words, they are arguing that the district court's

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<sup>10</sup> Plaintiffs make one additional claim. This case, they tell us, fits neatly within the framework of *American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp.*, 456 U.S. 556 (1982). They assert that because the trial court found the AMA manipulated the JCAH and caused it to adopt Standard X (as well as circulating the AMA's "Right and Duty of Hospitals to Exclude Chiropractors"), that JCAH was liable because it allowed itself to be manipulated and used as a mechanism through which the AMA enforced its anti-competitive scheme. Plaintiffs cite *Hydrolevel* in the portion of their argument dealing with JCAH's alleged knowing adherence and participation in the AMA's boycott. But *Hydrolevel* does not address the conscious parallelism issue. *Hydrolevel* speaks of an association's liability in its own right, not as a member of another's unlawful conspiracy. We thus believe *Hydrolevel* is inapplicable to this case.

finding that ACP was not a member of the AMA's boycott, 671 F.Supp. at 1494-96, is not at issue on this appeal. We will take them at their word; that issue is now foreclosed against them.

Apparently, then, plaintiffs are claiming, as they did with JCAH, that the ACP as a membership association engaged in concerted activity through various acts. That is, the ACP is liable under § 1 of the Sherman Act in its own right. Plaintiffs also present a second theory of liability: that the ACP, as a member of the JCAH, is liable for the unlawful acts of that organization because it knowingly participated in and ratified those acts.

### *1. ACP as a Conspiracy*

There is no evidence that ACP itself engaged in an unlawful boycott of chiropractors. Plaintiffs point to the ACP's bylaws which provided that the purpose of the ACP included "preserving the history and perpetuating the best tradition of medicine and medical ethics." Because of the fact that many of the ACP's members were also AMA members, plaintiffs argue that this veiled reference to ethics somehow furthered an ACP boycott. But the ACP never adopted the AMA's Principles (including former Principle 3), and never required its members to subscribe to those principles. 671 F.Supp. at 1494. Also, the ACP never had a code of ethics. In 1984 it published the American College of Physicians Ethics Manual. But this was not a code or set of regulations. Rather, it was an effort to address major contemporary issues confronting all physicians and merely attempted to stimulate debate on medical ethics. The manual stated nothing about chiropractic or about what remedies are or are not "scientific." Indeed, as the district court found, the manual appears to leave the individual physician free to make his own judgment as to the kinds of treatment he should participate in and in his relations with other licensed health practitioners. 671 F.Supp. at 1494.

The plaintiffs rely on two additional documents to establish an ACP boycott. The first grew out of a September 1978 meeting of the ACP's board of governors. (The board of governors was not the ACP's policymaking body.) The Board at that meeting accepted a report by an ad hoc committee appointed to suggest what might be done to promote the ACP's policy toward chiropractic. According to the district court, the minutes of that meeting reflect that:

The committee agreed unanimously that ACP should be concerned about and oppose any action which would include chiropractic among the scientifically-based modes of medical care and which would give chiropractors direct access to the diagnostic facilities of hospitals.

671 F.Supp. at 1495. Plaintiffs also point to a resolution adopted by the board of governors which provided, among other things:

(2) the governors should remain alert to efforts of chiropractors to gain access to radiographic and clinical laboratory diagnostic facilities in their regions and keep ACP headquarters informed of such developments;

\* \* \*

(8) the governors should alert colleagues in other disciplines to the efforts of chiropractors to gain access to radiographic and clinical pathology diagnostic facilities; and

(9) the governors and the college members in their regions should discuss these matters with their county and state medical societies and with their representatives to the house of delegates of the AMA.

671 F.Supp. at 1495-96.

Although the district court found that many parts of the resolution related to matters protected under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, not everything included was

protected. (This is not at issue on appeal.) What is important is that the district court found that the resolution contained no call for the participation of ACP or its members in the AMA's boycott against chiropractors, "or [in the] ACP's own boycott." 671 F.Supp. at 1496. Continuing, the court explained "[m]oreover, the resolution was never implemented . . . and there is no evidence that ACP members were called upon to cooperate in effectuating ACP's 'policy' on chiropractic." *Id.* Plaintiffs do not show how the district court's findings are clearly erroneous; rather, they just interpret the document differently. It is well established by now, however, that we do not substitute our view of the facts for the district court's on appeal. After reviewing the evidence, we are not left with the "definite and firm conviction" that the district court made a mistake in interpreting this evidence. *Anderson v. City of Bessemer City*, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985).

Plaintiffs also point to a joint document in which the ACP participated, titled "Status Report on Chiropractic Lawsuits" to establish an ACP conspiracy. The report was distributed to ACP members. It does contain an admission that Principle 3 forbade association with chiropractors. But, as the district court explained, this admission was irrelevant as to ACP which had not adopted the AMA's Principles, and which did not have a medical ethic similar to Principle 3. We agree. Again, plaintiffs just offer their different interpretation of the document, which has never been enough to carry the day when reviewing a district court's factual determinations. We see no error.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Plaintiffs also argue that the district court erroneously "excluded evidence [which] proves ACP's knowing intent to exclude chiropractors." (Plaintiff's reply br. at 23.) What plaintiffs are getting at is that certain evidence was held by the district court to be protected under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. The first involved a letter written to a governmental agency (the National Institute of Neurological Diseases and Strokes (NINDS)) in con-

(Footnote continued on following page)

## 2. *ACP Participation in JCAH's Conspiracy*

Finally, plaintiffs contend that ACP is a member of "the continuing conspiracy that is the JCAH." But since we have held JCAH did not violate the antitrust laws, ACP could not be liable for participating in JCAH's acts. Thus, plaintiffs' theory that ACP is liable for participating in JCAH's conspiracy fails.

## V.

### *Conclusion*

We affirm the district court's finding that the AMA violated § 1 of the Sherman Act by conducting an illegal boycott of chiropractors, and the district court's decision to grant an injunction against the AMA. In finding liability, the court did not improperly rely on evidence of conduct protected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. The district court's factual findings supported its finding that the AMA's boycott was illegal under the rule of reason, and those findings were not clearly erroneous. The district

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#### <sup>11</sup> *continued*

nection with a government project (the study of chiropractic). Plaintiffs claim this was not protected under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine because blind copies were sent to the AMA's Committee on Quackery and other medical societies. They ignore the fact, however, that the district court made an alternative holding with respect to this letter. It stated that even if the letter was not protected, it was obvious that it expressed only the author's own opinion as to what action the ACP's board of regents (its policy-making body) might take in the future, and that it was not the act of the ACP endorsing the AMA chiropractic policy statement. The court also found there was no evidence that ACP had knowledge of the activities of the Committee on Quackery. Thus, we do not need to address whether or not this document was protected under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, as the alternative ground is both sound and unchallenged.

Plaintiffs make two perfunctory and undeveloped contentions with regard to "exclusion" of "boycott activity." But neither of these amounts to an "argument" under Fed.R.App.P. 28(a)(4). Thus, we will consider neither.

court also did not clearly err in finding that the AMA did not meet its burden of proving its patient care defense, and in finding that the AMA's boycott caused the plaintiffs past injury and the threat of future injury. The court did not abuse its discretion in imposing an injunction on the AMA. The court's factual findings supported its exercise of equitable discretion, and the injunction was not overbroad.

We also affirm the district court's findings that JCAH and ACP did not participate in the AMA's boycott, or in any other way violate § 1 in their activities concerning chiropractors. The plaintiffs' theory that JCAH itself conspired by setting standards fails because the plaintiffs failed to prove that the JCAH's actions caused them any actual or threatened injury. The court's finding that JCAH did not participate in the AMA's conspiracy was not clearly erroneous. The plaintiffs have waived any contention that ACP participated in the AMA's conspiracy by claiming that any such participation was "irrelevant." The district court did not clearly err by finding that ACP did not conduct its own conspiracy, and since JCAH did not violate § 1, ACP could not be liable for participating in JCAH's actions.

The district court's decision is

AFFIRMED.

A true Copy:

Teste:

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*Clerk of the United States Court of  
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit*

JUDGMENT — ORAL ARGUMENT  
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
For the Seventh Circuit  
Chicago, Illinois 60604  
February 7, 1990.

Before

Hon. HARLINGTON WOOD, JR., *Circuit Judge*  
Hon. KENNETH F. RIPPLE, *Circuit Judge*  
Hon. DANIEL A. MANION, *Circuit Judge*

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Nos. 87-2672 & 87-2777

DR. CHESTER A. WILK, D.C.,  
DR. JAMES W. BRYDEN, D.C.,  
DR. PATRICIA B. ARTHUR, D.C., and  
DR. MICHAEL D. PEDIGO, D.C.,

*Plaintiffs-Appellees,  
Cross-Appellants,*

v.

AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,

*Defendant-Appellant,  
Cross-Appellee.*

---

DR. CHESTER A. WILK, D.C.,  
DR. JAMES W. BRYDEN, D.C.,  
DR. PATRICIA B. ARTHUR, D.C., and  
DR. MICHAEL D. PEDIGO, D.C.,

*Plaintiffs-Cross-Appellants,*

v.

AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,  
JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION  
OF HOSPITALS, AMERICAN COLLEGE  
OF PHYSICIANS and AMERICAN ACADEMY  
OF ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS,

*Defendants-Cross-Appellees.*

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Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.  
No. 76 C 3777 — Susan Getzendanner, Judge

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This cause was heard on the record from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, and was argued by counsel.

On consideration whereof, IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED by this Court that the judgment of the said District Court in this cause appealed from be, and the same is hereby, AFFIRMED, with costs in accordance with the opinion of this Court filed this date.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

April 27, 1990

Hon. HARLINGTON WOOD, JR., *Circuit Judge*

Hon. KENNETH F. RIPPLE, *Circuit Judge*

Hon. DANIEL A. MANION, *Circuit Judge*

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No. 87-2672

DR. CHESTER A. WILK, D.C.,

DR. JAMES W. BRYDEN, D.C.,

DR. PATRICIA B. ARTHUR,

DR. MICHAEL D. PEDIGO, D.C.,

*Plaintiffs-Appellees,*

v.

AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,

*Defendant-Appellant.*

---

Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.  
No. 76 C 3777 — Susan Getzendanner, Judge.

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AMENDED ORDER

On consideration of the petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing *en banc* filed in the above-entitled cause by Defendant-Appellant, no judge in active service has requested a vote thereon,\* and all of the judges on the original panel have voted to deny a rehearing. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the aforesaid petition for rehearing be, and the same is hereby, DENIED.

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\*Circuit Judges Walter J. Cummings, Richard A. Posner, and Frank H. Easterbrook did not participate in the suggestion for rehearing *en banc*.

**Chester A. WILK, D.C., et al.,  
Plaintiffs,**

**v.**

**AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,  
et al., Defendants.**

**Civ. A. No. 76 C 3777.**

**United States District Court,  
N.D. Illinois, E.D.**

**Sept. 25, 1987.**

**\* \* \* \* \***

**MEMORANDUM OPINION  
AND ORDER**

**GETZENDANNER, District Judge:**

This antitrust case is on remand for a new trial from the Court of Appeals, *Wilk v. AMA*, 719 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1983) ("*Wilk*"). On May 4, 1987 the case was reassigned to me under Local Rule 2.30e for the purpose of conducting the trial. The trial was conducted during May and June of 1987. The record consists of 3,624 pages of transcript, approximately 1,265 exhibits, and excerpts from 73 depositions.

On August 27, 1987, the Court issued a memorandum opinion containing written findings of fact and conclusions of law under Rule 52 of the Fed.R.Civ.P. Thereafter, two of the defendants, the American College of Surgeons and the American College of Radiology settled the case with the plaintiffs and I granted motions to amend the memorandum opinion of August 27th. In the present opinion I have made those changes, plus additional editorial changes, and have included citations to the record supplied, at my request, by plaintiff's counsel but checked by me.

### I. *The First Trial and the Wilk Decision*

The plaintiffs, Chester A. Wilk, James W. Bryden, Patricia B. Arthur, and Michael D. Pedigo, are licensed chiropractors. In a complaint filed in 1976, plaintiffs charged the defendants with violating Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. Sections 1 and 2. Section 1 of the Sherman Act declares illegal every contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce. Section 2 prescribes penalties for every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce. The original defendants were the American Medical Association ("AMA"), the American Hospital Association ("AHA"), the American College of Surgeons ("ACS"), the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals ("JCAH"), the American College of Physicians ("ACP"), the American College of Radiology ("ACR"), the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons ("AAOS"), American Osteopathic Association ("AOS"), American Academy of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation ("AAPMR"), Illinois State Medical Society ("ISMS"), Chicago Medical Society ("CMS"), The Medical Society of Cook County ("MSCC"), H. Doyl Taylor, Dr. Joseph A. Sabatier, Jr., M.D., Dr. H. Thomas Ballantine, M.D., and James H. Sammons, M.D.<sup>1</sup> A number of the original defendants settled the case and have been dismissed, and all of the original individual defendants except Dr. Sammons obtained summary judgment prior to the retrial of this case. Thus, the defendants which remain in the case are the AMA, JCAH and AAOS.

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<sup>1</sup> A full description of the defendants is set forth in *Wilk* and will not be repeated here.

At the first trial, the plaintiffs' principal claim was that the defendants engaged in a conspiracy to eliminate the chiropractic profession by refusing to deal with the plaintiffs and other chiropractors. Plaintiffs claimed that the boycott was accomplished through the use of Principle 3 of the AMA's Principles of Medical Ethics ("AMA's Principles") which prohibited medical physicians from associating professionally with unscientific practitioners. Principle 3 provided as follows:

A physician should practice a method of healing founded on a scientific basis; and he should not voluntarily professionally associate with anyone who violates this principle.

It was the plaintiffs' contention that the AMA used Principle 3 to achieve a boycott of chiropractors by first calling chiropractors "unscientific practitioners," and then advising AMA members and other medical societies that it was unethical for medical physicians to associate with chiropractors. The other defendants, plaintiffs claimed, joined the boycott and the result was a conspiracy in restraint of trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants and against the plaintiffs. That judgment was reversed on appeal and the case was remanded.

The *Wilk* Court clarified the principal legal issues in the case. The Court held that the legality of the defendants' conduct under Section 1 must be adjudged under the rule of reason articulated in *Chicago Board of Trade v. United States*, 246 U.S. 231, 238, 38 S.Ct. 242, 244, 62 L.Ed. 683 (1918). The Court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the defendants' conduct was a per se violation of Section 1, holding that "a canon of medical ethics purporting, surely not frivolously, to address the importance of scientific method gives rise to questions of sufficient

delicacy and novelty at least to escape per se treatment.” 719 F.2d at 222. Under the rule of reason, the inquiry mandated is whether the challenged agreement is one that promotes competition or one that suppresses competition. *National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States*, 435 U.S. 679, 691, 98 S.Ct. 1355, 1365, 55 L.Ed.2d 637 (1978).

The Court also considered whether proof of coercive enforcement of Principle 3 or of the purported agreement among the defendants was necessary to satisfy the Section 1 agreement criterion. Relying on *Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar*, 421 U.S. 773 at 791, n. 21, 95 S.Ct. 2004, 2015 n. 21, 44 L.Ed.2d 572 (1975), the Court noted that even without a threat of professional discipline, the mere existence of ethical opinions of professional associations constitutes substantial reason to adhere to the standards because professionals would comply in order to assure that they did not discredit themselves by departing from professional norms. Thus, the *Wilk* Court held:

... even without coercive enforcement, a court may find that members of an association promulgating guidelines sanctioning conduct in violation of Sec. 1 participated in an agreement to engage in an illegal refusal to deal.

719 F.2d at 230.

Next, the Court held that if the plaintiffs met their burden of showing that the effect of Principle 3 and the implementing conduct had been to restrict competition rather than to promote it, the defendants could then come forward to show:

(1) that they genuinely entertained a concern for what they perceive as scientific method in the care of each person with whom they have entered into a

doctor-patient relationship; (2) that this concern is objectively reasonable; (3) that this concern has been the dominant motivating factor in defendants' promulgation of Principle 3 and in the conduct intended to implement it; and (4) that this concern for scientific method in patient care could not have been adequately satisfied in a manner less restrictive of competition.

719 F.2d at 227. This was called the "patient care defense." Finally, with respect to the plaintiffs' Section 2 claim, the Court of Appeals noted that it was not separately argued on appeal, and the Court declined to separately discuss it.

Shortly before the scheduled trial before this court, the plaintiffs waived their claim for damages and sought only injunctive relief. This turned the case from a jury to a bench trial, and it shifted the focus of the case from the past to the present in order to determine whether the plaintiffs were entitled to injunctive relief under Section 16 of the Clayton Act.

## II. *Summary of This Court's Rulings*

In view of the length of this opinion, I shall summarize my principal findings. The AMA and its officials, including Dr. Sammons, instituted a boycott of chiropractors in the mid-1960s by informing AMA members that chiropractors were unscientific practitioners and that it was unethical for a medical physician to associate with chiropractors. The purpose of the boycott was to contain and eliminate the chiropractic profession. This conduct constituted a conspiracy among the AMA and its members and an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.

The AMA sought to spread the boycott to other medical societies. Other groups agreed to participate in the boycott by agreeing to induce their members to forego any form of professional, research, or educational association with chiropractors. The defendants which knowingly joined in the conspiracy were ACR (which has now been dismissed from the case) and AAOS. None of the defendants established the patient care defense. The plaintiffs are entitled to injunctive relief against the AMA, but not against AAOS or Dr. Sammons. The actions of the other defendants, JCAH and ACP, were taken independently of the AMA boycott and these defendants did not join the conspiracy. Accordingly, defendants JCAH, ACP, AAOS and Dr. Sammons are dismissed.

The plaintiffs' Section 2 claim was limited to the defendants' alleged conspiracy to monopolize the hospital health care market through restrictive hospital accreditation standards promulgated by JCAH. In view of the court's finding that JCAH did not join the conspiracy, the Section 2 claim is dismissed.

### III. *New Zealand Report*

During trial I reserved ruling on an important evidentiary ruling, the admissibility of a report summarizing the findings of a task force appointed by the New Zealand government to study chiropractic in that nation, "Chiropractic in New Zealand: Report of the Commission of Inquiry" ("the New Zealand Report"). (PX 1829.) The New Zealand Report was heavily relied upon by the plaintiffs to show that chiropractic was a valid health care profession. The defendants opposed introduction of the report, and the parties have now briefed the issue.

The Report was published in 1979 after nearly two years of investigation including 78 days of public hearings, 15 days of closed sessions, and visits to medical and chiropractic establishments both in New Zealand and other English-speaking countries. The plaintiffs assert that these acts entitle the Report to admission as evidence both for the truth of the matters asserted and for the purpose of showing the information available on chiropractic as of 1979. With one narrow exception, I disagree.

Rule 803(8) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which is an exception to the hearsay rule embodied in Rule 802, makes admissible:

Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth . . . in civil actions . . . factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.

The burden of proving untrustworthiness lies with those opposing admission. As explained in the advisory committee notes, "the rule . . . assumes admissibility in the first instance but with ample provision for escape if sufficient negative factors are present." Among these factors are the untimeliness of the inquiry, the lack of special skill or experience on the part of the investigating officials, procedural defects in the conduct of the investigation (such as failure to hold hearings), and/or the bias or motivation problems of the investigators. Other factors, both positive and negative, may, of course, also be considered.

With these considerations in mind, the defendants assert that the New Zealand Report is fundamentally untrustworthy primarily because its conclusions are based upon otherwise inadmissible, unreliable evidence collected and evaluated by persons with no particular skill or back-

ground to make assessments respecting the safety or efficacy of health care practices. Defendants particularly object to the New Zealand Commission's acceptance, at "face value," of the testimonial accounts of patients' experience with chiropractors. The Commission found that such "evidence is not decisive, but it is compelling."

Defendants' view of the scientifically questionable basis of the New Zealand Report's conclusions is supported by a review of the Report prepared by the United States Congress' Office of Technology Assessment ("the OTA review"). (Exhibit A to Memorandum of Defendant ACR in Opposition to Admission of New Zealand Report.) That review questions the applicability of the New Zealand findings to the United States and finds "serious problems" in the Report's treatment of safety and efficacy issues. Although the plaintiffs have suggested that the OTA review may be biased because it was prepared by a doctor of medicine, the court disregards these conclusory allegations. The OTA review itself is balanced and well-reasoned in its assessment of the New Zealand Report. Its primary criticism of the Report is not that its conclusions are wrong, but that they are not based upon well-designed, controlled clinical trials. Regarding the efficacy of chiropractic, the New Zealand Commission considered only five randomized trials. Of these, only two involved chiropractic services—each of which contained significant design flaws. The OTA review concluded: "There is a strong hint that spinal manipulation has efficacy in the immediate relief of back pain and other kinds of pain that goes beyond placebo effect. However, this can only be considered suggestive without further research." (*Id.* at 6.) With respect to the question of chiropractic safety, the OTA review—after disparaging as "not evidence" anecdotal accounts in the medical literature purporting to show chiro-

practic is unsafe—stated it was unable to find any well-designed study. It concluded, consistent with this finding, that the New Zealand Report's review of the safety issue was "unsatisfactory." (*Id.* at 6.)

In light of this thorough and well-considered appraisal of the New Zealand Report, with which I agree, I do not find the Report's conclusions trustworthy. The request for admission for the purposes of showing the truth of the matter asserted is therefore denied.

The plaintiffs urge, alternatively, that the New Zealand Report should be admitted to show first notice to the defendants that chiropractic was not quackery, and second that any belief that chiropractic was quackery could not be objectively reasonable. To the extent that the Report is offered solely to show information available on chiropractic in the latter half of 1979, the request to admit is unobjectionable. It is not, however, especially probative. The Report was not written until three years after the commencement of this lawsuit; its only possible relevance is with respect to plaintiffs' continuing violation point. The Report therefore may come in to show that the defendants may have suspected that their public position on chiropractic was untenable. It may not come in to show that that public stand was objectively unreasonable. To hold otherwise would negate my ruling on admissibility for the truth of the matter asserted. As the defendants correctly note, there is no basis upon which to infer that the defendants' belief was not reasonable absent reliance on the truth of the Report itself. I hold, accordingly, that the New Zealand Report may be admitted, but only for the limited purpose stated.

#### IV. *Liability of the Defendants*

##### A. *American Medical Association ("AMA") and Dr. Sammons*

###### 1. *Boycott Activities*

In the early 1960s the AMA became concerned that medical physicians were cooperating with chiropractors. (PX 550A.) In 1963, the AMA hired as its general counsel the author of the Iowa Medical Society's plan to contain chiropractic in Iowa. (Throckmorton Dep.) As early as September 1963, the AMA's objective was the complete elimination of the chiropractic profession. (PX 173.) In November of 1963, the AMA authorized the formation of the Committee on Quackery under the AMA's Department of Investigation. (PX 555-59.)

In 1964, the Committee's primary goal was to contain and eliminate chiropractic. (PX 464, 727; Stevens Tr. 2104, 2117, 2122, 2162, 2170, 2185.) Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, H. Doyl Taylor, the chairman of the Department of Investigation, repeatedly described the Committee's prime mission to be the containment and elimination of chiropractic as a recognized health care service. (PX 464, 466, 188.) I found his video deposition denials, and his explanation that at all times he and the Committee only meant to eliminate chiropractic as a health hazard, incredible and unworthy of belief. Mr. Taylor believed that chiropractic was based on a "single cause—single cure" theory of disease and that given this baseless foundation, the entire profession should be swept away.

The Committee worked aggressively to achieve its goals in several areas. It conducted nationwide conferences on chiropractic (PX 565, 742, 1177); prepared and distributed

numerous publications critical of chiropractic (e.g., Holman Dep.); assisted others in the preparation and distribution of anti-chiropractic literature (e.g., PX 251, 439); regularly communicated with medical boards and associations, warning that professional association between medical physicians and chiropractors was unethical (e.g., PX 466, 498, 550, 550A, 1288, 12C, 7296, 1705); and attempted to discourage colleges, universities, and faculty members from cooperating with chiropractic schools (e.g., PX 532, 456, 1519, 790; Fineberg Dep.; Tr. 2112-15).<sup>2</sup>

In 1966, the AMA adopted the anti-chiropractic resolution. (PX 464.) This resolution, recommended by the AMA Board of Trustees and adopted by the House of Delegates, called chiropractic an unscientific cult. (PX 464, 500.) This label implicitly invoked Principle 3 of the AMA's Principles which made it unethical for a physician to associate with an unscientific practitioner. (E.g., PX 56, 156A, 499A, 741, 745, 746.) In 1967, the AMA Judicial Council<sup>3</sup> issued an opinion under Principle 3 specifically holding that it was unethical for a physician to associate professionally with chiropractors. (Tr. 2939.) "Associating professionally"

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<sup>2</sup> The Committee worked to influence legislation on the state and federal levels and engaged in informational activities to inform the public on the nature of chiropractic. All of this activity is protected under the *Noerr-Pennington* doctrine and I have not relied on any such conduct in reaching any conclusion in this case. The *Wilk* Court specifically approved the jury instruction used in the first trial that stated that defendants' advocacy activity directed to legislative and administrative agencies or bodies was protected if the "defendants undertook such efforts to influence governmental bodies with a sincere purpose to obtain the governmental actions that they sought." 719 F.2d at 229.

<sup>3</sup> The Judicial Council is now known as the Council on Judicial and Ethical Affairs, but I shall refer to it in this opinion by its original name.

would include making referrals of patients to chiropractors, accepting referrals from chiropractors, providing diagnostic, laboratory, or radiology services for chiropractors, teaching chiropractors, or practicing together in any form. This opinion was published in the 1969 Opinions and Reports of the Judicial Council of the AMA ("1969 Opinions," PX 505) which was widely circulated to members of the AMA. (Holman Dep.) The opinion on chiropractic was also sent by the AMA to 56 medical specialty boards and associations. (PX 550, 550A.)

The AMA and the Committee on Quackery used the anti-chiropractic policy statement as a tool—what the Committee called a "necessary tool"—to spread the boycott to other medical groups. The Committee's efforts were successful. (PX 464.) Other groups, including some of the defendants, specifically adopted or approved the policy statement on the ethical prohibition against association with chiropractors. (PX 464, 478B, 1166, 120.) In 1971, the Committee made a report (PX 464) of its activities to the AMA Board of Trustees and described the policy statement as follows:

This was the necessary tool with which your Committee has been able to widen the base of its chiropractic campaign. With it, other health-related groups were asked and did adopt the AMA policy statement or individually-phrased versions of it. These, in turn led to even wider acceptance of the AMA position.

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The hoped-for effect of this widened base of support was and is to minimize the chiropractic argument that the campaign is simply one of economics, dictated and manipulated by the AMA.

The memorandum further stated:

The Committee has not submitted such a report [earlier] because it believes that to make public some

of its activities would have been and continues to be unwise. Thus this report is intended only for the information of the Board of Trustees.

Principle 3 was widely viewed as proscribing association with chiropractors. The three defendants who issued the Status Report on Chiropractic Lawsuits in 1978 acknowledged in that Report that Principle 3 proscribed association with chiropractors. (PX 1069.) Any reasonable medical physician who read Principle 3 and either the AMA policy statement or any AMA reference to chiropractors as unscientific practitioners, would conclude that it was unethical for medical physicians to associate with a chiropractor. (E.g., PX 499A, 1477B.)

In 1973, the AMA drafted Standard X, which incorporated the unscientific practitioners ethics bar into the JCAH hospital accrediting standards. (PX 2266, 72.) The AMA urged JCAH to adopt Standard X, and JCAH complied. (*Id.*) Keeping chiropractors out of hospitals was one of the goals of the boycott. (PX 9D, 9E, 9F, 9G, 12B, 12C, 18.) When chiropractic was included under Medicare in 1973, the AMA became concerned that this would open the way for chiropractors to be on hospital staffs. (E.g., PX 651, 700.) Doyl Taylor caused the Office of General Counsel of the AMA to publish an article entitled "The Right and Duty of Hospitals to Exclude Chiropractors" in the Journal of the American Medical Association. (PX 464.) This was intended to offer advice to hospital trustees across the country. (PX 716.) It also told every hospital attorney that JCAH accreditation might be lost if hospitals dealt with chiropractors. (E.g., PX 12B, 12C.)<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> The JCAH accreditation standards prior to 1983 did not permit a hospital to allow chiropractors on the medical staff or to

(Footnote continued on following page)

The Committee on Quackery disbanded in December of 1974. By this time, chiropractic had achieved licensing in all fifty states, chiropractic services had become reimbursable through Medicare, Medicaid, and virtually every private health insurance plan, and the chiropractic educational system had been given official sanction by the United States Office of Education. Nevertheless, the Committee pronounced itself a success. (Taylor Vid. Dep.; PX 464.) The AMA believed that chiropractic would have achieved greater growth if it had not been for the Committee's activities. (PX 253.) In May of 1975 the AMA Department of Investigation was disbanded and Doyl Taylor left the employ of the AMA. (PX 7292; Taylor Vid. Dep.)

This lawsuit was filed in 1976. In that year, the Judicial Council suspended distribution of the 1971 Opinions which contained the anti-chiropractic policy. (Tr. 2939.) Later that year the AMA Judicial Council adopted Opinion 3.50 and in March of 1977 Opinions 3.60, 3.70, and 3.71 were adopted. (Tr. 2940; DX 21231.) Under these opinions, a medical physician could refer a patient to a "limited licensed practitioner" for diagnostic or other health care services. Although there was no express reference to chiropractors, chiropractors would fall within the definition of "limited licensed practitioners." Next, a medical physician could choose to accept or decline patients sent to her or him by a licensed practitioner or by a layman. Finally, a medical physician could engage in any teaching per-

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<sup>4</sup> *continued*

obtain hospital privileges, except to the extent allowed by state law. (E.g., PX 6, 828A, 10A, 11A, 14A, 12C.) The legality of JCAH's actions prior to the 1983 revisions to the JCAH standards, and the responsibility of the member owners for such actions, will be discussed fully in the section of this opinion dealing with JCAH. I do not find that the AMA, or any other member of JCAH, is legally responsible for the pre-1983 accreditation standards.

mitted by law for which she or he is qualified. However, the relaxation of the right to refer patients was not without qualification. Opinion 3.60 specifically required that a medical physician should not refer a patient unless she or he is confident that the services provided on referral will be performed in accordance with accepted scientific standards. In addition, Opinion 3.01 provided that it is "wrong to engage in or aid and abet any treatment which has no scientific basis and is dangerous." Distribution of the revised opinions began in May of 1977. (Tr. 2941.) Principle 3 was still in effect.

In July of 1979, the AMA House of Delegates adopted Report UU. Report UU (Tr. 2941; PX 7248) was the AMA's new policy statement on chiropractic. It was a very begrudging change of position. Although it is now hailed by the AMA lawyers and Dr. Alan R. Nelson (Tr. 2028-33), present Chairman of AMA's Board of Trustees, as a recognition by the AMA of the growth and development of chiropractic as a valid health care service, the Report does not convey that change of heart. First, Report UU states that the AMA knows of no scientific evidence to support spinal manipulation and adjustment as appropriate treatment for such diseases as cancer, diabetes, and infections. It does not declare support for that which the AMA seemingly now approves—chiropractic manipulation for musculoskeletal problems. Next the Report condemns the single cause of disease theory and states that "chiropractors disagree on the extent to which they accept or reject traditional chiropractic doctrine." The Report does not state that the two major chiropractic associations had rejected the doctrine in 1969. (PX 245.) But the Report continues:

Describing chiropractic as an "unscientific cult" does not, however, necessarily mean that everything a chiropractor may do when acting within the scope of

his or her license granted by the state is without therapeutic value, nor does it mean that all chiropractors should be equated with cultists. It is better to call attention to the limitations of chiropractic in the treatment of particular ailments than to label chiropractic an "unscientific cult."

The Report then reaffirms that a physician should at all times practice a method of healing founded on a scientific basis. This again directly tied into Principle 3 which prohibited association with unscientific practitioners. Although the Report ends by stating that a medical physician may refer a patient to a limited licensed practitioner permitted by law to furnish such services, there is no particular reference to chiropractors. Report UU was obviously written by lawyers in an effort to bring the AMA into compliance with the antitrust laws, and not a bold change of position designed to reverse the attitudes of the AMA members formed, at least in part, by the then eleven-year old boycott.

In December of 1978, the AMA House of Delegates adopted Resolution 14 which provided that medical physicians "continue to exercise the duty to expose unscientific practices and practitioners while supporting and protecting the freedom of individuals to choose among physicians, other licensed practitioners or religious healers as part of the American tradition." (PX 7248.) It is hard to tell the purpose of this resolution, other than to suggest a similarity between chiropractors and Elmer Gantry, but it once again keyed into Principle 3 which condemned association with unscientific practitioners.

In 1980 the AMA adopted a completely revised version of the principles of medical ethics. (Tr. 2947-48; DX 21233.) Principle 3 finally was eliminated. The new principles provided that a medical physician "shall be free to choose

whom to serve, with whom to associate, and the environment in which to provide medical services.” (PX 7249.) The revised principles theoretically do allow association with chiropractors but there is no explicit reference to chiropractors in the new code.

The revised code received a fair amount of publicity in the medical and private press in 1980. (DX 21209, 21211-12, 21221.) The revision was interpreted as changing the AMA's position on chiropractic in response to various pressures, including the legal climate. And yet, two years later, when Dr. Daniel T. Cloud, who was then finishing his term as president of the AMA, was asked in a formal interview whether the 1980 ethics code changed the position of doctors with regard to chiropractors—“Was there a change?—he stated, “No.” (PX 7125.) This fairly bizarre answer (considering the nature of the publicity the ethics revision received) today is explained by the AMA's lawyers as a technically accurate answer since, they assert, the change in position was accomplished in 1977 and 1979. Yet today the AMA relies on the revision of the ethical standards in 1980 as part of its change in position on chiropractic. The lawyers' argument is not persuasive. In 1982 the president of the AMA appears to be announcing that the AMA has not changed its position on chiropractic.

The AMA settled three chiropractic lawsuits in 1978, 1980 and 1986 by stipulating and agreeing that under its current opinions of the Judicial Council a medical physician may, without fear of discipline or sanction by the AMA, refer a patient to a duly licensed chiropractor when he believes that referral may benefit the patient. The AMA confirmed that a physician may teach at a chiropractic college or seminar and that a physician may choose to accept or decline patients sent to him by a chiroprac-

tor. The only settlement entered into prior to the end of the boycott was in 1978, and that settlement did not effectuate a termination of the boycott since Principle 3 was still in effect.

In 1983 the AMA participated in the revision of the JCAH accreditation standards for hospitals. The revision process started in 1982 with recommendations from the JCAH staff and the JCAH Standard-Survey Procedures Committee that each hospital, through its governing body, be permitted to decide for itself, under applicable state law, which licensed health care providers would be allowed hospital privileges and membership on the medical staff. (Tr. 1775.) The AMA initially supported this approach but it was severely criticized by its members and other medical societies which wanted to ensure medical and osteopathic physician control of the medical staff and patient care in hospitals. (E.g., PX 7101-02, 7146, 7161-68, 7192, 7317.) As a result of this criticism, the AMA changed its position and supported revisions which would ensure such control. (PX 7102, 7109.) In February of 1983, the AMA voted to recommend revised standards that would require the medical staff of each hospital to have an "executive committee," the majority of which had to be medical or osteopathic physicians. (PX 7102.) The executive committee would make recommendations to the hospital's governing body for its approval of credentialing, membership on the medical staff, hospital privileges delineations, and structure of the medical staff. Any dispute between the medical staff and the governing body of the hospital would have to be resolved jointly by them. (PX 7142-48, 7150-54.) In late 1983, JCAH adopted the new standards which included the mandatory, medical physician dominated executive committee concept. (Tr. 1771-74.)

The plaintiffs rely heavily on the 1983 accreditation standards to show that the conspiracy was ongoing. This issue is discussed generally in the section of this opinion dealing with JCAH, and, in short, I have rejected the argument. What is noteworthy with respect to the AMA, however, is that although it believed that the standards originally proposed by the JCAH Standards-Survey Procedures Committee were more in tune with the existing anti-trust "legal climate," it was unable to sustain its position when faced with substantial criticism of its members and other medical groups. (PX 7153, 7103, 7120, 7133, 7159, 7192.)

Through the date of the trial, the AMA continued to respond to requests for information on chiropractic which it received from AMA members and others by sending out anti-chiropractic literature. (PX 7230, 7245-47, 7219-20, 7224-25, 7287, 7210, 7227, 7234-36, 7238-39.) The old boycott language has been eliminated, but the AMA has not had anything positive to say about chiropractic. It was not until midway through the trial of this case that the AMA announced that chiropractic has improved and that at least some forms of chiropractic treatment and joint adjustments are scientific. (Tr. 1214-17, 1222, 1249-56, 1259-60, 1975-76, 2029-30, 2984.) The membership has never been informed of this position.

The plaintiffs argue that the AMA boycott began in 1966 and continued until 1983 when the JCAH accreditation standards were revised. The AMA argues that Report UU and the 1977 opinions constituted a change in the AMA's policy on chiropractors and that any conspiracy ended in 1977 or before. I reject both positions. The discussion of the 1983 revision of the JCAH standards is continued in the section of this opinion dealing with JCAH.

Regarding the AHA's argument, Report UU and the 1977 opinions were clearly inadequate to end the boycott and probably deliberately so. This is well demonstrated by the American College of Physicians' analysis of the 1977 revisions of the opinions. (PX 1440.) In a 1978 report to its members, the ACP stated:

In 1977, as noted above, a revision of the Judicial Council interpretations of the AMA Principles of Medical Ethics appeared. The explicit language of 1966 was absent; there was no reference to *chiropractic per se*. In many places, the language used was unclear and ambiguous.

Paragraph 1, Section 3.50, of the 1977 Judicial Council Opinions and Reports does, however, remain forthright:

"A physician should not use unscientific methods of treatment, nor should he voluntarily associate professionally with anyone who does. It is wrong to engage in, or to aid and abet in treatment which has no scientific basis and is dangerous, is calculated to deceive the patient by giving him false hope, or which may cause the patient to delay in seeking proper care until his condition becomes irreversible."

This interpretation supports the court's view that the 1977 opinions were ambiguous and that the use of the key phrase "unscientific methods" continued to signal the existence of the boycott. I also find that the settlement agreements in other chiropractic litigation that occurred prior to 1980 did not end the boycott since Principle 3 was still in effect and the AMA had never publicly stated that its policy on chiropractic (calling chiropractic "unscientific") was wrong. I conclude that the AMA and its members engaged in a group boycott or conspiracy against chi-

ropractors from 1966 to 1980, when Principle 3 was finally eliminated.<sup>5</sup>

## 2. *Unreasonable Restraint of Trade*

The next question is whether the boycott or conspiracy constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. To answer this question, I have undertaken a rule of reason analysis.

The relevant market was the provision of health care services to the American public on a nationwide basis, particularly for the treatment of musculoskeletal problems. As noted by the Court of Appeals, some medical physicians (such as orthopedic surgeons, internists, and general practitioners) are in direct competition with chiropractors in this market. Medical physicians and chiropractors are interchangeable for the same purposes. (Tr. 423-26, 429-30, 433-34, 1259, 1953, 2108, 7140, 1449.) Consumers seek both medical physicians and chiropractors for the same complaints, principally back pain and other neuromusculoskeletal problems, and both groups render services for the treatment of those complaints. (Tr. 1104-36; PX 7247, 1055, 1529 at 46, 7208.) Competition between medical physicians and chiropractors was recognized by Dr. Joseph A. Sabatier, a member of the Committee on Quackery and a former defendant in this case, as early as 1964. At one point, Dr. Sabatier stated, "it would be well to get across that the

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<sup>5</sup> Dr. Sammons was a willing participant in the conspiracy. As an AMA trustee, Dr. Sammons was on the Committee on Quackery Oversight Panel of the Board of Trustees of the AMA and recommended continued funding of the Committee with knowledge that its prime mission was to be to contain and eliminate chiropractic. (PX 1391.) Dr. Sammons presently is the Executive Vice President of the AMA.

doctor of chiropractic is stealing [the young medical physician's] money." (PX 322; see also PX 172 at 8, 241.)

The AMA's intent is clearly relevant to the rule of reason analysis. The boycott was intended to contain and eliminate the entire profession of chiropractic. (Taylor Vid. Dep.; PX 464; Tr. 2104, 2117, 2122, 2162, 2170, 2185.) Whether or not the elimination of competition per se was consciously intended, that was the natural result of an intent to destroy a competitor. The AMA's market power is also relevant. Members of the AMA constitute a substantial force in the provision of health care services in the United States. (Tr. 416.) They constitute a majority of medical physicians (PX 7325, 7327-28; Tr. 415-16), and a much greater portion of fees paid to medical physicians in the United States is paid to AMA members. (Tr. 416.)

Given the substantial market power of AMA members and the specific intent of the AMA, a substantial adverse effect on competition is evident.<sup>6</sup> Despite the fact that the number of chiropractic schools, the number of chiropractors, and the number of patient visits to chiropractors grew during the boycott, I accept the Committee on Quackery's admissions that the boycott was successful. (Taylor Vid. Dep.; PX 464.) These admissions were not mere puffery. The success of the boycott is shown in part by the adverse reaction of various medical societies to the AMA's modification of its anti-chiropractic policy in 1977 and the AMA's settlement of some chiropractic lawsuits

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<sup>6</sup> The matter is so clear that in 1979 an AMA lawyer agreed that a medical organization that engages in activities calculated to professionally ostracize any member who voluntarily engages in any kind of a professional relationship with a chiropractor is in restraint of trade, and a general boycott against all doctors of chiropractic is indefensible. (PX 7184.)

in the late '70s and early '80s. (E.g., PX 1069.) Many medical physicians individually criticized the AMA for ameliorating its policy. This shows substantial support for the boycott. (*Id.*) It was also clear to me from the testimony, particularly of the older medical physicians, that medical physicians acted in conformity with Principle 3. (E.g., PX 1498A, 1467, 1477B, 1519A, 14A; Stronach Dep.; Bender Dep.) A principle of medical ethics is inherently a forceful mandater of conduct. No honest professional wants to risk the stigma of being labeled unethical. As the Court of Appeals noted, the fact that the AMA never sanctioned or disciplined a member for violation of Principle 3 is not controlling. Enforcement was not necessary to obtain compliance with the boycott.

The anti-competitive effects of the boycott were generally conceded by the defendants' expert, William J. Lynk of Lexecon Inc. (Tr. 1290-1346, 1361-1555.) Some of the anti-competitive effects acknowledged by Mr. Lynk include the following: it is anti-competitive and it raises costs to interfere with the consumer's free choice to take the product of his liking; it is anti-competitive to prevent medical physicians from referring patients to a chiropractor; (Lynk 1427-28) it is anti-competitive to impose higher costs on chiropractors by forcing them to pay for their own x-ray equipment rather than obtaining x-rays from hospital radiology departments or radiologists in private practice; and it is anti-competitive to prevent chiropractors from improving their education in a professional setting by preventing medical physicians from teaching or lecturing to chiropractors. (Tr. 1409-22, 1424-31.) Mr. Lynk agreed that in an economic sense a boycott such as the one described by plaintiffs raises the costs of chiropractic services and creates inefficiencies and economic dislocations. Obviously, Mr. Lynk did not concede the existence of the

boycott but agreed that these would be anti-competitive effects that would flow from such a boycott. I have also considered the fact that, as conceded by Mr. Lynk, there are substantial barriers to the entry of new chiropractors into the field, such as substantial education requirements. These barriers increase the likelihood that the boycott had a substantial adverse effect on competition.

The Court of Appeals in *Wilk*, which reviewed substantially the same boycott evidence, concluded:

Through such mechanisms, individual physicians were discouraged from cooperating with chiropractors in: patient treatment, because referrals were inhibited by defendants' activities; research; and educational activities, such as sharing clinical experience and research results. Chiropractors were denied access to the hospital facilities they considered necessary to practice their professions. Medical doctors were discouraged from aiding chiropractors in interpreting electrocardiograms. Requests by individual plaintiffs to use laboratory and X-ray facilities were not granted; requests for hospital in-patient privileges were similarly denied. Referrals from medical doctors were reduced. Public demand for chiropractic services was negatively affected.

719 F.2d at 214.

The defendants argue that all of this evidence is not enough—that the plaintiffs must specifically prove an impact on price and output. The cases do not support that position. As Professor Areeda recently noted in his article "The Rule of Reason—a Catechism on Competition," 55 *Antitrust Law Journal*, 571 (1986), the Supreme Court has held that the purpose of the inquiry into market definition and market power is to determine whether an arrangement has the potential for genuine adverse effects on competition. If there is actual proof of adverse effects,

then the plaintiffs need not prove market definition and market power. The Supreme Court in *Federal Trade Commission v. Indiana Federation of Dentists*, 476 U.S. 447, 106 S.Ct. 2009, 2019, 90 L.Ed.2d 445 (1986), stated that “the inquiry into market power is but a surrogate for detrimental effects.”

The AMA relies on Mr. Lynk’s conclusion that the boycott had pro-competitive effects that would have outweighed the anti-competitive effects. (Tr. 1409.) Mr. Lynk’s theory is that the boycott constituted nonverbal communication which informed consumers about the differences between medical physicians and chiropractors, and that this had a pro-competitive effect. (Tr. 1411-12.) I reject this opinion as speculative. (Tr. 1434-43.) Mr. Lynk neither conducted nor read any studies regarding the efficacy of such nonverbal communications. *Id.* He neither conducted nor read any surveys of consumer opinion to determine whether consumers were confused about the differences between medical physicians and chiropractors. (*Id.*) I saw no evidence of any such confusion during the trial. Mr. Lynk’s opinion does not accord with common sense. A nationwide conspiracy intended by its participants to contain and eliminate a licensed profession cannot be justified on the basis of Mr. Lynk’s personal opinion that it was pro-competitive, nonverbal communication to consumers.

### 3. Antitrust Injury

Having determined that the effect of Principle 3 and the implementing conduct has been to unreasonably restrict competition rather than to promote it, I now consider whether the plaintiffs have shown injury of the kind the antitrust laws were designed to prevent.

The plaintiffs principally rely on the testimony of Dr. Miron Stano, their economic expert. Dr. Stano compared the income of chiropractors, podiatrists, and optometrists over the relevant period of time and concluded that the income of chiropractors was lower than that of the other, comparable limited licensed practitioners. (Tr. 458.) He viewed this as consistent with the boycott theory. He also noted a jump in chiropractors' income during the period 1978 to 1980 and he concluded that the jump was consistent with the acknowledged lessening of the boycott by the AMA during that period. (Tr. 641.)

The defendants' economic expert, Mr. Lynk, faulted the data relied upon by Dr. Stano (Tr. 1309-20), but he agreed that if he were to compare chiropractors' income to comparable groups, he would also include podiatrists and optometrists, as well as other groups, but he would seek further explanations for the differences between the groups' incomes. (Tr. 1464-67.) Mr. Lynk further criticized the "jump" analysis done by Dr. Stano due to the fact that Dr. Stano relied on income projections from the Bureau of Labor Statistics ("BLS"). (Tr. 1310, 1322-23, 1500.) Defendants argued that BLS statistics are a poor source to begin with, and that reliance on such statistics further was not justified because in 1980 BLS began to note that it obtained its income projections for chiropractors from the American Chiropractors Association, thus signaling a change in the data collection methodology used by the BLS. This revelation caused the recalling of Dr. Stano, the introduction of a new defense expert, Mr. Robert Topel, a labor economist from the University of Chicago, and a new deposition of Dr. Stano. Mr. Topel's testimony cast further doubt on the BLS data used by Dr. Stano. (Topel Tr. 3574-3589.) However, the cross examination of Mr. Lynk demonstrated to my satisfaction

that the data used by Dr. Stano were reasonable. Several of the critical numbers had some independent verification. (Tr. 1525-30.) I have also considered Mr. Topel's criticism but find that the data collection procedures used by the BLS during the relevant time remained consistent enough to be useful in this case.

I do not rely on Dr. Stano's evidence in isolation. I understand that the data are not the best that could be used for such studies, but the best data, suggested by Mr. Topel, do not exist. What lends support to Dr. Stano's result is the very strong evidence of a pervasive, nationwide, effective conspiracy which by its very nature would have affected the demand curve for chiropractic services and adversely affected income of chiropractors. Again, defendants' economist, Mr. Lynk, agreed that such a conspiracy would shift the demand curve for chiropractic services. (Tr. 1415-22.)

The plaintiffs also established injury to reputation suffered by chiropractors. Both economic experts believed that injury to reputation would constitute an anti-competitive effect of the boycott. (Tr. 410-11, 1456-59.) See *Weiss v. York Hospital*, 745 F.2d 786, 806-07 (3rd Cir. 1984), *cert. denied*, 470 U.S. 1060, 105 S.Ct. 1777, 84 L.Ed.2d 836 (1985) (policy denying staff privileges to osteopaths likely to injure their professional reputations). In addition to labeling all chiropractors as unscientific cultists and depriving chiropractors of association with medical physicians, injury to reputation was assured by the AMA's name-calling practice. For example, in 1973, Dr. Sabatier, an AMA official, described chiropractors as rabid dogs and killers. (PX 1288.) Such statements were made in furtherance of the conspiracy and obviously injure reputations.

#### 4. *Rejection of Per Se Violation*

The Seventh Circuit has already held that Principle 3 escapes per se treatment because it involves a medical ethic which nonfrivolously addresses the importance of scientific method, a subject well within the natural ambit of a medical association. The plaintiffs argue that the Supreme Court's decision in *F.T.C. v. Indiana Federation of Dentists*, 106 S.Ct. 2009 (1986), decided after *Wilk*, compels application of the per se analysis. I disagree. First, *Indiana Dentists* itself was decided under a rule of reason analysis. Although the Supreme Court rejected the dentists' rationale that the withholding of x-rays in that case was justifiable as being in the best interests of patients, and specifically said that such a purported justification was legally and factually marred, the Court did not apply a per se rule.

*Indiana Dentists* is quite like *National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States*, 435 U.S. 679, 98 S.Ct. 1355, 55 L.Ed.2d 637 (1978). In both cases the Supreme Court refused to allow professional competitors to deprive consumers of information they desired, and in both cases the court rejected the professionals' purported consumer welfare justification for the restraint. I believe the result in *Indiana Dentists* was based on the same rationale that decided *Professional Engineers*. I do not read *Indiana Dentists* as requiring a per se analysis. The plaintiffs also urge that *Indiana Dentists* eliminates the patient care defense created by the Seventh Circuit in *Wilk*. The Supreme Court did not address the specific issue of whether patient care defense on the facts in this case would be allowed, and since *Indiana Dentists* is much more like *Professional Engineers* than this case, I believe I must follow *Wilk*.

### 5. *Patient Care Defense*

I now consider whether the AMA has established the *Wilk* patient care defense. The first element is whether the AMA and its members genuinely entertained a concern for scientific method in the care of patients. I have some questions about the genuineness of the AMA's concern for scientific method based on the fact that when the AMA adopted changes in its chiropractic policy between 1977 and 1980, it apparently did so without deciding whether chiropractic was scientific. That shows disregard for scientific method in patient care. Nevertheless, I conclude that the AMA has established this element. At the time it was attacking chiropractic as unscientific, it was attacking other unscientific methods of treatment of disease, for example the Krebiozen treatment of cancer. The existence of medical standards or guidelines against unscientific practice is common. Other medical societies have long had such prohibitions and the chiropractors themselves have a similar ethical guideline. (DX L31.) So I conclude that the AMA has established the first element of genuine concern.

The next element is whether the concern for scientific method in patient care is objectively reasonable. In connection with this element of the patient care defense, the parties have devoted a substantial amount of effort in attempting to prove that chiropractic was either good or bad, efficacious or deleterious, quackery or science. At the time the Committee on Quackery was operating, there was a lot of material available to the Committee that supported its belief that all chiropractic was unscientific and deleterious. (Tr. 2063-90.) In fact, there was a substantial amount of evidence on which the Committee reasonably could conclude that chiropractic was based on the single cause of disease theory, despite some contrary evidence

that the theory had been disavowed by modern practitioners. (*Id.*)

There also was some evidence before the Committee that chiropractic was effective—more effective than the medical profession in treating certain kinds of problems such as workmen's back injuries. (E.g., PX 241, 1476, 1471-72, 184, 192-94; Balantine Dep. 137-39.) The Committee on Quackery was also aware that some medical physicians believed chiropractic to be effective and that chiropractors were better trained to deal with musculoskeletal problems than most medical physicians. (*Id.*; Tr. 2159-74.) The Committee did not follow up on any of these studies or opinions. (*Id.*) Basically the Committee members were doctors who, because of their firm belief that chiropractic had to be stopped and eliminated, volunteered for service on the committee. Dr. David B. Stevens, who testified during the trial, was one of these dedicated individuals who devoted a substantial amount of time to his committee work. (Tr. 2065.) But it was very clear that he and other committee members did not have minds open to pro-chiropractic arguments or evidence. (Tr. 2159-74.)

The AMA acknowledges that, after the Committee on Quackery disbanded, chiropractic improved (and the AMA takes partial credit for it). For example, Mr. Carlson, one of the AMA's trial attorneys, stated in final argument:

Dr. Winterstein testified that chiropractic has changed. And it has changed.

And we suggest that one reason that it changed was because of the criticism of its bizarre methods. Now, do you hear in this courtroom anything about one cause/one cure? Sure don't.

You hear about neuromusculo reasons, neuromusculo diagnosis, neuromusculo conditions. This is the new parlance. They have done away, for the most part, with the one cause/one cure. I understand there is

one small element of chiropractic that still adheres to it. But it's not the major element.

... And they have improved. . . . Chiropractic, I think is still changing. It began really changing when the accrediting arm of the ACA [American Chiropractic Association], as opposed to the ICA [International Chiropractic Association], was accepted, was recognized by the Department of Education as the sole accrediting body for chiropractic.

And that occurred in '73, '74, '75, something like that. And that's really when chiropractic began to evolve.

(Tr. 3132-33.)

Most significantly, Dr. Alan R. Nelson, the current Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the AMA testified (at pp. 2029-30):

My personal position, and I think that I can accurately reflect the position of the AMA in this, is that the fundamental theory of chiropractic as it was earlier portrayed was not supported by scientific evidence, first.

Secondly, that the nature of services that are being delivered by chiropractors are now diverse and includes some forms of manipulation that do have a scientific basis.

And, third, the responsibility for determining what is in the best interest of an individual patient rests with the individual practitioner and that there is nothing unethical about me asking a chiropractor to deliver a form of manipulative therapy that appears to me to have a scientific basis, and I think I'm accurately reflecting the testimony of Dr. Epps.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Dr. Charles Harry Epps, an orthopedic surgeon, testified that some musculo-skeletal treatments by chiropractors are scientific

(Footnote continued on following page)

Most defense witnesses agreed that some chiropractic treatment is therapeutic—although certainly no one involved in this case, including the plaintiffs, believes that chiropractic treatment should be used for the treatment of diseases such as cancer, diabetes, heart disease, high blood pressure, and infections. (E.g., Tr. 1214-17, 1222, 1249-56, 1259-60, 1975-76, 2029-30, 2984.) It is hard to pinpoint when the changes in chiropractic testified to by AMA witnesses occurred, but it is likely that they occurred while the boycott was still in effect. Thus the AMA's own evidence suggests that at some point during the boycott there was no longer an objectively reasonable concern that would support a boycott of the entire chiropractic profession.

The plaintiffs clearly want more from the court. They want a judicial pronouncement that chiropractic is a valid, efficacious, even scientific health care service.<sup>8</sup> I believe that the answer to that question can only be provided by a well designed, controlled, scientific study such as the one urged by the United States Congress' Office of Technology Assessment in its review of the New Zealand Report. In 1980, the AMA House of Delegates urged that

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<sup>7</sup> *continued*

and he appeared to include chiropractic manipulation among those treatments. (Tr. 1975-76.) Dr. Epps is presently a member of the Judicial Council of the AMA and he testified for the AMA. (Tr. 1932.)

<sup>8</sup> At the beginning of the trial the Court told the parties that the question of whether or not chiropractic is scientific was not an issue in this case and would not be decided by the Court. A courtroom is not the proper forum for such a debate. Plaintiffs have submitted literally dozens of technical papers or reports (PX 7005-78) to demonstrate that there is a developing body of literature involving chiropractic and manipulative therapy (most of it dated since 1980) but I have not considered the contents of those papers for purposes of this opinion.

such a study be done. No such study has ever been done. In the absence of such a study, the court is left to decide the issue on the basis of largely anecdotal evidence. I decline to pronounce chiropractic valid or invalid on anecdotal evidence.

The plaintiffs, however, point out that the anecdotal evidence in the record favors chiropractors. The patients who testified were helped by chiropractors and not by medical physicians. (Tr. 1109-36.) Dr. Per Freitag, a medical physician who associates with chiropractors, has observed that patients in one hospital who receive chiropractic treatment are released sooner than patients in another hospital in which he is on staff which does not allow chiropractors. (Tr. 812.) Dr. John McMillan Mennell, M.D. testified in favor of chiropractic. (Tr. 35-42.) Even the defendants' economic witness, Mr. Lynk, assumed that chiropractors outperformed medical physicians in the treatment of certain conditions and he believed that was a reasonable assumption. (Tr. 1414.)

The defendants have offered some evidence as to the unscientific nature of chiropractic. The study of how the five original named plaintiffs diagnosed and actually treated patients with common symptoms was particularly impressive. (Tr. 2208-319.) This study demonstrated that the plaintiffs do not use common methods in treating common symptoms and that the treatment of patients appears to be undertaken on an ad hoc rather than on a scientific basis. And there was evidence of the use of cranial adjustments to cure cerebral palsy and other equally alarming practices by some chiropractors. (Tr. 917.)

I do not minimize the negative evidence. But most of the defense witnesses, surprisingly, appeared to be testifying for the plaintiffs. Taking into account all of the

evidence, I conclude only that the AMA has failed to meet its burden on the issue of whether its concern for the scientific method in support of the boycott of the entire chiropractic profession was objectively reasonable throughout the entire period of the boycott. This finding is not and should not be construed as a judicial endorsement of chiropractic.

The next element of the patient care defense is whether the AMA's concern about scientific method has been the dominant motivating factor in the defendants' promulgation of Principle 3 in the conduct undertaken and intended to implement Principle 3. The AMA has carried its burden on this issue. While there is some evidence that the Committee on Quackery and the AMA were motivated by economic concerns—there are too many references in the record to chiropractors as competitors to ignore—I am persuaded that the dominant factor was patient care and the AMA's subjective belief that chiropractic was not in the best interests of patients.

The final question is whether this concern for scientific method in patient care could have been adequately satisfied in a manner less restrictive of competition. It would be a difficult task to persuade a court that a boycott and conspiracy designed to contain and eliminate a profession that was licensed in all fifty states at the time the Committee on Quackery disbanded was the only way to satisfy the AMA's concern for the use of scientific method in patient care. The AMA presented no evidence that a public education approach or any other less restrictive approach was beyond the ability or resources of the AMA or had been tried and failed. The AMA obviously was not successful in defeating the licensing of chiropractic on a state by state basis, but that failure does not mean that they had to resort to the highly restrictive means of the

boycott. The AMA and other medical societies have managed to change America's health-related conduct by what appears to be good public relations work and there has been no proof that a similar campaign would not have been at least as effective as the boycott in educating consumers about chiropractic and the AMA's concern for scientific method.

Based on these findings, I conclude that the AMA has failed to carry its burden of persuasion on the patient care defense.

#### 6. *Entitlement to an Injunction*

Section 16 of the Clayton Act gives private parties the right to seek injunctive relief for violation of the antitrust laws:

Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief . . . against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws . . . when and under the same conditions and principles as injunctive relief against threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage is granted by courts of equity, under the rules governing such proceedings. . . .

In accordance with well established Supreme Court decisions, all that is required to state a case for such relief is "a real threat of future violation or a contemporary violation of a nature likely to continue or recur." *United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc.*, 343 U.S. 326, 333, 72 S.Ct. 690, 695, 96 L.Ed. 978 (1952); *Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.*, 395 U.S. 100, 130, 89 S.Ct. 1562, 1580, 23 L.Ed.2d 129 (1969). Thus, although the statutory provision "invokes traditional principles of equity," *Zenith Radio* at 130, 89 S.Ct. at 1580, an antitrust plaintiff need not meet all of the requirements for an injunc-

tion imposed by traditional equity jurisprudence. *Commodity Futures Trading Comm. v. Hunt*, 591 F.2d 1211, 1220 (7th Cir. 1979).

Any relief fashioned by the court must be in accordance with the regulatory scheme and adequately serve the particularized needs of the case before the court. The trial court's discretion must be exercised to effectuate the manifest objective of the specific legislation involved. *Commodity Futures*, 591 F.2d at 1220, quoting *SEC v. Advance Capital Growth Corp.*, 470 F.2d 40, 53 (7th Cir. 1972). In view of the strong public policies private antitrust plaintiffs tend to promote, the teaching of *Commodity Futures* is important to the court's decision in this case.

In determining the appropriateness of injunctive relief, courts have typically scrutinized the prior conduct of the defendant. Voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct is looked upon with extreme skepticism by courts but may be a factor in determining the appropriateness of injunctive relief "if the defendant can demonstrate that there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated. The burden is a heavy one." *United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc.*, 629 F.2d 1351, 1388 (5th Cir. 1980), quoting *United States v. W.T. Grant Co.*, 345 U.S. 629, 633, 73 S.Ct. 894, 897, 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953).

Where a violation has been founded on systematic wrongdoing, rather than on isolated occurrence or event, the Seventh Circuit has observed that a court should be more inclined to issue an injunction. *Commodity Futures*, 591 F.2d at 1220. Relief is appropriate against a defendant which retains a financial interest in continuing antitrust violations and/or a position in the market which could enable it to carry out such anticompetitive activity. *Commodity Futures* indicates that the defendant's acceptance

of blame for its conduct is a factor tending to diminish the necessity of injunctive relief. Conversely, lack of contrition would also have some relevance.

The plaintiffs urge that a court, once it has found a violation of the antitrust laws, has "the duty to compel action by the conspirators that will, so far as practicable, cure the ill effects of the illegal conduct, and assure the public freedom from its continuance." *United States v. United States Gypsum Co.*, 340 U.S. 76, 88, 71 S.Ct. 160, 169, 95 L.Ed. 89 (1950). While this is the only case I have found which states that such an injunction is *mandatory*, there is no question that a court may consider lingering efforts as a factor. As the Supreme Court stated in *International Salt Co. v. United States*, 332 U.S. 392, 400-01, 68 S.Ct. 12, 17-18, 92 L.Ed. 20 (1947):

The District Court is not obliged to assume, contrary to common experience, that a violator of the antitrust laws will relinquish the fruits of his violation more completely than the court requires him to do. And advantages already in hand may be held by methods more subtle and informed, and more difficult to prove, than those which, in the first place, win a market. . . . In an equity suit, the end to be served is not punishment of past transgression, nor is it merely to end specific illegal practices. A public interest served by such civil suits is that they effectively pry open to competition a market that has been closed by defendants' illegal restraints.

The point, clearly, is to deny those in violation of the Act future benefits from their forbidden conduct. *United States Gypsum Co.*, 340 U.S. at 89, 71 S.Ct. at 169. See also *Oregon State Medical Soc.*, 343 U.S. at 333, 72 S.Ct. at 695. Continuing effects of past illegal conduct, therefore, is an important factor to consider.

Because this suit is brought by private citizens, the AMA contends that (1) the plaintiffs must show a threat of personal injury and (2) that they are entitled only to preventive relief disabling that threat. It bases its position on the Supreme Court's recognition that a private litigant's objectives in pursuing an antitrust action are not necessarily congruent with the public interest. *United States v. Borden Co.*, 347 U.S. 514, 518-19, 74 S.Ct. 703, 706-07, 98 L.Ed. 903 (1954). This difference in interests, it adds, renders inapplicable many of the cases cited by the plaintiffs in support of broad injunctive relief. That contention is only partially correct.

It is true that an antitrust plaintiff must prove some kind of personal injury or threat of injury stemming from the defendant's anti-competitive activity in order to maintain its lawsuit; both the Clayton Act and Article III of the Constitution require this much. See *Borden*, 347 U.S. at 518-19, 74 S.Ct. at 706-07 (Clayton Act); Julian O. von Kalinski, 1 *Antitrust Law and Trade Regulation* Section 4.06[6] (1986); *Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United For Separation of Church and State*, 454 U.S. 464, 472, 102 S.Ct. 752, 758, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982) ("at an irreducible minimum, Art. III requires the party who invokes the court's authority to show that he personally has suffered from actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant").

Where the AMA's argument is flawed is in its suggestion that the relief granted to a private plaintiff is *necessarily* more limited than that available were the government bringing the lawsuit. While it is true that a private plaintiff may not bring an action *on behalf* of the public, it does not follow that the relief granted to a private

litigant may not take on a “public” character. See *International Salt*, 332 U.S. at 401, 68 S.Ct. at 17 (“A public interest served by such civil suits is that they effectively pry open to competition a market that has been closed by defendants’ illegal restraints”). See also *Hawaii v. Standard Oil Company of California*, 405 U.S. 251, 262, 92 S.Ct. 885, 891, 31 L.Ed.2d 184 (1972) (Congress sought enforcement of antitrust laws by encouraging plaintiffs to serve as private attorneys general). I generally agree, however, that courts should be “quite reluctant to grant ‘drastic’ or sweeping” injunctive relief to private plaintiffs. von Kalinski, *Antitrust Laws* at Section 4.406[6].

The defendants argue that the plaintiffs have not shown any personal injury, as opposed to just a generalized injury to the profession of chiropractic. This argument has led to an extensive inquiry into each incident by which the plaintiffs claim they were harmed or are being threatened with harm as a result of the boycott. Each rejection suffered by one of the plaintiffs has been dissected to determine whether the boycott was the source of the rejection.<sup>9</sup>

It obviously would be extremely difficult to discover facts which would show whether a particular rejection or lost opportunity suffered by a plaintiff or any chiropractor was caused by the boycott. For example, the AMA argues that many medical physicians have reached an independent conclusion that chiropractors have no value or impose harm on patients based on their own experiences,

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<sup>9</sup> The material facts relating to the rejections testified to by the plaintiffs (and recited, for example, in the Plaintiffs’ Summary of Proofs) are not in dispute and they will not be recited in this opinion. The disputed question is the source of or the basis for the rejection.

or on sources of such conclusions that are independent of the AMA (such as the 1975 Consumers Report articles, PX 7322), or on statements of or actions by the AMA and other defendants which are protected *Noerr-Pennington* activity. The AMA would have this court ask, if a medical physician refuses to associate with a chiropractor, who can say that the boycott was a contributing factor?

While it is difficult to say in any particular instance, a fair inference from the evidence is that the nature and extent of the boycott has influenced the thinking of medical physicians in their dealing, or refusing to deal, with chiropractors. The Committee on Quackery directly resulted from the AMA's concern that some medical physicians were cooperating with chiropractors and the AMA believed that this should be stopped. The Committee believed it was successful, and as I have already noted, I believe that the Committee's self-assessment was correct. It took the boycott to stop cooperation among medical physicians and chiropractors.<sup>10</sup> After the ethical proscription was lifted in 1980, some medical physicians did begin to associate with chiropractors. Certainly, Dr. Nelson and Drs. Epps and Dickey (current members of the Judicial Council who testified for the AMA) would not be taking referrals from chiropractors today, as they do (e.g., Tr. 2031), if Principle 3 were still on the books and if the AMA had not changed its chiropractic policy. It is important to note that these three doctors are well versed in the AMA's present policies since they were all called to testify about those policies.

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<sup>10</sup> Obviously, the boycott was not 100% successful and there has always been some cooperation among medical physicians and chiropractors.

I conclude that while the boycott was in full bloom it more likely than not affected individual decision-making by AMA members and other medical physicians in their relationships with chiropractors, including the plaintiffs. Until AMA members learn that the AMA's policies in fact have changed and that the reason for the change, as Dr. Nelson has testified (Tr. 2028-30), is that chiropractic has matured, the effects of the boycott, in my judgment, will continue to affect AMA members' decision-making with respect to association with chiropractors. From this I conclude that the rejections and lost opportunities suffered by the individual plaintiffs more likely than not were caused in significant part by the boycott. Thus, the individual plaintiffs have been personally harmed, and continue to be personally threatened, by a lack of association with members of the AMA caused by the boycott and the lingering effects of the boycott. The injury and the threatened loss are "fairly traceable" to the AMA's actions. *Allen v. Wright*, 468 U.S. 737, 752, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 3324, 82 L.Ed.2d 556, 569 (1984); *Valley Forge Christian College v. American United*, 454 U.S. 464, 472, 102 S.Ct. 752, 758, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982); *Hope, Inc. v. College of DuPage*, 738 F.2d 797, 804 (7th Cir. 1984). I reach this conclusion despite the fact that no AMA member confessed that she or he refused to associate with one of the plaintiffs because of the constraints of Principle 3, and despite the self-serving denials that Principle 3 had anything to do with a decision not to deal with one of the plaintiffs.

The evidence has also established a continuing injury to reputation which both Dr. Stano and Mr. Lynk testified would constitute an anti-competitive effect of the boycott. The activities of the AMA undoubtedly have injured the reputation of chiropractors generally. This kind of injury more likely than not was sustained by the four plaintiffs.

In my judgment, this injury continues to the present time and likely continues to adversely affect the plaintiffs. The AMA has never made any attempt to publicly repair the damage the boycott did to chiropractors' reputations. There has been no affirmative statement by the AMA to its members that it is ethical to associate with chiropractors. There has been no public announcement of what the AMA has argued in this courtroom in defense against an injunction, namely that chiropractic has changed and improved. I believe that until some of these things are said by the AMA to its members, plaintiffs and chiropractors generally will continue to suffer injury to reputation resulting from the boycott.

Finally, based on Dr. Stano's testimony, the plaintiffs have established a likelihood that their incomes have been diminished as a result of the boycott, and that such injury threatens to continue to this day. The AMA points out that the last data point utilized by Dr. Stano showed that chiropractors' income in 1984 exceeded that of podiatrists and optometrists. (Tr. 475.) That is correct, but the analyses done by Dr. Stano to predict income through 1986 showed that the projection was still lower than similar projections for podiatrists and optometrists. Thus, I conclude that the plaintiffs have demonstrated sufficient personal injury to obtain an injunction in this case.

The final question is whether the court will exercise its discretion and issue an injunction against any of the defendants who have been found guilty of a Section 1 violation. The AMA strenuously argued that no injunction is necessary since its present policies are in compliance with the antitrust laws; it has no intention of changing its present policies; most of the conduct relied upon by the plaintiffs occurred in the mid to late 1960s; and the AMA voluntarily has taken corrective action.

I agree that the AMA's present policies do not prohibit association with chiropractors. With respect to the specific corrective action taken by the AMA, I have already discussed the begrudging nature of Report UU and the continued use of the concept of "unscientific practices" in both Report UU and in the 1977 revised Opinions of the Judicial Council. Until Principle 3 was eliminated in 1980, Report UU and the revised opinions remained ambiguous due to the references to unscientific conduct. To this day, the AMA responds to requests for information on chiropractic by sending outdated anti-chiropractic literature. But the more important point for purposes of determining whether an injunction is necessary is the fact that in none of the AMA policies is there any affirmative statement that the boycott is over. An example of such an affirmative statement is that of the Illinois State Medical Society: "There are and should be no ethical or collective impediments to full professional association and cooperation between doctors of chiropractic and medical physicians, except as provided by law." The Opinion of the Judicial Council which the AMA relies on most heavily to show its new position on chiropractic, Opinion 3.01, is entitled "Nonscientific Practitioners." (DX 21077 at 13.) So the AMA member has to look under "Nonscientific Practitioners" to find out that it is permissible to associate with a chiropractor. In contrast, the 1969 Opinions had a separate section on optometrists, about whom the AMA at one time had very negative things to say, but today there is nothing similar on chiropractors. (Tr. 1964-65.) Another example is the AMA's acknowledgement of its changed thinking about osteopaths. In 1969 Opinions contained an opinion on osteopathy which states that "recognition should be given to the transition presently occurring in osteopathy." (PX 505.) A medical physician whose thinking on chiropractic was formed at least in part by

the boycott has not been told affirmatively by the AMA that the boycott is off and that it is ethical for a medical physician to professionally associate with a chiropractor if she or he believes it is in the best interests of her or his patient.

The AMA also relies on the settlement agreements it entered into in several other lawsuits brought by chiropractors in Pennsylvania, New York, and Iowa.<sup>11</sup> In these agreements the AMA basically reaffirmed and reiterated its policy changes and agreed to not change those policies. In addition, Drs. Nelson, Epps, and Dickey, testified that the AMA has no plans to change its present policies on chiropractic. (Tr. 2005, 1939, 2959.) Some of the plaintiffs' witnesses, Dr. Freitag and Dr. James Winterstein, D.C., stated their agreement with and support of the current AMA policies. (Tr. 852-53, 294-95.) Finally, the AMA relies on the fact that the change in the AMA position, and the medical profession's criticism of that change in position, received wide publicity in both the medical and popular press in the late 1970s and early 1980s. From this the AMA concludes its members have been informed of the change in position.

In response to the AMA's argument that there is no evidence that suggests a return to its former policies, I need only refer to AMA's behavior in connection with the 1983 revision of the JCAH accreditation standards for hospitals. The AMA was forced to change its original position which was more favorable to chiropractors in response to criticism from its members and other medical

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<sup>11</sup> The AMA also relies on the favorable results it received in other chiropractic litigation, but none of those results is binding here and there are substantial differences among the various lawsuits that render comparison useless.

societies. The AMA changed its position to satisfy its constituents, medical physicians, and it voted to approve the more restrictive accreditation standards. The fact that the AMA was forced to back away from its original position indicates to me that the AMA's present assurances are good only until the next chiropractic battle.

The plaintiffs note that in all of the settlement agreements executed by the AMA there is no admission of liability, and that in this case the AMA vigorously argues that its conduct is now and always has been legal. "The activities of the AMA relating to chiropractic and doctors of chiropractic have always been in compliance with anti-trust laws. . . ." AMA Motion for Summary Judgment, March 24, 1987, p. 10. This is a relevant factor.

I conclude that an injunction is necessary in this case. There are lingering effects of the conspiracy; the AMA has never acknowledged the lawlessness of its past conduct and in fact to this day maintains that it has always been in compliance with the antitrust laws; there has never been an affirmative statement by the AMA that it is ethical to associate with chiropractors; there has never been a public statement to AMA members of the admissions made in this court about the improved nature of chiropractic despite the fact that the AMA today claims that it made changes in its policy in recognition of the change and improvement in chiropractic; there has never been public retraction of articles such as "The Right and Duty of Hospitals to Deny Chiropractor Access to Hospitals"; a medical physician has to very carefully read the current AMA Judicial Council Opinions to realize that there has been a change in the treatment of chiropractors and the court cannot assume that members of the AMA pore over these opinions; and finally, the systematic, long-term wrongdoing and the long-term intent to destroy

a licensed profession suggests that an injunction is appropriate in this case. When all of these factors are considered in the context of this “private attorney general” anti-trust suit, a proper exercise of the court’s discretion permits, and in my judgment requires, an injunction.

After reviewing the form of injunction proposed by the plaintiffs in connection with the motions for summary judgment, I informed the parties that regardless of the outcome of this case, I would not grant the sweeping form of injunction sought by the plaintiffs. As the defendants have suggested, the plaintiffs appear to want a forced marriage between the professions. Certainly no judge should perform that ceremony. Since August 27th, the form of permanent injunction proposed by the court has been discussed with the parties and modified to take some of the AMA’s 1st amendment concerns into account, the Permanent Injunction shall be entered today.

*B. Liability of Remaining Defendants*

*1. General Legal Principles Applicable to Co-Conspirators*

After the first trial, defendants JCAH, ACP, and AAOS appealed the denial of their motions for directed verdict. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of those motions. The Court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to permit, but not require, the finder of fact to conclude that each defendant knew that concerted action in a scheme was contemplated and invited and that each acquiesced and participated in that scheme. “Such a finding would have provided sufficient footing for liability in this civil antitrust action. *See Theater Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp.*, 346 U.S. 537, 540, 74 S.Ct. 257, 259, 98 L.Ed. 273 (1954); *Interstate Circuit*,

*Inc. v. United States*, 306 U.S. 208, 226-27, 59 S.Ct. 467, 474-75, 83 L.Ed. 610 (1939).” *Wilk*, 719 F.2d at 233.<sup>12</sup>

The defendants argue that *Monsanto v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.*, 465 U.S. 752, 104 S.Ct. 1464, 79 L.Ed.2d 775 (1984), and *Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.*, 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986), have clarified and limited the “conscious parallelism” doctrine of the cases relied upon in *Wilk*. In *Monsanto* the Supreme Court held that in order for the plaintiffs’ case to survive a motion for summary judgment or for directed verdict, there must be evidence that tends to (1) “exclude the possibility” of independent action by the alleged conspirators, and (2) prove that the alleged conspirators had “a conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective.” *Monsanto*, 465 U.S. at 764, 768, 104 S.Ct. at 1473. Those standards were reaffirmed in *Matsushita*, where the Court noted:

We do not mean to imply that, if petitioners had had a plausible reason to conspire, ambiguous conduct could suffice to create a triable issue of conspiracy. Our decision in *Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.* . . . establishes that conduct that is as consistent with permissible competition as with illegal conspiracy does not, without more, support even an inference of conspiracy.

(106 S.Ct. 16 1632 n. 21).

The standards of *Monsanto* and *Matsushita* must be met in this case. Also, under general conspiracy law, a particular defendant’s membership in the conspiracy must be proved by its own acts and declarations and not the

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<sup>12</sup> The appeal of the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons from the denial of its post-trial motion was decided in a separate order. The Court issued a similar finding against the Academy.

acts or declarations of the alleged co-conspirators. *United States v. Jefferson*, 714 F.2d 689, 696 (7th Cir. 1983); *United States v. Santiago*, 582 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1978). Accordingly, the evidence relating to each remaining defendant will be analyzed to determine: first, if that defendant's own conduct shows membership in the conspiracy, secondly, whether the defendant has established the patient care defense and then, if pertinent, whether the plaintiffs are entitled to injunctive relief against the defendant.

One factual issue relates to all of the other defendants. The plaintiffs note that two years after the Committee on Quackery was formed, the Committee sent the AMA's 1966 chiropractic policy to 56 groups, including some specialty medical societies, to seek their cooperation in reminding their members of the ethical standards. (PX 550, 550A.) There was no evidence as to the identity of these groups. Plaintiffs argue that a reasonable assumption is that the co-defendants received this communication. There was no direct evidence that any of the co-defendants received this communication and I shall not infer receipt by any defendant.

2. *Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals*  
("JCAH")

(a) *Activity through 1980*

JCAH is a not-for-profit corporation for the purpose of setting standards and conducting a health care accreditation program in conjunction with those standards. JCAH members are the AMA, ACP, the American College of Surgeons (ACS), the American Hospital Association ("AHA"), and the American Dental Association. (PX 7130.)

JCAH is governed by its Board of Commissioners. Twenty-one commissioners are appointed by the various members and those commissioners appoint one public commissioner. (Tr. 3367.) The two dominant members are the AMA and former defendant AHA, each having seven commissioners for a total of 14 out of a total of 22 votes. (Tr. 3367.) ACS and ACP each has three commissioners. (Tr. 3367.) Commissioners appointed by a particular member generally are free to vote their conscience on any issue, but typically a commissioner is a strong organization man who became a commissioner after serving on the national policy board of the member organization. JCAH's power derives from the power of its member organizations. (Schlicke Dep. 129-30; DX 5006; PX 7169.) It would have difficulty surviving if it did not have the support of its powerful members. (*Id.*)

Participation by hospitals in the accreditation program is voluntary. (Tr. 1729, 1756; JCAH II 2.) However, obtaining accreditation is important to a hospital and loss of accreditation would be devastating. "Denial or loss of accreditation can close a hospital." (Schlicke Dep. 109-10).

As the hospital standard-setting organization, JCAH has the power to define and regulate the activities which take place in hospitals and to eliminate or frustrate competition from non-medical physician health care providers. (PX 7157.) From before 1958, JCAH had standards which provided that the hospital medical staff shall be limited to fully licensed physicians. (Tr. 3371.) It was not until 1970 that dentists were included.

On May 16, 1964, JCAH's director stated, in a column in the national newsletter of AHA, that the Commission viewed chiropractors as cultists and that any hospital that encouraged cultists to use its facilities in any way would

“very probably be severely criticized and lose its accreditation.” (PX 6.) This statement was later republished in a reference manual distributed to approximately 6,100 hospitals. (Sullivan Trial I Tr. 5306; PX 828.) At the time this statement was first published, the AMA Committee on Quackery was only five months old and the Committee had not yet begun its efforts to get other groups to support the AMA’s policy on chiropractic. There was no direct evidence that JCAH was acting in concert with the AMA in connection with the publication of the statement or its later distribution. The actions appear to be independent.

In 1970 JCAH completed a revision of its standards and published the *Accreditation Manual for Hospitals* (“AMH”). Standard X (drafted by the AMA) was included. (PX 72 at 32, PX 2266.) Under this standard, the governing board of the hospital had to assure that medical staff members practice in an ethical manner. (JCAH II 6.) AMH included a source reference to the AMA’s Principles and the American Dental Association’s Principles of Ethics. (DX 72, p. 33.) The uncontradicted testimony was that JCAH’s Board of Commissioners never discussed the subject of chiropractic and that the subject was never raised in connection with the 1970 revisions and the publication of AMH. (Tr. 1623-24.) I accept this testimony. No chiropractor participated in any way in the revision process despite extensive opportunity to participate. (Tr. 1586-90; Tr. 1761-63, 1804.) There was no evidence that JCAH adopted Standard X in connection with chiropractors or in furtherance of the AMA boycott.

Throughout the early 1970s, JCAH staff responded to several inquiries from hospitals and others about the role of chiropractors in hospitals by stating that the Commission would withdraw and refuse accreditation of a hos-

pital that had chiropractors on its medical staff or that granted privileges to chiropractors. (PX 10A, 11A.) One of these letters specifically stated that such association would violate Principle 3. (PX 14A.) Another letter enclosed the article published by the AMA, "The Right and Duty of Hospitals to Exclude Doctors of Chiropractic." (PX 12B.) However, these letters were completely consistent with the then-existing accreditation standards. The fact that the letters were written is not surprising and is not convincing evidence that JCAH had joined the conspiracy against chiropractors.

Much of this correspondence was shared with the AMA and the AHA, and there were communications between Dr. Donald L. Kessler of JCAH and the AMA regarding chiropractic. (PX 12B.) In 1973 Dr. Kessler of JCAH cooperated with the AMA in connection with the distribution of "The Right and Duty of Hospitals to Exclude Chiropractors from Hospitals," which contained the statement that inclusion of chiropractors would threaten JCAH accreditation. (PX 12B.)

In 1974, the American Hospital Association was concerned that the inclusion of chiropractic under Medicare might mandate chiropractic services in health maintenance organizations. AHA was planning to meet with the AMA and JCAH to discuss this problem. (PX 9D.) The AHA inter-office memorandum that refers to the plan to meet with the AMA and JCAH is not the act or declaration of JCAH, however, and it cannot be considered by the court in determining the JCAH's membership in the conspiracy.

In 1977, after this lawsuit was filed, JCAH revised its standards to provide that medical staff membership shall be limited "unless otherwise provided by law" to fully licensed physicians and dentists. (Tr. 1639.) Also, all references to the AMA's Principles were deleted. (Tr. 1626;

JCAH II-13.) JCAH responded to all further inquiries regarding chiropractors by advising that the issue was one of local law. (JCAH II Exhibits.) Thus, from 1977, JCAH's position was that if under local law a limited licensed practitioner could be on a medical staff, the hospital could allow such a practitioner to be on the medical staff without jeopardizing its accreditation. In 1979, JCAH amended its laboratory and radiology standards to provide that hospitals could, if permitted by law, grant non-physician and non-medical staff members access to diagnostic laboratory and radiology services. (Tr. 3368.) Many states have laws which deal with the question of which limited licensed health practitioners can be on hospital medical staffs or have hospital privileges. In 1980 JCAH amended *AMH* to delete Standard X. (Tr. 1625-27.)

Focusing on JCAH's conduct from 1964 through 1980, I find that it was undertaken independently of the AMA boycott. JCAH's conduct during this period was consistent with its stated purpose of promoting high quality health care. (Tr. 3366.) From a time well before the AMA boycott, JCAH believed that only fully licensed physicians should be on medical staffs of hospitals. (Tr. 3371.) That belief was incorporated into the earliest standards and it was carried through 1980 except for the addition of dentists in 1970 and changes dictated by expanding state law. (JCAH II Exhibits.) At the most, the evidence establishes exchanges of information among JCAH and the AMA and AHA on the subject of chiropractic. Undoubtedly, JCAH was manipulated by the AMA to promote and expand its boycott—getting JCAH to adopt Standard X is but one example—but the evidence falls far short of establishing a conscious commitment to the scheme on the part of JCAH.

I note that JCAH's standards were largely consistent with federal law. From 1966 on, the conditions of hospital participation under Medicare provided that members of the medical staff be qualified professionally and ethically, that participating hospitals assure that patients were admitted to the hospital only on the recommendation of a physician, that the medical staff be responsible for all medical care, that the hospital's bylaws contain provisions concerning professional ethics, and that laboratory and radiological services be performed only on the order of a physician. It was not until 1972 that the Medicare statute defined physician as including chiropractors, and even then there was some question whether the inclusion was for reimbursement for office services only or whether by including chiropractors within the definition of physician Congress was allowing chiropractors on medical staffs of participating hospitals. (PX 7283, p. 38.) The consistency between the JCAH standards and Medicare requirements is further evidence that JCAH was acting independently rather than in concert with the AMA.

(b) *Liability of JCAH Members for JCAH Standards*

Plaintiffs argue that even if JCAH was acting independently of the AMA boycott, JCAH members are responsible for the actions of JCAH. Thus, if JCAH was acting to exclude chiropractors from hospitals, the JCAH members were acting in concert to exclude them. The plaintiffs' first theory is that the JCAH is the alter ego of each of its members. The evidence is simply insufficient to establish this theory. There is almost no evidence on the participation of the members in the creation and revision of JCAH standards prior to the 1983 revisions. The general evidence is that JCAH standards are created as

a result of an elaborate deliberative process involving many organizations and public hearings. (Tr. 1586-90, 1761-63, 1804.) Chiropractors were not involved in the process despite the fact they could have elected to become involved. (*Id.*) There is no evidence as to how the commissioners appointed by the defendants voted in connection with revisions prior to the 1983 revisions. I reject the alter ego theory.

Next plaintiffs argue that mere membership in JCAH is evidence that the member was engaged in a conspiracy to violate the antitrust laws. Plaintiffs rely on *Phelps Dodge Refining Corp. v. F.T.C.*, 139 F.2d 393, 396-97 (2nd Cir. 1943). The Court held that the circulation of a price list to members of a trade association put recipients on notice of illegal activities and provided a basis for imposing civil liability:

Thus the issue is reduced to whether a member who knows or should know that his association is engaged in an unlawful enterprise and continues his membership without protest may be charged with complicity as a confederate. We believe he may. Granted that his mere membership does not authorize unlawful conduct by the association, once he is chargeable with knowledge that his fellows are acting unlawfully his failure to dissociate himself from them is a ratification of what they are doing. He becomes one of the principals in the enterprise and cannot disclaim joint responsibility for the illegal uses to which the association is put.

Others have followed this view. *Chain Institute v. F.T.C.*, 246 F.2d 231, 240 (8th Cir. 1957); *Vandervelde v. Put & Call Brokers and Dealers Assn.*, 344 F.Supp. 118, 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); *Expert Electric Inc. v. Levine*, 554 F.2d 1227, 1235 (2nd Cir. 1977) (noting *Phelps* rule in dicta) and 399 F.Supp. 893, 897-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).

The membership-ratification theory articulated in *Phelps* has not retained the force of law. More recent cases have tended to require a greater showing to establish proof of conspiracy. See *Moore v. Boating Industry Associations*, 819 F.2d 693, 716 (7th Cir. 1987), quoting T. Vakerics, *Antitrust Basics*, Sec. 6.13 at 6-37 to 6-38 (1985) ("There must . . . be some evidence of actual knowledge of, and participation in, an illegal scheme in order to establish a violation of the antitrust laws by a particular association member.") *Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co.*, 508 F.2d 226, 231-33 (9th Cir. 1974) (to be liable, trade association member must have "knowingly, intentionally, and actively participated in an individual capacity in the scheme"); *Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp.*, 465 F.Supp. 195, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), *aff'd*, 610 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1979) (association, even coupled with knowledge of wrongful conduct by other members, does not create liability); *James Julian Inc. v. Raytheon Co.*, 557 F.Supp. 1058, 1065 (D. Del. 1983) (membership in trade association, including attendance at meetings, will not give rise to inference of conspiracy). By minimizing the importance of a member's knowledge of his association's wrongful conduct, these Courts have reformulated the membership-ratification doctrine virtually out of existence. *Kline*, 508 F.2d at 231. This emasculation of the *Phelps* rule is consistent with the Supreme Court's decisions in *Monsanto* and *Matsushita*. Accordingly, I conclude that mere membership in JCAH does not make each member liable for the acts of JCAH, and that the acts of JCAH prior to the 1983 revisions were not the result of a conspiracy among the JCAH members.

(c) 1983 Revisions of JCAH Standards

The 1983 revisions of the JCAH standards have already been described and discussed in connection with the AMA.

The 1983 revisions liberalized the prior standards regarding admission to medical staffs of, and allowance of hospital privileges to, limited licensed practitioners (which include chiropractors). (Tr. 1779.) The revisions were prompted by changes in state law which recognized the increased significance of limited licensed practitioners in the health care field. (Tr. 1750, 1788-89.) Despite the liberalization achieved by the revisions, the plaintiffs claim that the JCAH members' insistence that the medical staff of each accredited hospital must have an executive committee, the majority of which had to be medical and osteopathic physicians, is evidence that the conspiracy against chiropractors continued into 1983. (Plaintiffs do not claim that the 1983 JCAH standards violate the antitrust laws).

The evidence supports the conclusion that the 1983 revisions concerning the medical staffs of hospitals were the act of the defendants who are JCAH members. (PX 7268, 7101, 7117, 7141, 7154, 7181.) These members aggressively sought the revisions and the commissioners appointed by them appear to have been instructed on how to vote on the issue. (E.g., PX 7102-03, 7117, 7120, 7146.) There was also some evidence that the defendant members were concerned about chiropractors and the possibility of competition from chiropractors in the hospital setting. However, I reject plaintiffs' conclusion that the 1983 revisions constitute evidence that the boycott or conspiracy against chiropractors continued into 1983.

The proposed liberalization of the standards governing limited licensed practitioners created the theoretical possibility that a medical staff of a hospital could become dominated by limited licensed practitioners. (Tr. 1774.) That in turn created a discussion of whether JCAH ought not insure that patient care in acute care hospitals be controlled by fully licensed physicians. (*Id.*) The overwhelm-

ing response was that patient care and medical staffs must remain under medical and osteopathic physician control. (Tr. 1774-76.) Although the revision process was wide-open in that many drafts were distributed, public hearings were held, and comments were received and considered, no chiropractor participated in the process. (*Id.*) No argument was made with respect to the proper role of chiropractors, if any, in the hospital setting. No complaint was made on behalf of chiropractors that the requirement of an executive committee of the medical staff would work against the admission of chiropractors to hospitals.

The evidence supports the conclusion that the JCAH members were acting to assure that responsibility for patient care in acute care hospitals remained in the hands of medical and osteopathic physicians (Tr. 2517-18), and that this was an appropriate goal for JCAH. Today, acute care hospitals treat patients who are very sick or in need of surgery. Generally they are patients who require treatment with drugs or surgery, that is treatment by fully licensed physicians. (Tr. 1774.) A chiropractor may have a patient in a hospital who is in need of chiropractic treatment (e.g., Tr. 909), and there may be some justification for chiropractic services in hospitals (e.g., Tr. 811-12), but these facts do not justify hospital standards less rigorous than the ones adopted by JCAH in 1983. The evidence supports no conclusion other than that patient care in acute care hospitals, and the medical staffs of acute care hospitals, ought to be under the control of fully licensed physicians rather than limited licensed practitioners. I am persuaded that the JCAH members were not acting to prevent chiropractors from being admitted to hospitals or obtaining hospital privileges.

Current federal regulations have similar requirements. Under the current Medicare conditions of participation, if a medical staff has an executive committee, a majority

of the members of the committee must be doctors of medicine or osteopathy, and the responsibility for organization and conduct of the medical staff must be assigned only to an individual doctor of medicine or osteopathy. 42 CFR Sec. 482.22(b)(2), (3). Even though a chiropractor may have responsibility for a patient (but under the regulations only with respect to "treatment by means of manual manipulation of the spine to correct a subluxation demonstrated by x-ray to exist"), a physical examination and medical history of that patient must be done by a medical or osteopathic physician. 42 CFR Sec. 481.11(c)(5).

Under current JCAH standards, a hospital may grant chiropractors medical staff membership, clinical privileges, admission privileges, and access to diagnostic services without fear of loss or threatened loss of JCAH accreditation. Hospitals may select chiropractors to serve on the medical staff executive committee without affecting their accreditation. (Tr. 1779.) The hospital's governing board has the responsibility and ultimate authority for making individual medical staff appointments and delineations of clinical privileges, even though the governing board must resolve any differences it has with the medical staff. (Tr. 1814-15.) Since 1983, hospitals in fact have been allowing chiropractors on medical staffs. (Tr. 1824.) The uncontradicted evidence is that the current JCAH standards are reasonable because of the severity and complexity of conditions treated in the hospital setting, and plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Freitag, so testified. (Tr. 834-35.)

Since I have found that JCAH's acts before the 1983 revisions were independent of the AMA boycott and were not the acts of its members, and that the 1983 revisions are not evidence that the conspiracy against chiropractors continued into 1983, I find that the plaintiffs have

failed to prove that JCAH was a member of the conspiracy. Accordingly, judgment shall enter for JCAH.

### 3. *American College of Physicians ("ACP")*

ACP never had a code of ethics. In 1984, it published the American College of Physicians Ethics Manual. (PX 8051.) The document was not a code or set of regulations but "a modest effort to address major contemporary issues that confront every physician in practice" (PC 8051 at 1) and an effort "to stimulate reasonable debate so as to widen the area of agreement on medical ethics shared by the lay public, physicians, and others who take part in health care" (*Id.* at 2). With respect to relationships with other health professionals, the Manual states that

there are no rigid guidelines, but rather each situation must be approached in a context of the realities of the practice environment and state law. . . . Degrees of responsibility must be dictated by the competence of the allied health professionals and the nature of the actual practice setting. . . . The patient should be told about the variety and availability of such service, which can be facilitated through cooperation between physicians and licensed allied health professionals.

(*Id.* at 19-20.) With respect to "non-scientific medical systems," the Manual states that a patient's request for care "outside the orthodox medical system" warrants "the physician's considerate attention" and that the physician "should not abandon the patient if he should elect to try a non-scientific remedy" but that the physician "should not participate in such treatment." (*Id.* at 14-15.) The Manual states nothing about chiropractic or about what remedies are or are not "scientific." It appears to leave the individual physician free to make his own judgments

as to the kinds of treatment he should participate in and his relations with other licensed health practitioners.

Importantly, ACP never adopted the AMA's Principles and never required its members to subscribe to those principles. (Barondess Trial I at Tr. 5829.) The only reference to ethics in ACP's governing provisions was the statement in its constitution and bylaws that the purpose of the ACP included "preserving the history and perpetuating the best tradition of medicine and medical ethics." (PX 1812 at 1.)

Prior to the filing of this lawsuit in 1976, ACP considered the subject of chiropractic only once: On July 31, 1974, Daniel S. Ellis, M.D. wrote to Dr. Edward Rosenow, Jr., the executive vice president of ACP, stating that he had been asked by the Chairman of the Committee on Quackery, Dr. Ballantine, to see if ACP would send a statement to the National Institute of Neurological Diseases and Stroke ("NINDS"), which was conducting a congressionally mandated study of chiropractic. (PX 1816.) Dr. Rosenow must have agreed to do it because on September 4, 1974, he wrote to Donald B. Tower, M.D., Acting Director of NINDS. (PX 347.) The letter stated in part:

Although the Board of Regents of the College will not meet until November to take any specific action on the inclusion of chiropractic in Medicare and Medicaid, I am sure that they would be most distressed to find that the government was considering the inclusion of this non-scientifically based form of practice under Medicare and Medicaid. . . . The College, I am sure, would agree with the statement on chiropractic adopted by the American Medical Association's House of Delegates in 1966. . . .

(PX 347.) The letter then quoted the AMA's policy statement. (*Id.*) The ACP Board of Regents, however, did not

later adopt the AMA's policy. (Barondess Trial I at Tr. 5839.)

ACP argues strongly that this letter is protected under the *Noerr-Pennington* doctrine. I agree. The letter was written to a governmental agency in connection with a government project (the study of chiropractic) and it is also apparent from the letter that Dr. Rosenow was acting under the misapprehension (incredible as that may be) that chiropractic had not yet been included in Medicare and Medicaid. That, in fact, had happened a year earlier. Nevertheless, Dr. Rosenow appeared to believe that the letter was written to influence government action on the issue of the inclusion of chiropractic into Medicare and Medicaid. Even if the letter was not protected, it clearly reveals that it expresses Dr. Rosenow's opinion as to what action the Board of Regents might take in the future and it is not the act of ACP endorsing the AMA chiropractic policy statement. Furthermore, ACP had no member on the Committee on Quackery and there is no evidence that ACP had knowledge of the activities of the Committee.

After this lawsuit and several other chiropractic lawsuits were filed, Dr. Jeremiah Barondess, the president of ACP, wrote to ACP members, principally about the defense of the lawsuits. (Barondess Trial I at Tr. 5834-36.) Dr. Barondess viewed the lawsuits as an effort by chiropractors to gain legitimacy. The letter states in part:

Our concern about these suits does not relate to their merit; indeed, we feel strongly that they have no merit whatever. . . . All have agreed that the issue that is paramount is the health of the population of this country, and that the only ethical position for the College to take in relation to these efforts by the chiropractors is to resist them as strongly as possible.

(PX 1440.) The letter also discusses various settlements of chiropractic lawsuits by the AMA and other co-defendants and seeks the support of the membership in the defense of this lawsuit. (*Id.*) This letter is protected under the *Noerr-Pennington* doctrine.

In September of 1978, there was a meeting of the Board of Governors of the ACP (the Board of Governors was not the policy making body—that was the Board of Regents). (Barondess Trial I at Tr. 5829-32, 5853; Moser Dep. 113-14; Tr. 2528, 2540-41.) At the meeting the Board heard and accepted a report by the ad hoc committee appointed to suggest what might be done at the chapter or regional level to promote the College's policy toward chiropractic. (PX 1441.) The minutes of the meeting reflect that:

The Committee agreed unanimously that ACP should be concerned about and oppose any action which would include chiropractic among the scientifically-based modes of medical care and which would give chiropractors direct access to the diagnostic facilities of hospitals.

(PX 1441 at 33.) The Board of Governors then adopted the following resolution:

- (1) the Regents and ACP staff should keep the Governors informed of development in the North Penn case and related actions;
- (2) the Governors should remain alert to efforts of chiropractors to gain access to radiographic and clinical laboratory diagnostic facilities in their regions and keep ACP headquarters informed of such developments;
- (3) the membership of the College should be informed by special mailing regarding the status of the North Penn and Wilk cases and be provided with background information regarding the strategy of intervention;

- (4) the aforementioned mailing to the membership should include information on the nature of chiropractic;
- (5) the Governors should discuss these issues with the College membership in their regions and prepare them for the possibility of a voluntary assessment to support the legal defense;
- (6) the Governors should consider contacting the Attorney General or Medical Practice Committee of their state legislature regarding the efforts of chiropractors to gain access to certain diagnostic facilities, raising the question of the legality of such arrangements;
- (7) the Governors should review the current roster of AMA Trustees and consider, if appropriate, discussing the North Penn agreement and related topics with them on an individual basis;
- (8) the Governors should alert colleagues in other disciplines to the efforts of chiropractors to gain access to radiographic and clinical pathology diagnostic facilities; and
- (9) the Governors and the College members in their regions should discuss these matters with their county and state medical societies and with their representatives to the House of Delegates of the AMA.

(PX 141 at 33-34.)

Many parts of the resolution relate to matters protected under the *Noerr-Pennington* doctrine, but not all. Nevertheless, in carefully reviewing the list, there is no call for the participation of ACP or its members in the AMA's boycott against chiropractors or ACP's own boycott. I see no evidence in the resolution of any agreement to join the AMA conspiracy. The activity is independent of the AMA's boycott. Moreover, the resolution was never imple-

mented (Barondess Trial I at Tr. 5829-32, 5853; Moser Dep. 113-14) and there is no evidence that ACP members were called upon to cooperate in effectuating ACP's "policy" on chiropractic.

Finally, ACP was one of four medical specialty societies which prepared a Status Report on the Chiropractic Lawsuits in 1978. (PX 1069.) The report was distributed to ACP members. I held during the trial that the report is protected activity but that to the extent it contains relevant admissions of fact, it is admissible. The report does contain an admission that Principle 3 forbade association with chiropractors. (PX 1069 at 4.) This admission is relevant to a medical specialty society, such as the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, which had adopted the AMA's Principles. It is not relevant to ACP which had not adopted the Principles (Barondess Trial I at Tr. 5829) and which did not have a medical ethic similar to Principle 3.

ACP is a member owner of JCAH. (PX 7275.) However, I have already found that the members are not legally responsible for JCAH's accreditation standards before 1983, and that the actions of the JCAH members in connection with the 1983 revisions of the hospital standards do not constitute evidence of participation in a conspiracy against chiropractors. Thus, ACP's membership in JCAH is not material.

On the basis of the evidence, I conclude that plaintiffs have failed to establish ACP's participation in the boycott or conspiracy. Plaintiffs have also failed to establish a separate conspiracy between ACP and its members. Accordingly, judgment shall enter in favor of ACP.

4. *American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons*  
("AAOS")

From early on, the exact date is not known, AAOS required its members to pledge compliance with AMA's Principles of Medical Ethics. (PX 7408, 1804.) This required compliance with Principle 3. (*Id.*) Prior to January 30, 1981, again the exact date is not known, AAOS's by-laws were amended to delete this requirement. (DX 6046-49.)

In 1966, Dr. David B. Stevens, a Kentucky orthopedic surgeon, sent a copy of the Kentucky Medical Society's anti-chiropractic resolution to Robert Youngerman, a lawyer with the AMA's Department of Investigation. (PX 478; Tr. 2170-71.) Stevens also sent Youngerman a draft of a resolution to be proposed by Stevens to the AAOS. (*Id.*) Youngerman proposed less "monopolistic" language which would not change the "basic intent." (*Id.*) Stevens adopted Youngerman's proposed changes and deleted references to the "elimination" of chiropractic. (PX 478A.) Some argument could be made that at this point Stevens and the AMA are conspiring and that only they knew that the true intent of the resolution was to eliminate and contain chiropractic (which, according to Youngerman, would indicate a monopolistic intent).

On January 16, 1967, there was a meeting of the AAOS resolutions committee. (PX 1153) Stevens and three others proposed affirmance of the AMA anti-chiropractic policy. Youngerman was an "official guest" at the meeting and "was able to offer the committee helpful advice and suggestions." (*Id.*; Tr. 2170-72.) The AMA's 1966 anti-chiropractic policy statement was presented. (*Id.*) AAOS adopted a resolution affirming the AMA's policy statement that chiropractic was an unscientific cult and constituted a

hazard to health. (PX 1153.) The resolution also requested the Executive Committee of AAOS to establish activities to alert the professional and lay public of the hazards of unscientific practice and to participate in the medical profession's program to reduce such dangers to the public health. (*Id.*) Although there was no explicit reference to the prohibition of professional association with chiropractors, the reasonable inference is that AAOS knew that a significant part of the medical profession's program to reduce chiropractic dangers to the public health was the prohibition against association with chiropractors. This inference is based on Youngerman's participation at the meeting of the resolutions committee and it is also further supported by the admission made by AAOS in the Status Report on Chiropractic Lawsuits dated October 27, 1978. (PX 1069.) In this report AAOS acknowledged that Principle 3 proscribed all voluntary association with chiropractors and subscribed to the belief that this interpretation of Principle 3 should not be changed.

AAOS argues that the passing of the 1967 resolution was protected *Noerr-Pennington* activity because the AAOS resolution was obtained by the Committee on Quackery in connection with the Committee's legislative activities. In support of this argument, AAOS relies on a portion of Dr. Stevens' testimony (Tr. 2196-98.) during which he is responding to a series of leading questions which assumed that at the time Stevens was presenting his resolution to AAOS he was also a member of the Committee on Quackery, and that his activity was on behalf of the Committee on Quackery. The evidence in this record does not support that assumption. Dr. Stevens testified that he joined the Committee in 1967 (Tr. 2053), but he did not state it was as early as January. He frankly could not recall. The Court of Appeals in *Wilk* referred to the

fact that Stevens joined the Committee on Quackery in 1968. During the first trial AAOS's counsel informed the court that Dr. Stevens joined the Committee on Quackery one and one-half years *after* the AAOS resolution was adopted. (See p. 866 of the first trial transcript.) AAOS cannot argue in one trial that Stevens joined the Committee on Quackery in 1968 and in this trial that he joined the Committee before January 17, 1967. There is no factual basis for the *Noerr-Pennington* argument made before this court. There is no evidence that AAOS was acting in furtherance of any political goals when it adopted its anti-chiropractic policy.

In 1972, a member of AAOS complained to the Academy about pro-chiropractic legislation in California (PX 1154) and AAOS wrote to the AMA stating "we are aware of your stated position in this matter." (PX 1158.) This shows an awareness of the AMA's position but not of any particular activities.

In 1974, there was some activity involving AAOS and the ACS regarding the study of chiropractic being undertaken by the NINDS. (PX 1160.) I have already held, in connection with ACP, that attempts to influence NINDS, a governmental agency, was protected activity. Also in 1974, a neurosurgeon told the American College of Chiropractic Orthopedists that Principle 3 prevented him from speaking to the group and he cancelled his commitment to speak. (PX 790.) There is no evidence, however, that this doctor was acting this way because of his membership in the AMA or in AAOS.

On February 23, 1986, AAOS formally rescinded its anti-chiropractic resolution. (PX 7121.) It included the resolution among several other "obsolete" resolutions and the membership was asked to approve the deletion of these

“obsolete” resolutions. There was no affirmative statement that the policy had been rescinded or was wrong.

During the entire relevant period AAOS never attempted to enforce the AMA’s Principles against any members. However, the bylaws did have discipline procedures. (PX 2408.) Dr. Freitag, an orthopedic surgeon who testified on behalf of the plaintiffs, regularly associates with chiropractors. (Freitag Tr. 806, 811.) He had some concerns about his association with chiropractors in connection with passing his specialty boards, but he in fact encountered no difficulty. (Freitag Tr. 837.) Several of the plaintiffs have professionally associated with orthopedic surgeons. (Pedigo Tr. 722.)

In a separate order dated October 25, 1983, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of AAOS’s motion for directed verdict at the end of the first trial, holding as follows:

However, the evidence permitted the jury to find: that there was communication between the AMA and AAOS on the subject of chiropractic; that this communication revealed acquiescence by AAOS in the AMA view that chiropractic is unscientific cultism; and that by adopting the essence of the 1966 AMA policy statement, in combination with AMA’s Principle 3, AAOS endeavored to discourage medical doctors from professional association with chiropractors.

735 F.2d 217 (1983).

On the basis of the evidence, I find that AAOS knowingly joined the conspiracy. Whether it adopted Principle 3 of the AMA’s Principles intending to boycott chiropractors is not decisive. When AAOS adopted the 1966 AMA policy statement branding chiropractors as unscientific cultists, it knew that it was prohibiting association with chiropractors. This is clear from the 1978 Status

Report. (PX 1069.) AAOS consciously participated in the conspiracy. The evidence clearly establishes that AAOS was not acting independently.

AAOS relied on the same evidence as the AMA on the patient care defense. That evidence is inadequate to establish that defense.

The question of whether an injunction should issue is not so easily answered. AAOS took no corrective action until 1986, many years after the corrective action taken by the AMA. Orthopedic surgeons are direct competitors of chiropractors and they directly benefited from the boycott. However, the actions of AAOS which tied it to the AMA conspiracy occurred in 1966. Apart from protected activity, it did not actively participate in the boycott after 1967. Most of the facts which led the court to enjoin the AMA simply are not present in the evidence against AAOS. I conclude that there is no likelihood that AAOS would renew any boycott or conspiracy against chiropractors. I find that an injunction should not issue against AAOS.

## 5. *American College of Radiology ("ACR")*

### (a) *Participation in AMA Conspiracy*

In the mid-1970s, ACR included 12,000 of the 14,000 radiologists in the country. (Stronach Dep. 12-13.) ACR conditions membership on adherence to the AMA's Principles (which are printed in ACR's bylaws) and the Principles of Ethical Radiological Practice. (PX 1147.) The Principles of Ethical Radiological Practice have contained Principle 3 (identical to the original AMA Principle 3) since the early 1940s. (Tr. 2355.)

Under the bylaws, the Board of Chancellors may discipline any member of the College for violation of its principles. (PX 106 at 11.) Any member who for reasons of moral turpitude or unethical practices ceases to be a member of the AMA or of any country, state, or provincial medical society shall have her or his status as a member of the College referred to the Board of Chancellors for possible action. (*Id.*) No radiologist has ever been disciplined for associating with chiropractors. (Tr. 2356; Becker Dep. 191.)

In the late 1960s, the AMA requested that ACR pass a resolution regarding chiropractic. (PX 108.) The AMA supplied ACR with materials on chiropractic for this purpose. (*Id.*) ACR in fact adopted a resolution but it was less aggressive than the AMA wanted. ACR informed the AMA that:

This was done on the feeling that the College would like to offer something which would be helpful but not necessarily legally hazardous, since there would seem to be little gain in having the College sued as apparently the AMA has been sued lately on this kind of issue.

(PX 108C.) The actual resolution passed in 1968 (and again in 1969) stated that ACR

advised the people of the United States that they regard the use of radiation for medical purposes by chiropractors as an unwarranted use of radiation without potential for medical gain to balance the potential risk.

(PX 114B.) The policy continued by urging state radiation protection agencies and others to "warn the public against the misuse and unsafe uses of x-rays on patients by chiropractors." (*Id.*) The ACR members and other medical societies. Although this resolution was not pub-

lished in any way designed to reach “the people of the United States,” I view it as protected activity.

A revised version of the resolution was passed by the ACR Council in 1975. This resolution was strongly worded and it explicitly prohibited the submission of x-rays to chiropractors—even at the request of a patient:

[S]ubmitting x-ray films or other medical records to a chiropractor or to a patient to be conveyed to a chiropractor, constitutes a tacit endorsement of chiropractic as a legitimate healing art and as such is not consistent with the Principles of Medical Ethics of the American Medical Association.

(PX 120.) This resolution was again amended in 1981 to permit radiologists to provide previously taken x-rays to a chiropractor or a patient. Radiologists were advised as follows:

In deciding whether to make previously taken x-rays, copies thereof, or x-ray reports available to a chiropractor or a patient, a radiologist should take into account applicable laws, hospital rules and regulations, and the best interests of the patient.

(DX 21059.) This change was made in response to changing state laws and changes in the rules of some hospitals which required radiologists to turn over previously taken x-rays to the patient or any person designated by the patient.<sup>13</sup> Except in cases where turning over x-rays is re-

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<sup>13</sup> Despite the existence of this resolution, ACR staff occasionally advised inquiring radiologists that it would be appropriate to make prior x-rays available to chiropractors at the request of patients. (PX 122A, 123, 124A, 126.)

(continued . . .)\*

\* Publisher's Note: The text of footnote 13 so reads, though no continuation appears in the copy.

quired by law or hospital rule, the 1981 resolution may not be all that significant since the current Chairman of the Board of Chancellors of ACR testified at trial that in his view it was not in the patient's best interest to turn over a previously taken x-ray or x-ray report to a chiropractor. (Tr. 2347-49.)

Throughout the mid-1970s, ACR informed its members in response to member inquiries that it was unethical to associate with chiropractors because chiropractic was unscientific. (PX 115-18, 124A, 126, 128A, 129.) In these responses, explicit reference was made to the AMA's Principles. (PX 128A, 129.) During the 21-year period from 1960 to 1981, there were only ten such letters written by ACR staff. However, most of them were in 1973 and 1974. In the past six or seven years, every ACR response to an inquiry about chiropractic included a statement to the effect that notwithstanding the College's anti-chiropractic policy, the radiologist should make an individual choice in deciding to associate with chiropractors. (DX 21060; Tr. 2355-56.)

ACR vigorously opposed the AMA's settlement of some chiropractic lawsuits and the changes in AMA's policies on chiropractic. In the 1978 Status Report on Chiropractic Lawsuits the ACR acknowledged that Principle 3 of the AMA's Principles forbade all association with chiropractors and it condemned any change in the AMA's policies. (PX 1069 at 10.) Radiologists also opposed the revision of the AMA's Principles in 1980 which deleted Principle 3. (Tr. 2363-64.)

In opposing the plaintiff's settlement with the Illinois State Medical Society, ACR publicly informed its members of its position on chiropractic:

### **The College's Position on Chiropractic**

The College has always held that consultations or professional association between chiropractors and radiologists are not in the best interest of patient care and are not optimal radiologic practice, and that, therefore, chiropractors should not be provided privileges to request radiological services in the hospital. Any decision to provide hospital privileges to chiropractors would be difficult to reconcile with the increasingly rigorous credentiality of medical physicians.

In 1981, the College Council adopted a policy statement criticizing chiropractic use of radiation. It states that the ACR "regards the prescription and use of radiation by chiropractors as unwarranted and without likelihood of significant benefit to patients." The policy statement notes that radiological studies for medical diagnosis and evaluation should only be requested or conducted by individuals who are scientifically trained and licensed physicians. "There is no scientific evidence to justify the use of radiation by health care providers for non-medical purposes," according to the statement. In addition, it condemns "the use of radiation for promotional purposes by chiropractors or others," and counsels radiologists, when deciding whether to make reports of previously performed radiological studies available to a chiropractor or a patient, to "take into account applicable laws, hospital rules and regulations, and the best interests of the patient."

The Principles of Ethical Radiological Practice also address the question of professional association with chiropractors. Principle three states that "Physicians should practice a method of healing founded on a scientific basis; and they should not voluntarily associate professionally with anyone who violates this principle."

Chiropractic theory and practice is based upon unscientific and unproven tenets. Furthermore, there

is no comparability between the comprehensive training and clinical experience of a physician and the limited training and experience of a chiropractor.

A radiologist accepts referrals from other physicians on the premise that the physician's judgment in requesting an x-ray examination is valid. This premise is not valid in the case of chiropractors, who are not equipped by training or experience to assess the risk/benefit ratios of such examinations. Radiologists provide a verbal or written consultation to attending physicians on the premise that they are able to assess these matters and to understand and act upon their findings. This premise also is invalid in the case of chiropractors.

The College has another concern. And that is that chiropractors historically have engaged in inappropriate advertising and promotion of x-ray exposure, including advertising of free x-rays to patients, use of full spine x-rays, and unnecessary follow-up or progress studies. A number of examples of chiropractic misuse of radiation have been brought to the attention of the College over the years. The College feels it is inappropriate for trained and qualified medical radiologists to participate in such a use of radiation.

The College's policy position on chiropractic and its ethical principles serve as guidelines or advice to members of the college and are not intended in any way to preclude the individual radiologist from exercising his best professional judgment concerning patient care. No member of the College has ever been disciplined or otherwise censured for electing to associate professionally with chiropractors. (DX ACR 21059.)

Plaintiffs characterize statements such as the one just quoted as a renewed call to radiologists to boycott chiropractors. The College argues that it is entitled to state its policy to its members in a statement describing this

litigation and the College's position in this case and that the statements are protected under the *Noerr-Pennington* doctrine. I agree, but the statement of the policy is admissible to prove that this was the ACR policy (a fact not disputed by ACR at trial).

ACR's policies can directly affect hospitals. JCAH accreditation standards for hospitals require that a hospital's radiology equipment and services be controlled by a medical physician radiologist. (PX 72 at 159.) Almost all radiologists are members of ACR. (Stronach Dep. 12-13.) Radiologists would heavily influence any hospital decision relative to chiropractors, whether it be admission to the medical staff or more limited privileges such as access to the radiology department equipment or services. (Stronach Dep. 16-17.) The testimony of Sister Bonaventure, the President of Resurrection Hospital in Chicago, was enlightening. She has been the chief executive officer of a large hospital for many years (Tr. 1153) and she would rely on the decision of the radiologists in determining whether the services of the radiology department would be made available to chiropractors. (Tr. 1160-61.) ACR is opposed to any hospital privileges for chiropractors. As ACR's Executive Director admitted, radiologists following the policy of the ACR effectively bar chiropractors from the use of hospital radiology departments or services. (Stronach Dep. 16-17.)

All of the radiologists who testified, in person or by deposition, testified that they had made individual decisions in deciding not to associate with chiropractors but a "number of radiologists testified that they followed ACR's advice." (Post-trial Submission of ACR at Paragraph 21). A reasonable inference from the evidence is that most radiologists do not associate with chiropractors. About half of all chiropractors own their own x-ray equip-

ment and they purchase this equipment because radiologists in private practice and hospitals refuse to deal with chiropractors.

The common perception among radiologists was that ACR's canons of ethics proscribed as an unethical practice the taking or interpretation of x-rays by radiologists on referral from chiropractors in all circumstances. For example, the New York chapter of the College issued a resolution in May of 1977 urging ACR to consider amendment of the ethical canon so as to permit association between radiologists and chiropractors in states in which chiropractors were licensed. (PX 2209.) In New Jersey the State Board of Medical Examiners promulgated a regulation that required all radiologists in New Jersey to accept referrals from chiropractors. (PX 7088 at 2.) On October 1, 1976, ACR's Maine chapter issued a resolution unanimously supporting the policies of the AMA and ACR regarding doctors of chiropractic. (PX 1137.) And there was no question what those policies were.

On August 30, 1978, ACR circulated to all its state chapters a Pledge of Membership which required members to agree to abide by the Principles of Medical Ethics of the AMA and the Principles of Radiological Ethics of ACR. (PX 1147.) There is some question whether this pledge actually was signed by radiologists but there is no doubt that it was circulated to all state chapters and a reasonable inference is that the pledge was distributed to and executed by some radiologists.

ACR challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on the conspiracy issues, claiming there is not sufficient evidence that ACR was in conspiracy with the AMA to boycott chiropractors. I find the evidence strong. In 1968, ACR passed a resolution "to be helpful" to the AMA. (PX

108C.) ACR had the AMA's literature on chiropractic, including the AMA's 1966 anti-chiropractic resolution, and had to know that the AMA believed chiropractic to be unscientific and association between medical physicians and chiropractors to be unethical. (PX 108.) ACR had its own Principle 3 and it too opposed association with chiropractors because "the use of radiation for medical purposes by doctors of chiropractic [is] unwarranted." (PX 106, 114B.) ACR staff conferred with AMA staff before adopting the 1968 resolution.

Beginning in 1973, after chiropractic had been included in Medicare, ACR began to work with the AMA on matters relating to chiropractic. (PX 113, 151.) ACR staff specifically referred inquiries on chiropractic to Doyl Taylor. (*Id.*) Mr. Taylor was a fervent, highly motivated person. He had a single goal: to eliminate chiropractic as a profession. (E.g., PX 464; Taylor Vid. Dep.) The Assistant Executive Director of ACR described Taylor's department at the AMA as "a very active department concerning the problems that medicine encounters with chiropractors."

In 1973 ACR advised its members that the College concurred in the opinion of the AMA that "any association with cultists by physicians in the practice of medicine is considered unethical." In 1974 ACR stated: "The American College of Radiology concurs with the American Medical Association. *Our stand is:* that physicians should not have professional relationships with the practice of chiropractic medicine, and such relationships would be considered by either society as unethical." (PX 117; emphasis added). (See also, e.g., PX 114-18, 120, 123, 124A, 126, 156, 128A, 129, 1137, 1818-19, 1109, 1147, Stronach Dep. 16-17.) See citations *supra* and see also PX 7090-91, 7274, 7131, 7191.)

ACR argues that there is no indication that it had any specific knowledge of, let alone involvement in, the activities of the AMA's Committee on Quackery. Such specific knowledge is not necessary. ACR had knowledge of the boycott. (PX 1069.) It had a copy of the AMA's anti-chiropractic resolution condemning chiropractic as unscientific and ACR knew, as any reasonable person would have known, that under Principle 3 association with unscientific practitioners (chiropractors) was unethical. ACR also argues that the mere existence of an unscientific practitioner ethical standard, such as Principle 3, is not evidence of a conspiracy. That is correct. But when a medical society that has such an ethical standard brands a competing profession as unscientific, that tells its members that association with such practitioners is unethical. See citations *supra* and see also (PX 7090-91, 7274, 7131, 7191.) This combination of action may be considered in determining whether ACR entered into a conspiracy with the AMA.

Plaintiffs' evidence establishes more than mere independent action on the part of ACR. The evidence demonstrates a conscious commitment to the AMA boycott and participation in the boycott. I find that ACR was a member of the AMA conspiracy.

(b) *Patient Care Defense*

ACR maintains that it has a patient care defense that is different from the patient care defense of the other defendants due to the unique consultative role of a diagnostic radiologist.<sup>14</sup> The College described that unique role

<sup>14</sup> Therapeutic radiology, the treatment of cancer patients with radiation, is not involved in this suit. Diagnostic radiology is a consultative practice whereby radiologists, using various imaging techniques, attempt to detect pathology in the patient.

in its Memorandum Concerning Patient Care Defense at 4-5:

Diagnostic radiologists provide *consultative* services only—i.e., they conduct radiologic examinations only upon referral from other medical doctors, and they report their findings to the referring physicians, to be used as a component of their diagnoses and further treatment of the patients. Radiologists frequently do not even meet their patients and rarely report findings directly to the patients. . . . This consultative role means that radiologists must rely on their referring physicians, both for initial guidance as to the patient's condition, and for follow-through on the patient's diagnosis and treatment after the radiologic procedure. Hence, a radiologist is critically dependent on the knowledge and competence of his cooperating colleagues for the proper care of the radiologist's patients.<sup>4</sup>

\* \* \* \* \*

<sup>4</sup> Even though a radiologist performs his task fully competently, he or she (and the patient) face a risk that the patient may nevertheless not receive proper treatment, because the primary provider: (1) gives the radiologist inadequate information to determine what radiologic procedures are indicated; (2) misunderstands the radiologic findings; (3) fails to treat the patient in accordance with those findings; or (4) fails to initiate other diagnostic steps necessary to identify the patient's problem.

I accept ACR's claim that it was acting out of a genuine belief that chiropractors misuse and abuse radiation. Half of all chiropractors own x-ray equipment and it is the prevailing practice to x-ray each new patient. Some chiropractors routinely take repeat follow-up x-rays. Regrettably, the current use of x-rays is attributable in part to Medicare regulations which provide that chiropractors may be reimbursed for chiropractic treatment of "subluxations demonstrated by x-ray to exist." The better view is that a chiropractic subluxation cannot be seen in an

x-ray, but chiropractors undoubtedly continue to use x-ray so that they or their patients may qualify for Medicare reimbursement.

There was substantial evidence of radiation abuse—both historic and current—by chiropractors. (DX 6011, 6012, 1299-1302, 1304-07, 7000-01.) Some chiropractors, including one of the plaintiffs, routinely take full spine x-rays despite the fact that such x-rays very likely are unnecessary and exposure to radiation is substantially increased. (DX 6007.) Some chiropractors, again including one of the plaintiffs, fail to use gonadal shields when x-raying patients in their procreation years. (Tr. 1022.) Some chiropractors use the offer of free spine x-rays to obtain new business. (DX 7001, 6014.) There has been recent recognition in chiropractic literature of the abuse of radiation by chiropractors. (DX 6007, 6016, 6017.)

ACR's concern about abuse of radiation has not been limited to chiropractors. The College regularly has chastised medical physicians and radiologists about overuse and misuse of radiation. (Tr. 2345.) So I conclude that ACR was genuinely concerned about the subject and that its concerns about radiation abuse were objectively reasonable. However, to the extent ACR has to establish an objectively reasonable concern about chiropractic generally, it relies on the same evidence as the AMA and the same negative conclusion would apply. Notably, most of ACR's anti-chiropractic activity occurred in the mid-1970s when, according to the AMA's position at trial, chiropractic was growing and changing. Today ACR maintains that chiropractic is unscientific and yet the AMA witnesses are in disagreement, claiming now that at least some chiropractic manipulations are scientific. For these additional reasons, ACR has not established the "objectively reasonable" standard.

Radiologists' concern over chiropractic abuse of radiation has been the dominant motivating factor in ACR's policy on chiropractic. As medical physicians, radiologists have an affinity for their fellow professionals, and this could account in part for ACR's willingness to participate in the AMA boycott. Also, medical physicians currently are radiologists' principal source of business and radiologists could be keen to support their suppliers in a boycott against their suppliers' competitors. This would be true even if chiropractors were an alternative source of business to radiologists because the record established that even in the absence of the boycott chiropractors would not become a large source of business to radiologists. It would be in radiologists' interests to support their fellow medical physicians. But these competitive impulses, while present, did not, in my opinion, dominate ACR's motivation.

The final element in the patient care defense, whether the least restrictive means have been utilized, has not been established by ACR. ACR joined in a boycott to prevent all association between chiropractors and medical physicians, not just between chiropractors and radiologists. ACR's beliefs about chiropractic misuse of radiation cannot support such a boycott. Accepting as given the nature of radiological consultative services as described by the defendant, ACR could have advised its members to distinguish between the services requested of a chiropractor rather than advocating a total boycott. For example, if a chiropractor requested a certain x-ray (such as a full spine x-ray) and the radiologist was concerned that there was no medical justification for the irradiation exposure, the radiologist could discuss the issue with the referring

chiropractor or simply refuse the patient.<sup>15</sup> If a radiologist became concerned that his report would not be properly interpreted by the chiropractor, the report could be made more explicit. Radiologists already advise medical physicians if they believe that a referral to another medical specialist is appropriate, and similar explicit advice could be given to a chiropractor. It would be a foolhardy chiropractor who would ignore a radiologist report, for example, that there was a possible cancer pathology and the patient should be referred to an oncologist for further treatment.

The patient is far better off with this result than being treated only by a chiropractor who does not have access to the kind of sophisticated, expensive radiological equipment available to radiologists.<sup>16</sup> The radiologists argue that if the patient chooses to go to a chiropractor instead of a medical physician, she or he must take the consequences and one of those consequences is lack of association between chiropractors and radiologists. That is not much solace to the patients who make 10,000,000 visits per year to be treated by chiropractors licensed by the fifty states to render treatment.

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<sup>15</sup> Certainly not all x-rays requested by a chiropractor are useless. Chiropractors as well as medical physicians routinely take x-rays for leg length measurements (Tr. 2413) and back pain syndrome and such x-rays easily could be taken by a radiologist without risking harm to the patient.

<sup>16</sup> This kind of equipment generally is available only at hospitals. It is equipment that is not owned by radiologists, but access to the equipment is, as described above, in the control of the radiologists who are members of the hospital's medical staff. (Stronach Dep. 16-17, Tr. 2426.) So a radiologist in that position at a hospital may, by declining to associate with chiropractors, deprive all patients of chiropractors access to that equipment. (Stronach Dep. 16-17.)

Next the radiologists argue that their actions were "least restrictive" because they only occasionally admonished a member of the College not to associate with chiropractors and it was done in private correspondence between the College and the member who sought advice. But the members knew about Principle 3 and it was well known that the College's policy was that association between radiologists and chiropractors was unethical. The College does not have to take the final step of advising the membership against association with chiropractors. That conclusion flows from the synergy created from the existence of the ethical prohibition against association with unscientific practitioners and the knowledge that the College considered chiropractors unscientific practitioners. I conclude that ACR's participation in the AMA conspiracy was not the least restrictive means of achieving ACR's legitimate patient care goals. Accordingly, I find that ACR has failed to establish the patient care defense.

Based on a recent Settlement Agreement between the plaintiffs and the ACR, no additional findings or actions regarding the ACR need to be made.

#### ORDER

Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth in this opinion, the case is dismissed against defendants JCAH, ACR, AAOS, and Dr. Sammons, and an injunction shall issue against defendant AMA. The ACR has recently settled with plaintiffs and is dismissed.

It is so ordered.

## **PERMANENT INJUNCTION ORDER AGAINST AMA**

The court conducted a lengthy trial of this case in May and June of 1987 and on August 27, 1987, issued a 101 page opinion finding that the American Medical Association ("AMA") and its members participated in a conspiracy against chiropractors in violation of the nation's antitrust laws. Thereafter an opinion dated September 25, 1987 was substituted for the August 27, 1987 opinion. The question now before the court is the form of injunctive relief that the court will order.

As part of the injunctive relief to be ordered by the court against the AMA, the AMA shall be required to send a copy of this Permanent Injunction Order to each of its current members. The members of the AMA are bound by the terms of the Permanent Injunction Order if they act in concert with the AMA to violate the terms of the order. Accordingly, it is important that the AMA members understand the order and the reasons why the order has been entered.

### **The AMA's Boycott and Conspiracy**

In the early 1960s, the AMA decided to contain and eliminate chiropractic as a profession. In 1963 the AMA's Committee on Quackery was formed. The committee worked aggressively—both overtly and covertly—to eliminate chiropractic. One of the principal means used by the AMA to achieve its goal was to make it unethical for medical physicians to professionally associate with chiropractors. Under Principle 3 of the AMA's Principles of Medical Ethics, it was unethical for a physician to associate with an "unscientific practitioner," and in 1966 the AMA's House of Delegates passed a resolution calling chiroprac-

tic an unscientific cult. To complete the circle, in 1967 the AMA's Judicial Council issued an opinion under Principle 3 holding that it was unethical for a physician to associate professionally with chiropractors.

The AMA's purpose was to prevent medical physicians from referring patients to chiropractors and accepting referrals of patients from chiropractors, to prevent chiropractors from obtaining access to hospital diagnostic services and membership on hospital medical staffs, to prevent medical physicians from teaching at chiropractic colleges or engaging in any joint research, and to prevent any cooperation between the two groups in the delivery of health care services.

The AMA believed that the boycott worked—that chiropractic would have achieved greater gains in the absence of the boycott. Since no medical physician would want to be considered unethical by his peers, the success of the boycott is not surprising. However, chiropractic achieved licensing in all 50 states during the existence of the Committee on Quackery.

The Committee on Quackery was disbanded in 1975 and some of the committee's activities became publicly known. Several lawsuits were filed by or on behalf of chiropractors and this case was filed in 1976.

### **Change in AMA's Position on Chiropractic**

In 1977, the AMA began to change its position on chiropractic. The AMA's Judicial Council adopted new opinions under which medical physicians could refer patients to chiropractors, but there was still the proviso that the medical physician should be confident that the services to be provided on referral would be performed in accordance with

accepted scientific standards. In 1979, the AMA's House of Delegates adopted Report UU which said that not everything that a chiropractor may do is without therapeutic value, but it stopped short of saying that such things were based on scientific standards. It was not until 1980 that the AMA revised its Principles of Medical Ethics to eliminate Principle 3. Until Principle 3 was formally eliminated, there was considerable ambiguity about the AMA's position. The ethics code adopted in 1980 provided that a medical physician "shall be free to choose whom to serve, with whom to associate, and the environment in which to provide medical services."

The AMA settled three chiropractic lawsuits by stipulating and agreeing that under the current opinions of the Judicial Council a physician may, without fear of discipline or sanction by the AMA, refer a patient to a duly licensed chiropractor when he believes that referral may benefit the patient. The AMA confirmed that a physician may also choose to accept or to decline patients sent to him by a duly licensed chiropractor. Finally, the AMA confirmed that a physician may teach at a chiropractic college or seminar. These settlements were entered into in 1978, 1980, and 1986.

The AMA's present position on chiropractic, as stated to the court, is that it is ethical for a medical physician to professionally associate with chiropractors provided the physician believes that such association is in the best interests of his patient. This position has not previously been communicated by the AMA to its members.

#### **Antitrust Laws**

Under the Sherman Act, every combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade is illegal. The court has held that

the conduct of the AMA and its members constituted a conspiracy in restraint of trade based on the following facts: the purpose of the boycott was to eliminate chiropractic; chiropractors are in competition with some medical physicians; the boycott had substantial anti-competitive effects; there were no pro-competitive effects of the boycott; and the plaintiffs were injured as a result of the conduct. These facts add up to a violation of the Sherman Act.

In this case, however, the court allowed the defendants the opportunity to establish a "patient care defense" which has the following elements:

- (1) that they genuinely entertained a concern for what they perceive as scientific method in the care of each person with whom they have entered into a doctor-patient relationship; (2) that this concern is objectively reasonable; (3) that this concern has been the dominant motivating factor in defendants' promulgation of Principle 3 and in the conduct intended to implement it; and (4) that this concern for scientific method in patient care could not have been adequately satisfied in a manner less restrictive of competition.

The court concluded that the AMA had a genuine concern for scientific methods in patient care, and that this concern was the dominant factor in motivating the AMA's conduct. However, the AMA failed to establish that throughout the entire period of the boycott, from 1966 to 1980, this concern was objectively reasonable. The court reached that conclusion on the basis of extensive testimony from both witnesses for the plaintiffs and the AMA that some forms of chiropractic treatment are effective and the fact that the AMA recognized that chiropractic began to change in the early 1970s. Since the boycott was not formally over until Principle 3 was eliminated in 1980, the court found that the AMA was unable to establish that

during the entire period of the conspiracy its position was objectively reasonable. Finally, the court ruled that the AMA's concern for scientific method in patient care could have been adequately satisfied in a manner less restrictive of competition and that a nationwide conspiracy to eliminate a licensed profession was not justified by the concern for scientific method. On the basis of these findings, the court concluded that the AMA had failed to establish the patient care defense.

None of the court's findings constituted a judicial endorsement of chiropractic. All of the parties to the case, including the plaintiffs and the AMA, agreed that chiropractic treatment of diseases such as diabetes, high blood pressure, cancer, heart disease and infectious disease is not proper, and that the historic theory of chiropractic, that there is a single cause and cure of disease was wrong. There was disagreement between the parties as to whether chiropractors should engage in diagnosis. There was evidence that the chiropractic theory of subluxations was unscientific, and evidence that some chiropractors engaged in unscientific practices. The court did not reach the question of whether chiropractic theory was in fact scientific. However, the evidence in the case was that some forms of chiropractic manipulation of the spine and joints was therapeutic. AMA witnesses, including the present Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the AMA, testified that some forms of treatment by chiropractors, including manipulation, can be therapeutic in the treatment of conditions such as back pain syndrome.

### **Need for Injunctive Relief**

Although the conspiracy ended in 1980, there are lingering effects of the illegal boycott and conspiracy which re-

quire an injunction. Some medical physicians' individual decisions on whether or not to professionally associate with chiropractors are still affected by the boycott. The injury to chiropractors' reputations which resulted from the boycott has not been repaired. Chiropractors suffer current economic injury as a result of the boycott. The AMA has never affirmatively acknowledged that there are and should be no collective impediments to professional association and cooperation between chiropractors and medical physicians, except as provided by law. Instead, the AMA has consistently argued that its conduct has not violated the antitrust laws.

Most importantly, the court believes that it is important that the AMA members be made aware of the present AMA position that it is ethical for a medical physician to professionally associate with a chiropractor if the physician believes it is in the best interests of his patient, so that the lingering effects of the illegal group boycott against chiropractors finally can be dissipated.

Under the law, every medical physician, institution, and hospital has the right to make an individual decision as to whether or not that physician, institution, or hospital shall associate professionally with chiropractors. Individual choice by a medical physician voluntarily to associate professionally with chiropractors should be governed only by restrictions under state law, if any, and by the individual medical physician's personal judgment as to what is in the best interest of a patient or patients. Professional association includes referrals, consultations, group practice in partnerships, Health Maintenance Organizations, Preferred Provider Organizations, and other alternative health care delivery systems; the provision of treatment privileges and diagnostic services (including radiological and other laboratory facilities) in or through hospital facilities;

association and cooperation in educational programs for students in chiropractic colleges; and cooperation in research, health care seminars, and continuing education programs.

An injunction is necessary to assure that the AMA does not interfere with the right of a physician, hospital, or other institution to make an individual decision on the question of professional association.

### **Form of Injunction**

1. The AMA, its officers, agents and employees, and all persons who act in active concert with any of them and who receive actual notice of this order are hereby permanently enjoined from restricting, regulating or impeding, or aiding and abetting others from restricting, regulating or impeding, the freedom of any AMA member or any institution or hospital to make an individual decision as to whether or not that AMA member, institution, or hospital shall professionally associate with chiropractors, chiropractic students, or chiropractic institutions.

2. This Permanent Injunction does not and shall not be construed to restrict or otherwise interfere with the AMA's right to take positions on any issue, including chiropractic, and to express or publicize those positions, either alone or in conjunction with others. Nor does this Permanent Injunction restrict or otherwise interfere with the AMA's right to petition or testify before any public body on any legislative or regulatory measure or to join or cooperate with any other entity in so petitioning or testifying. The AMA's membership in a recognized accrediting association or society shall not constitute a violation of this Permanent Injunction.

3. The AMA is directed to send a copy of this order to each AMA member and employee, first class mail, postage prepaid, within thirty days of the entry of this order. In the alternative, the AMA shall provide the Clerk of the Court with mailing labels so that the court may send this order to AMA members and employees.

4. The AMA shall cause the publication of this order in JAMA and the indexing of the order under "Chiropractic" so that persons desiring to find the order in the future will be able to do so.

5. The AMA shall prepare a statement of the AMA's present position on chiropractic for inclusion in the current reports and opinions of the Judicial Council with an appropriate heading that refers to professional association between medical physicians and chiropractors, and indexed in the same manner that other reports and opinions are indexed. The court imposes no restrictions on the AMA's statement but only requires that it be consistent with the AMA's statements of its present position to the court.

6. The AMA shall file a report with the court evidencing compliance with this order on or before January 10, 1988.

It is so ordered.

In the

# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

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No. 81-1331

CHESTER A. WILK, D.C.; JAMES W. BRYDEN, D.C.;  
PATRICIA A. ARTHUR, D.C.; STEVEN G. LUMSDEN, D.C.;  
and MICHAEL D. PEDIGO, D.C.,

*Plaintiffs-Appellants,*

v.

AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, AMERICAN HOSPITAL  
ASSOCIATION, AMERICAN COLLEGE OF SURGEONS,  
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS, JOINT COMMISSION  
ON ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS, AMERICAN COLLEGE  
OF RADIOLOGY, AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ORTHOPAEDIC  
SURGEONS, ILLINOIS STATE MEDICAL SOCIETY, H. DOYL  
TAYLOR, JOSEPH A. SABATIER, M.D., H. THOMAS  
BALLANTINE, M.D., JAMES H. SAMMONS, M.D.,

*Defendants-Appellees.*

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Appeal from the United States District Court for the  
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.  
No. 78 C 3777—Nicholas J. Bus, Judge.

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ARGUED JANUARY 20, 1982—DECIDED SEPTEMBER 19, 1983

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Before SWYGERT, *Senior Circuit Judge*, SPRECHER,\*  
*Circuit Judge*, and DOYLE, *Senior District Judge*.\*\*

\* Judge Sprecher heard oral argument and participated in the conference which followed. He died May 15, 1982, and did not participate in the preparation or approval of this opinion.

\*\* James E. Doyle, a Senior United States District Judge for the Western District of Wisconsin, is sitting by designation.

DOYLE, *Senior District Judge*. Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of defendants-appellees. Plaintiffs, five licensed chiropractors, charged defendants-appellees<sup>1</sup> with violating sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1 and 2 (1979).<sup>2</sup> Plaintiffs alleged that defendants engaged in a combination and conspiracy to eliminate the chiropractic profession through refusing to deal with plaintiffs and other chiropractors. Plaintiffs alleged defendants implemented the group boycott by agreeing to induce individual medical doctors to forego any form of professional, research, or educational association with chiropractors, to induce hospital and other health care facilities to deny access to chiropractors, and to induce actual and prospective patients of chiropractors to avoid seeking chiropractic services. Plaintiffs also alleged that through this agreement, defendants attempted to monopolize and conspired to monopolize certain health care markets.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Two defendant medical organizations settled prior to trial and thus were not parties to the judgment. Plaintiffs have not appealed from the judgment in favor of one defendant, the Chicago Medical Society. Plaintiffs' complaint named individual members of the defendant associations as co-conspirators but not as defendants.

<sup>2</sup> Section 1 of the Sherman Act declares illegal "[e]very contract, combination . . . or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce . . . ." 15 U.S.C. §1 (1970). Section 2 prescribes penalties for "[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce . . . ." 15 U.S.C. §2 (1970).

<sup>3</sup> On appeal, plaintiffs raise no claim based solely on §2. They assert conclusorily that the trial court erred with regard to those claims in its jury instructions on conspiracy, its failure to instruct the jury that good motives do not constitute a defense to either §1 or §2 violations, and its admission of evidence on defendants' public health and welfare motives. They do not present specific argument on these issues. Since we treat each of these points in light of plaintiffs' §1 claims, and since plaintiffs failed to raise the §2 claims in any meaningful fashion on appeal, we do not address separately their general assertion of claims based solely on §2.

## I. GROUNDS OF APPEAL

Plaintiffs' principal ground of appeal is that the court's instructions gave the jury to understand, incorrectly, that a boycott by defendants, resulting in a diminution of competition between chiropractors and medical doctors, was lawful if the boycott was the product of a genuine belief by medical doctors that chiropractic is dangerous quackery. Because the district court embraced this incorrect view of the law, plaintiffs contend, it received in evidence, erroneously and over objection, much prejudicial material concerning the alleged evils of chiropractic. Plaintiffs contend also that the jury was incorrectly instructed on the application of the first amendment in the circumstances.

The remaining grounds of appeal relate to: jury instructions on coercive enforcement of ethical canons as an essential element of a conspiracy of the type alleged; jury instructions relating to apparent authority of agents; the trial court's handling of the "unclean hands" concept; and the trial court's refusal to permit reopened discovery into settlement negotiations.

Defendants-appellees dispute all of these contentions, of course. Five of the organization defendants (JCAH, AHA, ACP, ACS, and ISMS) raise a further argument. Each claims that its motion for a directed verdict was erroneously denied by the district court. Each asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support a jury finding that it was a member of a conspiracy. Thus, each contends, the judgment they won should be affirmed even if the judgment in favor of the other defendants were to be reversed on one ground or another.

In the following section headed "Facts," we set forth those propositions which a reasonable jury might have found as fact and which might arguably have prompted a verdict in plaintiffs' favor, had the jury been instructed as plaintiffs contend it should have been and had the jury been protected from the allegedly prejudicial evidence. We set forth, also, those facts concerning the involvement of JCAH, AHA, ACP, ACS, and ISMS in the alleged con-

spiracy which a reasonable jury might have found from the evidence, viewed most favorably to the plaintiffs.

## II. FACTS

The American Medical Association (AMA) is a non-profit corporation with a membership of over 200,000 medical doctors, which is nearly half the total number of medical doctors in the United States. AMA is a federation of independent state and territorial medical societies, each of which appoints representatives to the House of Delegates of the national organization. The House of Delegates elects the AMA Board of Trustees. AMA is heavily involved in this country's professional and public medical education programs. AMA also publishes numerous professional journals, receives and responds to questions from the public on medical subjects, and engages in legislative lobbying. AMA promulgates the Principles of Medical Ethics, which are interpreted by its Judicial Council.

The American Hospital Association (AHA) is a non-profit corporation composed of 7,000 organization members and 30,000 individual members. Approximately 6,000 of the 7,000 hospitals in the United States belong to AHA. AHA publishes several periodicals and manuals on various topics related to hospital operations. It also collects statistics on hospitals, sponsors educational programs, and reviews and responds to governmental activities relevant to hospital operations.

The American College of Surgeons (ACS) is a nonprofit corporation having as its members about 40,000 of the 100,000 American physicians who identify themselves as surgeons. ACS takes public positions on relevant issues and sometimes expresses those positions to legislative and administrative bodies.

The American College of Physicians (ACP) is a non-profit corporation composed mainly of physicians who specialize in internal medicine. Its chief function is to conduct continuing education programs for members and nonmembers.

The Joint Committee on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) is a nonprofit corporation having AMA, AHA, ACS, ACP, and the American Dental Association as its members. The member organizations appoint representatives to the JCAH Board of Commissioners, the policy-making body of JCAH. JCAH operates a health care facilities accreditation program, in which it establishes standards for accreditation and conducts surveys of individual institutions when they so request. If a facility meets JCAH standards, that facility is accredited.

The American College of Radiology (ACR) is a nonprofit corporation with approximately 13,000 members, most of whom are medical doctors specializing in radiology. It is active in education and research, and it furnishes advice and information to government, private industry, and health care professionals concerning radiation protection and the practice of radiology.

The American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons (AAOS) is a nonprofit corporation composed of about 9,000 medical doctors who specialize in orthopaedic surgery. More than 75 percent of the total number of board-certified orthopaedic surgeons in the United States belong to AAOS. AAOS conducts continuing medical education courses for practicing orthopaedic surgeons and persons working in related areas, including orthopaedic nursing, occupational therapy, physical therapy, and manufacturing braces and artificial limbs.

The Illinois State Medical Society (ISMS) is a state medical society with approximately 14,000 medical doctors as members. ISMS is one of the fifty state medical societies that comprise AMA.

Doyl Taylor was employed by AMA and served as director of the AMA Department of Investigation and as secretary to the AMA Committee on Quackery. Joseph A. Sabatier, Jr., M.D., and H. Thomas Ballantine, Jr., M.D., both served on the AMA Committee on Quackery as members and chairmen. James H. Sammons, M.D., was a member of the AMA Board of Trustees.

Chiropractic is a health care service. Its primary therapeutic tool is spinal manipulation.<sup>4</sup> Chiropractors and medical doctors treat some of the same medical problems. Chiropractors would treat some patients in health care facilities and would use hospital X-ray and laboratory services if such treatment and use were permitted.

In Illinois, Michigan, California, Colorado, and Missouri, five states where plaintiffs have practiced, there were no laws in effect during the time relevant to this lawsuit that prohibited chiropractors from furnishing care in a hospital under the supervision of a medical staff member, nor were there laws preventing hospitals from providing X-ray or laboratory services to chiropractors or preventing hospital X-ray departments or radiologists from making X-ray films or copies of X-rays available to chiropractors at the request of their patients.

Principle 3 of the AMA Principles of Medical Ethics in effect during the alleged boycott provided: "A physician should practice a method of healing founded on a scientific basis; and he should not voluntarily professionally associate with anyone who violates this principle."

At its meeting on November 2 and 3, 1963, the AMA Board of Trustees voted to establish a "Committee on Quackery" (Committee). The Committee was active from that time until 1974. It considered "its prime mission to be, first, the containment of chiropractic and ultimately, the elimination of chiropractic." Memorandum to AMA Board of Trustees from Committee on Quackery, January 4, 1971. During these years, the AMA also operated a Department of Investigation (Department), a clearing-house for information on healing methods AMA deemed unscientific.

In December of 1966, upon the recommendation of the Committee and the AMA Board of Trustees, the AMA House of Delegates adopted a resolution asserting: "It is

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<sup>4</sup> Spinal manipulation also is practiced by osteopathic physicians, physical therapists, and a small number of medical doctors.

the position of the medical profession that chiropractic is an unscientific cult whose practitioners lack the necessary training and background to diagnose and treat human disease." This resolution, together with Section 3 of the Principles of Medical Ethics, was incorporated into the Opinions and Reports of the Judicial Council.

The Committee characterized this policy statement as follows:

This was the necessary tool with which your Committee has been able to widen the base of its chiropractic campaign. With it, other health-related groups were asked and did adopt the AMA policy statement or individually-phrased versions of it. These, in turn led to even wider acceptance of the AMA position.

The hoped-for effect of this widened base of support was and is to minimize the chiropractic argument that the campaign is simply one of economics, dictated and manipulated by the AMA.

Memorandum, *supra*, at 2.<sup>8</sup>

The Committee and the Department prepared numerous publications critical of chiropractic for distribution to medical professionals and laypersons. The Committee was extensively involved in legislative work at state and national levels on such matters as chiropractic licensing and Medicaid and Medicare reimbursement for chiropractic services. Among its other activities were sending letters warning medical boards and associations that professional cooperation and association between chiroprac-

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<sup>8</sup> This memorandum was characterized as a report of the Committee's activities during the previous seven years.

The memorandum said: "The Committee has not submitted such a report [earlier] because it believes that to make public some of its activities would have been and continues to be unwise. Thus this report is intended only for the information of the Board of Trustees."

tors and physicians were unethical and attempting to discourage colleges, universities, and faculty members from cooperating with chiropractic schools.

Codefendant organizations AHA, ACS, ACP, JCAH, ACR, AAOS, and ISMS communicated in various ways with defendant AMA and its Committee on Quackery. Some codefendant staff members attended meetings and a conference of chiropractic sponsored by the Committee. Codefendant staff members also discussed with Committee members ways of responding to inquiries from individual physicians and hospitals concerning possible professional cooperation with chiropractors. Representatives of three codefendant associations joined with AMA to form defendant JCAH and to determine requirements for JCAH accreditation. The JCAH accreditation manual asserted that a hospital permitting chiropractors to use its facilities would "very probably" lose its accreditation. Some codefendant organizations adopted the AMA Principles of Medical Ethics, including Principle 3.

Through such mechanisms, individual physicians were discouraged from cooperating with chiropractors in: patient treatment, because referrals were inhibited by defendants' activities; research; and educational activities, such as sharing clinical experience and research results. Chiropractors were denied access to the hospital facilities they considered necessary to practice their professions. Medical doctors were discouraged from aiding chiropractors in interpreting electrocardiograms. Requests by individual plaintiffs to use laboratory and X-ray facilities were not granted; requests for hospital in-patient privileges were similarly denied. Referrals from medical doctors were reduced. Public demand for chiropractic services was negatively affected.

**JCAH.** JCAH was comprised of twenty-one members, seven appointed by AMA, seven by AHA, three by ACS, three by ACP, and one by the American Dental Association. JCAH exercised considerable power over hospitals through the mechanism of accreditation. JCAH staff members replied to letters from hospitals on chiroprac-

tors by asserting that a hospital permitting chiropractors to use its services, such as laboratory testing and X-rays, would endanger its status as an accredited institution, even if a state passed a law requiring hospitals to allow chiropractors to be staff members. These letters at times referred to the AMA Principles of Medical Ethics and to an AMA publication on chiropractic. JCAH jointly published with AHA a widely distributed manual, *Hospital Accreditation References*, setting forth standards and criteria for JCAH accreditation. The manual was written by the director of JCAH. The manual contained the following statements: "The Commission looks on chiropractors as cultists. A hospital that encourages cultists to use its facilities in any way would very probably be severely criticized and lose its accreditation." The same statements appeared in a column written by the JCAH director, published in the Journal of the American Hospital Association. In its Accreditation Manual for Hospitals JCAH incorporated the AMA Principles of Medical Ethics, and asserted: "Failure by the medical staff and the governing body to take all reasonable steps to ensure adherence to these ethical principles shall constitute grounds for nonaccreditation." In denying plaintiff Lumsden staff privileges, one hospital cited its unwillingness to jeopardize its JCAH accreditation.

**AHA.** AHA appointed commissioners to JCAH. AHA and JCAH collaborated to publish *Hospital Accreditation References*. AHA also published that material in the AHA professional journal. Dr. Shu, an AHA employee who responded on behalf of AHA to inquiries from individual hospitals concerning use of facilities by chiropractors, answered those inquiries by citing the JCAH view that accreditation would be jeopardized if such use were permitted. At the AMA "National Conference on Health Quackery—Chiropractic," Dr. Shu attended a presentation of the "right and duty" of hospitals to exclude chiropractors. He also met informally with AMA and JCAH employees to discuss ways of answering questions from hospitals concerning chiropractors. Persons attending this meeting discussed the

ethical prohibition on physicians' association with chiropractors. Dr. Shu had telephone conversations with AMA and JCAH personnel on the subject of chiropractors using hospital facilities.

ACP. ACP appointed commissioners to JCAH. Minutes from an ACP board of governors meeting in 1978 described activities of the ACP's "Ad Hoc Committee on Chiropractic."<sup>6</sup> The committee was named "to suggest what might be done at the Chapter or regional level to promote the College's policy toward chiropractic." Although part of the committee's purpose was simply to inform ACP members of pending lawsuits by chiropractors against ACP, the committee also recommended that:

the Governors should remain alert to efforts of chiropractors to gain access to radiographic and clinical laboratory diagnostic facilities in their regions and keep ACP headquarters informed of such developments;

the Governors should alert colleagues in other disciplines to the efforts of chiropractors to gain access to radiographic and clinical pathology diagnostic facilities; and

the Governors and the College members in their regions should discuss these matters with their county and state medical societies and with their representatives to the House of Delegates of the AMA.

The ACP board of governors unanimously voted to approve the committee's report and to distribute it immediately.

<sup>6</sup> Defendant ACP argues that the trial court erred in admitting this exhibit, or alternatively, that the exhibit could not be the basis of an antitrust violation, because the activities it described were protected by the *Noerr-Pennington* doctrine. Some of the committee's recommendations were directed toward protected activities. But others were not. That some activities of a particular organization are protected by the first amendment does not shield all its activities, under *Noerr-Pennington*.

**ACS.** ACS appointed three commissioners to JCAH. The ACS "Statement on principles" endorsed the Principles of Medical Ethics and suggested that infraction of those principles would result in disciplinary action by ACS. An ACS director attended the National Conference on Health Quackery sponsored by the AMA Committee on Quackery. A former ACS director responded to a request from a state medical society for the ACS position on the relationship between physicians and chiropractors by asserting: "The College has never taken an official position in regard to relationships between M.D.s and chiropractors. We have followed the lead of the AMA, which is not always entirely clear." The letter notes that this director called the AMA legal department for an answer to the inquiry, and the letter suggests the AMA be consulted for an "authoritative" opinion.

**ISMS.** ISMS adopted the Principles of Medical Ethics, and ISMS members are bound by the principles. ISMS appointed its own Committee on Quackery. AMA Committee on Quackery staff member Doyl Taylor spoke to the ISMS committee on AMA activities and formal positions concerning chiropractic. ISMS committee members attended an AMA-sponsored meeting on quackery at which chiropractic was a major item of discussion. The ISMS committee endorsed the AMA House of Delegates statement labeling chiropractic an "unscientific cult." The ISMS Board of Trustees subsequently adopted this statement. The ISMS Board of Trustees had jurisdiction over all ethical questions. Doyl Taylor wrote the chair of the ISMS Committee on Quackery to suggest various meetings, referring to ISMS as "an active partner in the fight to head off chiropractic." The "Policy Manual of the Illinois State Medical Society," May, 1967, included the following statement: "The Judicial Council of the American Medical Association has ruled that it is unethical to associate VOLUNTARILY with an individual who practices as a member of a 'cult.'" (emphasis in original) In 1975, the AMA named Dr. Lees, former chairman of the ISMS Board of Trustees, to the AMA Committee on Quackery. A letter written by an

ISMS staff member in 1966, complained to Doyl Taylor about the AMA position on chiropractic, but took no action to dissociate itself from that position.

### III. *OPINION*

Plaintiffs alleged and undertook to prove that each of the defendants-appellants had done certain things at certain times, with the result that chiropractors' ability to compete with medical doctors for patient fees had been impaired. In their affirmative case, plaintiffs presented themselves and chiropractors generally as serious, unpretentious, governmentally-licensed practitioners in competition with medical doctors only within the narrow band of health services to which chiropractors limited themselves. Plaintiffs presented evidence intended to prove when and how the defendants came to a decision to trim and eventually perforate chiropractors' sails and when and how they chose and employed the means to that end. This evidence came largely from various officers and employees of the defendant organizations, called adversely, and from documents obtained from defendants' files. There was no way in which it could have been presented without revealing the low opinion of chiropractic entertained by medical doctors generally and the reasons for that opinion as stated from time to time by the medical doctors.

In plaintiffs' view of the Sherman Act, it was irrelevant whether the stated reasons, namely, ethical considerations springing from belief that chiropractic is dangerous quackery, were the true reasons or whether the true reasons were economic. But nothing was to be lost by plaintiffs, so far as the jury was concerned, by inuendo that money and not ethics spurred on the medical doctors.

In mild degree, there was dispute whether particular defendants had done the things plaintiffs alleged; in higher degree, whether there was competition between chiropractors and medical doctors; and in yet higher degree, whether defendants' conduct had in fact im-

paired chiropractors' ability to compete.<sup>7</sup> But in the district court, before and during trial, defendants were insistent that under the Sherman Act, available defenses were that their conduct had been undertaken in the interest of public health, safety, and welfare and that their conduct had been non-commercial. The trial was dominated by defendants' efforts to persuade the jury that they had acted in the good faith belief that chiropractic is dangerous quackery. Evidence intended to show that chiropractic is indeed dangerous quackery was introduced to support the proposition that defendants' belief was genuine.

The upshot of all this was that much of the trial, and virtually all of the parties' arguments to the jury were a free-for-all between chiropractors and medical doctors, in which the scientific legitimacy of chiropractic was hotly debated and the comparative intensity of the avarice of the adversaries was explored.

During the pretrial stages and the trial, the able and experienced district judge suffered from the uncertainty which marks the law of boycotts by professionals: specifically, what legal justification, if any, exists for such boycotts when their effect is to restrain competition. From time to time, understandably, he described this core issue as "unique," "new waters," and "close." On the eve of trial, he embraced plaintiffs' contention that it was irrelevant whether defendants' conduct had been undertaken in the interest of public health, safety and welfare (the "public interest defense") and whether that conduct had been non-commercial, and he struck those attempted affirmative defenses. He agreed that a trial on the validity of chiropractic should not be allowed to develop; that it was for legislatures and not defendants to decide whether

<sup>7</sup> In part II, above, we have set forth those facts concerning what defendants actually did and with what effect, that a reasonable jury could have found from the evidence when viewed most favorably to plaintiffs. In all that follows, we will assume that the jury did make such findings. In this manner, the significance of error in the conduct of the trial, if any, can be tested.

chiropractic should be permitted to exist; and that even if defendants could prove that their sole motivation was a sincere and well founded belief in the dangers of chiropractic, they could not escape liability for an otherwise unlawful boycott. But simultaneously he denied a broad motion by plaintiffs, *in limine*, to exclude evidence bearing on public health, safety or welfare. He expressed the opinion that evidence pertaining to defendants' "public interest" beliefs might bear on how to view and weigh evidence that defendants did or did not conspire; that such evidence might be necessary to determine whether a *per se* violation of the Sherman Act had occurred; and, if significant in amount, such evidence might be relevant to rule of reason analysis. He also observed that such evidence would necessarily bear on the nature and availability of the equitable relief plaintiffs were seeking (in addition to money damages). So he decided that defendants' "public interest" evidence should be allowed "if it is shown that such evidence is relevant, probative, and not cumulative." From the moment of their opening statements on through the trial, defendants pressed for the admission of their "public interest" evidence and over repeated objection the district court received it.

Whether the district judge enjoyed discretion to receive or not to receive this evidence is a question we will address in a moment. However, it is obvious that because it was received in such abundance, the significance of the jury instructions and the form of the verdict was sharply enhanced.

Although the verdict form requested by plaintiffs, acquiesced in by defendants, and used by the district court was "special" in the sense that the questions of causation and of the amount of the damages were separated from the other questions, it was general in that question 1 was simply whether each defendant "conspired to restrain trade within the meaning of Section 1 of the Sherman Act" (and question 2, whether each defendant conspired to monopolize or attempted to monopolize within the meaning of Section 2). That is, the liability issue (apart

from the question of causation) was not broken down into a series of questions, from the answers to which the judge might have determined the judgment. Thus the district court found it necessary, in a bundle of instructions, to explain to the jury its duty, for example, first to address whether there had been a *per se* violation and, only if the jury decided that question negatively, then to address whether there had been a violation under the rule of reason.

We commend the use of more precise questions in an antitrust case of this kind.

Once the decision had been made to permit the jury to entertain the *per se* theory, it would surely have been helpful to the jury had the special verdict form embodied a set of fact questions bearing on the *per se* rule and another set bearing on the rule of reason, with a portion of the instructions expressly directed to the *per se* questions, and with an explanation in the verdict form itself that the jury's answers to the *per se* questions would determine whether the jury would be required to answer the rule of reason questions. If so required, the jury could have been told to answer them in the light of another portion of the instructions relating expressly to the rule of reason.

We do not consider it error to have submitted the case in the form of a single all-inclusive question on Section 1 of the Act. But because it was submitted in this manner, we are obliged to examine the instructions with particular care to determine whether they explained the law not only correctly, but reasonably understandably.

#### A. *Jury Instructions*

The case presents difficulties, both theoretical and what may be called forensic or rhetorical. It was important that the court's instructions help the jury through both sets of difficulties.

On the theoretical side, the "boycott" which plaintiffs alleged and undertook to prove is surely not within any of

the more familiar contexts. However, "[b]oycotts are not a unitary phenomenon." P. Areeda, *Antitrust Analysis* 381 (2d ed. 1974). "In its simplest aspects, a boycott . . . is nothing more than an agreement among a number of economic actors to sever or limit economic relations with another economic actor or actors." Bird, *Sherman Act Limitations on Noncommercial Concerted Refusals to Deal*, 1970 Duke L. J. 247, 248.

Here, the jury was free to find that the services of one medical doctor were interchangeable with the services of other medical doctors; they competed with one another. The services of one chiropractor were interchangeable with the services of other chiropractors; they competed with one another. The services of a relatively small number of medical doctors were interchangeable with the services of all or nearly all chiropractors; they competed with one another. Superficially at least, the benefits to consumers arising from unrestrained competition could have been realized without any cooperation between any two medical doctors, between any two chiropractors, between any medical doctor and any chiropractor, or between an enclave of medical doctors and an enclave of chiropractors. The medical doctors, generally, were more than content with the absence of cooperation between two enclaves; the plaintiffs and chiropractors, generally, were not. The chiropractors contend that they would have gained economically had medical doctors referred patients to them, which seems accurate. The chiropractors seem also to contend that they would have gained economically had medical doctors accepted referrals from them, with the professional courtesies of exchanging reports and opinions, so as to permit the chiropractors better to serve their patients; this seems accurate because in the long run more persons will seek out chiropractors if chiropractic services are perceived to be beneficial. The chiropractors contend that those medical doctors who controlled the defendant medical associations influenced their colleagues to keep the medical doctor enclave intact.

The chiropractors contend that they would have gained economically had there been available to them: hospital

facilities, laboratory facilities, X-ray-taking facilities, and the services of radiologists trained in reading X-rays. The chiropractors seem to contend that these facilities and resources were not available to them within their own enclave; that these facilities and resources are to be viewed as standing free of both enclaves; and that it is the members of the medical doctor enclave who caused these otherwise independent facilities and resources to be unavailable to the chiropractors, to the economic disadvantage of the latter.

This is not a case in which it is alleged or shown that the medical doctors, competitors of one another, have combined, for example, to fix the prices they will receive from consumers, and that they have agreed to ostracize or boycott those among them who fail to go along. It is not a case in which the medical doctors are alleged to have combined to boycott chiropractors in an attempt to coerce the chiropractors to behave in a certain economic manner, such as pricing.

What the antitrust law implications of all this may be for consumers of health care services, as distinguished from chiropractors as a group of health care providers, is difficult to discern. See *Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons*, 706 F.2d 1488, 1495-1496 (7th Cir. 1983). In any event, in the absence of partial or plenary summary judgment or directions of verdict, they are implications which arise from facts which it was for the jury to have found, combined with law which it was for the judge to have explained in the instructions.

On the forensic or rhetorical side, as we have already observed, the opening statements, the evidence, and the closing arguments which the jury had heard and seen must have come through as if the jury was being called upon to decide whether in our society it is the medical doctors who are the heroes and the chiropractors the villains, or vice versa.

It is familiar law that we must look to the instructions as a whole, in a common sense manner, avoiding fastidiousness, inquiring whether the correct message

was conveyed to the jury reasonably well. Even if we should discern error in one or more instructions, we will not reverse a judgment—especially after eight weeks of trial—unless we are persuaded the jury's understanding of the issues was seriously affected, to the prejudice of the plaintiffs. *See, e.g., Beard v. Mitchell*, 604 F.2d 485, 498 (7th Cir. 1979).

We are persuaded that from the evidence, the statements of counsel, and the court's instructions, several basic points must have been well understood by the jury. The jury very likely understood that it was called upon to decide whether each of the defendants had agreed with others that the medical doctors would not refer patients to chiropractors and would not themselves consult or cooperate with chiropractors, and that hospitals and X-ray facilities would be placed off limits to chiropractors. If the jury made this finding, it very likely found as well that the boycotters: acted voluntarily and intended to do these things; intended the natural consequence that significantly fewer persons would consult chiropractors about certain health problems, such as back and neck pains; and were not displeased by the anticipation of this consequence.

But what this jury needed badly to know was whether "within the meaning of Section 1" it made a difference why the defendants had behaved in this intentional manner with this intended consequence. The jury could certainly have found that defendants had behaved in this manner: (1) because they believed that it would permit them to make more money than they would make if they did not do it; or (2) because they believed they were performing a public service in applying economic pressure to diminish or eliminate the general threat posed by chiropractic to public health, safety and welfare; or (3) because defendants respected scientific method as the basis for diagnosis and treatment and were unwilling to risk the health and lives of their patients by associating professionally in the care of patients with persons who (so defendants thought) do not share respect for scientific method; or (4) because of some combination of (1), (2) and

(3). For brevity and convenience, we will refer to (1) as a money motive, (2) as a public interest motive, and (3) as a patient care motive.

The jury needed to know whether it should answer the verdict question yes or no if it found that a defendant's motive had been money alone, public interest alone, or patient care alone. It needed to know whether to answer yes or no if it found that a defendant had entertained two or all three motives, and, if so, whether it is legally significant that one motive was more powerful than another.

### 1. *Per se* instructions

Over defendants' objection, the court granted plaintiffs' request that the jury be permitted to decide whether there had been a *per se* violation of Section 1 and, if not, then to apply the rule of reason in determining whether a violation had occurred. We have sustained a judgment for a plaintiff based upon a verdict by a jury which was permitted to proceed in this manner. *Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc.*, 586 F.2d 821, 827 (7th Cir. 1978), *cert. denied* 440 U.S. 930 (1979). However, before the jury is freed to find a *per se* violation, the trial court must determine that there is evidence from which the jury may find that the defendants engaged in certain conduct—for example, a horizontal agreement among competitors to fix prices charged to consumers—which conduct, the court (not the jury) must decide, constitutes a *per se* violation. In such a case, it must be explained to the jury that its function is to decide whether certain conduct, described with precision in the instruction, did or did not occur. It must be explained, also, that if the jury finds that the described conduct did occur, it must also find, without further factual inquiry, that section 1 was violated. In this important respect, the verdict as to a *per se* violation must be controlled by the court.

We will assume for a moment that in the present case there was evidence of conduct which constituted a *per se*

violation of section 1 and, on that assumption, inquire whether the jury was properly instructed as to its function.

The jury was instructed that:

- (1) To establish *per se* unlawfulness, plaintiffs were obliged to show: (a) that defendants entered into "a concerted refusal to deal, engaged in by the participants primarily or in large part for the purpose of excluding competitors from the market"; and (b) "that the primary motivations for this refusal to deal were essentially commercial or economic in nature."
- (2) Not all concerted refusals to deal are group boycotts of the kind the law deems *per se* unlawful. Those "that are of a noncommercial nature or character, ones that do not include among their principal aims the economic purpose of excluding competitors, may be lawful or unlawful depending on their reasonableness."
- (3) "[I]f you find that any of the boycott conspiracies which plaintiffs have alleged were entered into to contain or eliminate chiropractors or to injure them in their ability to compete, . . . you may not consider whether the resulting restraint of trade was reasonable or unreasonable. Conspiracies are illegal. However, if you find that the conspiracies existed, but not for the specific purpose of excluding chiropractors from the market or injuring them in their ability to compete, then you must determine whether the agreements imposed an unreasonable restraint on trade."<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> "Conspiracies are illegal" is taken from the reporter's transcript of the instructions as read by the trial judge. It is clear from the joint appendix that the judge intended to say: "The conspiracies are illegal." Whether the error was his or the reporter's, we are sure that the jury understood the reference to be to the kind of conspiracies described in the immediately preceding sentence.

The third of these instructions, including the use of the word "purpose" rather than "intent," resembles closely an instruction requested by the plaintiffs themselves, but the first and second were inconsistent with plaintiffs' requests.

Still assuming that from the evidence the jury could have distilled conduct on the part of one or more of the defendants which did indeed constitute a *per se* violation, the instructions were faulty in two major respects. First, unfairly to the defendants, the instruction failed to describe with sufficient precision the conduct which, if the jury found it to have occurred, constituted a *per se* violation. Second, unfairly to the plaintiffs, the instruction created a strong impression that conduct which would otherwise constitute a *per se* violation escapes that categorization if the "public interest motive" was the "primary" or "principal" motive.

As to the first point, the active role imposed upon the trial judge with respect to the concept of *per se* violations demanded that the jury be instructed that only if it found that a particular defendant had done A, B, C, and D, could it proceed to find that such conduct constituted a *per se* violation. But the only descriptions provided this jury were "a concerted refusal to deal" and "any of the boycott conspiracies which plaintiffs have alleged." We appreciate that elsewhere in the instructions, the elements of the alleged concerted refusal to deal were described (for example, refusal to refer patients, denial of access to hospitals, closing doors of educational programs). But the *per se* rule is extraordinarily severe and it was necessary for the jury to know whether it became operative only if the jury found that a particular defendant participated in all of the alleged misconduct or if it found participation in some but not all of the alleged misconduct. No guidance was provided in this respect.

As to the second point, taken together and taken in the context of all of the instructions, the jury was plainly led to believe that if the money motive was present but was not "primary" or "principal," even the most classical anti-

competitive conduct would not constitute a *per se* violation. The jury may well have found that a generalized public interest motive was dominant with one defendant or another. If so, the jury was required by the instructions to withhold the *per se* violation label even from conduct—comparable to horizontal price-fixing, for example—to which the label would otherwise clearly attach. This was error. *Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc.*, 457 U.S. 332 (1982); *National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States*, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).

It can fairly be said that the Supreme Court of the United States has been persistent and firm in its support of the *per se* doctrine. Since the trial of the case before us, the Court has pointedly described and endorsed its virtues. *Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc.*, 457 U.S. at 342-348. Also, it is now firmly established that the members of learned professions and their professional associations are within the terms of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. *Id.* at 348-349; *Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar*, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). Nor are the duration and depth of the judiciary's experience with the health care industry too little to permit application of the *per se* rule to a particular device, such as price-fixing, the anti-competitive effects of which have long been recognized. *Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc.*, 457 U.S. at 349-351. Moreover, as recently as in *Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc.*, a price-fixing case, the Court quoted approvingly this language from *Northern Pac. R. Co. v. United States*, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958): "Among the practices which the courts have heretofore deemed to be unlawful in and of themselves are price fixing, division of markets, group boycotts, and tying arrangements." 457 U.S. at 344, n. 15.

Nevertheless, we conclude that in the present case, the trial court should not have acceded, over defendants' objection, to plaintiffs' request that the jury be afforded the option to find a *per se* violation. It follows that any error in the *per se* instructions which was disadvantageous to plaintiffs was not prejudicial.

We reach this conclusion because we reject the assumption, in which we have indulged for the purpose of analysis, that facts could have been distilled by the jury from this record which would constitute a *per se* violation, and because the evidence of the "patient care motive" required that rule of reason analysis be applied.

This court has recently recognized in *United States Trotting Ass'n v. Chicago Downs Ass'n*, 665 F.2d 781, 787-90 (7th Cir. 1981) (*en banc*), "that boycotts are illegal *per se* only if used to enforce agreements that are themselves illegal *per se*—for example price-fixing agreements." *Marrese v. American Academy*, 706 F.2d at 1495. As we have observed, one of the peculiarities of the boycott which plaintiffs alleged and undertook to prove was that it was not used to compel either medical doctors or chiropractors to engage in certain economic behavior *vis-a-vis* consumers, such as price-fixing. The evidence was that the compulsion to be exerted upon medical doctors, hospitals, X-ray facilities, and laboratories through the conspiracy, if the jury found there was such intended compulsion, was to engage in the boycott itself, and not to exert, through the boycott, compulsion upon any one to do or to refrain from doing anything else. Particularly when a conspiracy of this sort is alleged in the context of a profession, the nature and extent of its anticompetitive effect are too uncertain to be amenable to *per se* treatment, as contrasted with treatment under the rule of reason.

Moreover, assuming the case were otherwise amenable to *per se* treatment, the presence of substantial evidence of motive (3)—the "patient care" motive— rendered the case inappropriate for *per se* treatment. In discussing the instructions on the rule of reason, we will comment further on the legal significance of the patient care motive. For the present, we note that in *Goldfarb*, 421 U.S. at 788, n. 17, *National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States*, 435 U.S. at 696 (1978), and *Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc.*, 457 U.S. at 348-349, the Court has taken pains to preserve the possibility that a particular practice which could be viewed as a

violation of the Sherman Act in another context, should be viewed and treated differently in the circumstances peculiar to a learned profession. We know from *Professional Engineers and Maricopa County* that an agreement to fix prices will not escape *per se* treatment simply because it is entered into by professionals and accompanied by ethical protestations. But a canon of medical ethics purporting, surely not frivolously, to address the importance of scientific method gives rise to questions of sufficient delicacy and novelty at least to escape *per se* treatment.

## 2. Rule of reason instructions

A famous articulation of the rule of reason appears in *Chicago Board of Trade v. United States*, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918):

The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.

In *National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States*, 435 U.S. at 691, referring to *Chicago Board of Trade*, the Court stated that for sixty years it had "adhered to the position that the inquiry mandated by the Rule of Reason is whether the challenged agreement is one that promotes competition or one that suppresses competition."

Plaintiffs in the present case requested a rule of reason instruction which stated plainly that: the rule focuses directly on the challenged restraint's impact on competition; the question is whether the agreement merely regulates and thereby promotes competition or is such as may injure or suppress or even destroy competition; and a restraint is not illegal if on balance it promotes competition or has no effect upon competition, but is illegal if on balance it suppresses or injures competition. The trial court declined to give this instruction, and it gave the following instructions on the rule of reason as the jury was to apply it in this case:

One of the factors to be considered in determining whether any agreement in restraint of trade is unreasonable is whether it has or is likely to have unreasonable effects. The law is not concerned with restraints of trade that are not anticompetitive in purpose unless they also have a substantial adverse effect on the marketplace.

One of the factors you should consider in judging reasonableness is the effect of the defendants' practices on competition, if any, that exists between chiropractors generally and medical doctors. You have been instructed as to the definition of the term "competition" in an antitrust case such as this, and you must keep that definition in mind when considering whether there was any effect on competition.

If you find from the evidence that defendants engaged in activities, meaning direct, private activities, as distinguished from governmental activities, which have had a substantial effect in preventing chiropractors from offering services which are reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes as the services offered by medical doctors, that would be an element weighing on the side of unreasonableness. If, on the other hand you find from the evidence that the defendants' activities did not have any substantial effect in preven-

ting chiropractors from offering such services as licensure permits, that would be an element weighing on the side of the reasonableness of the defendants' activities.

If you find that the conduct complained of on the part of the defendants was not so motivated by economic considerations that it amounted to a per se violation of the antitrust statutes, you then must consider whether the actions of those defendants in agreeing to adopt and enforce certain ethical standards or principles as a means of eliminating or preventing associational activities between chiropractors and medical doctors had the effect of unreasonably restraining the trade of chiropractors.

In this regard, it is a proper function of professional associations to formulate and express principles concerning desirable standards of professional conduct and service. This is so because such principles may benefit the public by raising professional standards generally, and by helping to insure that the profession merits the trust that the public necessarily places in its members. Such principles also assist members of the profession by giving them guidance as to generally accepted standards of conduct in their profession.

In judging whether a particular professional standard in operation produces an unreasonable restraint of trade, it is necessary to consider the genuineness of the justification advanced in support of the standard, the reasonableness of the standard itself, the manner of its enforcement, and the effects of it on the relevant area of trade or commerce.

The fact that an ethical standard which affects the conduct of one profession, such as medical doctors, may also have an indirect effect on the activities of another profession, such as chiropractors, does not alone mean that it amounts to an unreasonable restraint of trade. Rather, the determination to be made is whether, as a consequence of the operation

of that standard, there has been a cognizable adverse effect on the public interest in the sense that the opportunity of chiropractors to provide services they are licensed to provide and the opportunity of the public to receive those services has been unreasonably impaired or obstructed.

[Y]ou are further instructed that chiropractors have been given the right by law to carry on their practice and to engage in the treatment of patients, subject to whatever legal limits are placed on their licenses. The question of whether chiropractic poses an impermissible hazard to the health and welfare of the public is one for the Congress and/or the state legislatures to resolve, not the defendants or other private persons or groups. Because those legislative entities alone have the authority to determine whether chiropractors should be permitted to offer their services to the general public, the law will not allow their decision to be overturned.

It is a different question, however, whether members of the medical profession may limit their own relationships with chiropractors for the purpose of practicing their own profession according to standards they consider necessary or desirable for the proper practice of medicine. As I have already instructed you, reasonable ethical principles having that objective and not aimed at barring the practice of chiropractic within the limits allowed by state licenses may be lawful if they do not, in operation, also have a significant and unnecessarily adverse effect on the chiropractors' ability to carry on their trade. You may, therefore, consider as bearing on the reasonableness of the defendants' purposes what the evidence shows to be the depth and sincerity of their beliefs that the sharing of responsibility by doctors with chiropractors poses substantial hazards to the welfare of patients and the public welfare.

Plainly the instructions as given failed to convey that the single standard is whether the challenged agreement

is one that promotes competition or one that suppresses competition.

It is true, as defendants argue on appeal, that the instructions as given include the following points:

"One of the factors to be considered in determining whether any agreement in restraint of trade is unreasonable is whether it has or is likely to have unreasonable effects . . . . One of the factors you should consider in judging reasonableness is the effect of the defendants' practices on competition, if any, that exists between chiropractors generally and medical doctors." If the jury were to find that defendants' activities had had a substantial effect on the chiropractors' ability to compete, "that would be an element weighing on the side of unreasonableness." The determination to be made is whether "there has been a cognizable adverse effect on the public interest in the sense that the opportunity of chiropractors to provide services they are licensed to provide and the opportunity of the public to receive those services has been unreasonably impaired or obstructed." It is for legislative bodies alone to decide whether chiropractic should be permitted; they have decided that it should; "the law will not allow their decision to be overturned." Even ethical principles limiting the relationships of medical doctors with chiropractors for the purpose of protecting the medical doctors' own profession, and not aimed at barring the practice of chiropractic within the limits licensed by the state, are unlawful if, in operation, they "have a significant and unnecessarily adverse effect on the chiropractors' ability to carry on their trade."

The passages just summarized include every portion of the instructions which might be thought to approximate an instruction that the single standard is whether the challenged agreement merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. In a case in which a "public interest motive" has not been made the centerpiece of the

defense, an indulgent appellate court might conceivably decide that this portion of the instructions sufficiently approximated the single standard. But surely in the context of the present case, this is not possible. To instruct that "the effect of the defendants' practices on competition" is "one" of the factors in judging reasonableness and that "a substantial effect in preventing chiropractors from offering services" in competition with medical doctors is "an" element weighing on the side of unreasonableness is unmistakably to suggest that the jury was free, even obliged, to weigh factors unrelated to impact on competition. The expression "unnecessarily adverse" can mean only that an adverse effect on competition may be "reasonable," within the meaning of the rule of reason, if there is a necessity for it arising from some value unrelated to free competition.

Any possibility that the instructions as given sufficiently approximated the single standard of promoting or suppressing competition is dispelled by other portions of the instructions on the rule of reason. After being told of the importance of ethical canons in raising professional standards generally and in insuring that public trust in the members of the profession is merited, the jury was instructed that in judging whether a particular professional standard, in operation, produces an unreasonable restraint of trade, it was "necessary to consider the justification advanced in support of the standard, the reasonableness of the standard itself, the manner of its enforcement," as well as "the effects of it on the relevant area of trade or commerce." Again, the implication is unmistakable: the "reasonableness" of the standard, in terms of values unrelated to free competition (in this case, generally raising the standards of the medical profession and insuring that the public trust in that profession is merited), is a factor which it is "necessary" for the jury to consider in addition to its consideration of the standard's effects on competition.

We appreciate that in the classic exposition in *Chicago Board of Trade*, it was said that facts relevant to the test of promotion or suppression of competition include: "[t]he

history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, [and] the purpose or end sought to be attained . . . ." 246 U.S. at 238. But the Court followed this observation immediately with the statement that "[t]his is not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation, . . . but because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences." *Id.* We understand this to mean that it is effect or consequence which controls, not intent or motive. In ascertaining effect or consequence, it is useful to determine the setting in which the restraint was adopted and the effect or consequence which its instigators anticipated. An anticipated effect on competition may be somewhat more likely to have emerged as the true effect than an unanticipated effect. But in a claim for damages (as contrasted with injunctive relief), the true effect, as it has emerged, is the critical and sole factor.

On this appeal, defendants stoutly insist that the references in the instructions to the "genuineness" of the justification advanced in support of the standard, the "reasonableness" of the standard itself, and the "depth and sincerity" of defendants' beliefs about chiropractic, were all clearly subordinated to the inquiry blessed in *Chicago Board of Trade*. That is, as we understand the contention, defendants refrain, on this appeal, from disputing that the effect on competition is the single test. They contend that in determining that effect, it is useful to inquire into what the instigators anticipated the effect on competition would be; inquiry into that anticipation includes inquiry into the instigators' "reason for adopting the particular remedy" and the "purpose or end sought to be attained" by them; inquiry into what their true (as contrasted with pretextual) "reason," "purpose" or "end" may have been, in turn, may be affected by ascertaining their "genuineness," the "depth and sincerity" of their beliefs, and the "reasonableness" of the means they chose.

Conceivably, an instruction which explained this tortuous sequence might pass muster, but the instructions as

given fail utterly to explain in understandable language the severely limited function of the inquiry, sanctioned by *Chicago Board of Trade*, into the reason for adopting the ethical canon and the purpose or end sought to be attained by it."

In short, the instructions given cannot be defended successfully as an adequate approximation of a rule of reason test geared simply, clearly, and exclusively to the question whether the challenged conduct promoted or suppressed competition between medical doctors and chiropractors. We cannot escape the conclusion that in the district court, defendants flatly resisted the test geared exclusively to effect on competition and sought a modification which affords recognition to values other than those associated with unrestrained competition. The district court acceded to these urgings. From the jury's viewpoint, the result was ambiguity, an uncertain trumpet.

The judgment must be reversed unless: (1) the district court and we are free to modify the rule of reason test in this case involving Principle 3 of the AMA Principles of Medical Ethics; and (2) despite their ambiguity, the instructions adequately expressed the permissible

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<sup>9</sup> Defendants explain that the phrases "genuineness of the defendants' justification" and "reasonableness of the standards themselves" were drawn from *Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad*, 586 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1978), *cert. denied*, 444 U.S. 924 (1979). An abortion clinic claimed, among other things, that the defendant medical doctors had conspired to boycott it, and the district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. In reversing in part, the court of appeals commented that even if defendants' efforts to enforce professional standards were to be tested by the rule of reason, rather than the *per se* rule, factual issues remained "as to the genuineness of the defendants' justification, the reasonableness of the standards themselves, and the manner of their enforcement." *Id.* at 547. The Fifth Circuit's choice of words in its cryptic dealing with this summary judgment question cannot fairly be accorded the immense significance attributed to it by defendants in the context of the case before us.

modification, without prejudice to the plaintiffs' proper interests. We hold that the district court and we are free to modify the rule of reason test in a case involving a certain kind of question of ethics for the medical profession, but that the instructions as given failed to express a permissible modification and that prejudice to the plaintiffs resulted.

As we have noted, in the course of its relatively recent application of the Sherman Act to the professions, including the medical profession, the Supreme Court has been markedly careful to preserve the courts' freedom to discriminate between nonprofessional and professional activities, in construing and applying the Act. "The public service aspect, and other features of the professions, may require that a particular practice, which could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another context, be treated differently . . . ." *Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar*, 421 U.S. at 787, n. 17. "[B]y their nature, professional services may differ significantly from other business services, and, accordingly, the nature of the competition in such services may vary." *National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States*, 435 U.S. at 696. It is true that in *National Society of Professional Engineers*, the theme from *Goldfarb* was echoed in a context in which the Court was emphasizing the narrow limits of the theme and was making clear that even in the setting of the profession of engineering, even in the face of a possibly accurate contention that the consequence of competitive bidding would be corner-cutting dangerous to the users and consumers of products, "the Rule of Reason does not support a defense based on the assumption that competition itself is unreasonable." *Id.* Moreover, in *Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society*, 457 U.S. 332 (1982), the Court held it not only a violation of the rule of reason, but a *per se* violation, for medical doctors to agree upon maximum fees that they might claim in full payment for health services provided to policyholders of specified insurance plans, despite the doctors' contention that the agreement facilitated the successful marketing of an insurance plan

in which the participating medical doctors had no financial interest and which apparently was beneficial to consumers.

Conscious of the narrowness of the range of the preserved opportunity for differential treatment of professions and nonprofessions under the Sherman Act, we believe that the considerations reflected in the AMA's Principle 3 fall within that range. In his concurrence in *National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States*, Justice Blackmun regretted the intimations he found in the Court's opinion that any ethical rule with an overall anticompetitive effect promulgated by a professional society is forbidden by the Act. He expressed the view that flexibility should remain, in the professional context, to "take account of benefits other than increased competition" and to recognize "that there may be ethical rules which have a more than de minimis anticompetitive effect and yet are important in a profession's proper ordering." 435 U.S. at 699-700.

In the case at hand, evidence of what we have referred to as the "patient care motive" was that when they enter into a doctor-patient relationship with specific persons, medical doctors believe it is essential to bring scientific method to bear upon diagnosis and treatment. There was evidence of their belief that to collaborate with chiropractors in the care of persons who are patients of the medical doctors is to compromise the application of scientific principles, to violate the oaths taken by the medical doctors, and to introduce risk to the health and lives of the patients for whom the medical doctors have accepted responsibility. Clearly, an individual medical doctor is free to act on this belief by declining to associate with a particular chiropractor in the care of a particular patient. It seems reasonable that two or three medical doctors, sharing this view and working as a team in the care of a particular patient, would be free to agree, and to act on the agreement, to decline to associate with a particular chiropractor in the care of that patient. The Sherman Act problem in the present case arises from the express embodiment of this viewpoint in a formal set of

ethical principles promulgated by a large association of medical doctors, and by the alleged efforts of that association and kindred associations to give effect to the exclusionary attitude in the setting of hospitals staffed by medical doctors.

If it should be determined eventually in this case that the Sherman Act was violated, that determination should not rest on insistence that the Act is indifferent to, or even hostile to, the value of permitting medical doctors to honor in their practice what they perceive to be scientific method, or indifferent to or hostile to the value of encouragement, from within the profession, to its members to honor scientific method by declining to associate with those thought to dishonor it. A value independent of the values attributed to unrestrained competition must enter the equation. The reasonableness of any resulting restraint on competition must be determined by a reconciliation of values of differing kinds. Because Congress has for so long assigned such pronounced value to freedom of competition and the Supreme Court has for so long applied the rule of reason so as virtually to exclude other values (except, for example, the value of activity protected by the first amendment), the adaptation of the rule of reason in the Principle 3 setting should impose a heavy burden on those who would justify conduct having significant anticompetitive effect.

The jury should be instructed in appropriate language to the following effect: The burden of persuasion is on the plaintiffs to show that the effect of Principle 3 and the implementing conduct has been to restrict competition rather than to promote it. If the plaintiffs have met this burden, the burden of persuasion is on the defendants to show: (1) that they genuinely entertained a concern for what they perceive as scientific method in the care of each person with whom they have entered into a doctor-patient relationship; (2) that this concern is objectively reasonable; (3) that this concern has been the dominant motivating factor in defendants' promulgation of Principle 3 and in the conduct intended to implement it; and (4) that this concern for scientific method in patient care

could not have been adequately satisfied in a manner less restrictive of competition.

We hold that this requirement does not constitute an affirmative defense which must be pleaded. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c). We hold, however, that if plaintiffs meet their burden to show that the effect has been to restrict competition, they make a prima facie showing that the restraint has been unreasonable, within the meaning of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Only if the defendants then meet their burden, as described, does their conduct escape condemnation as unreasonable. We commend the use of a special verdict to permit the jury to understand clearly the nature and sequence of the questions it must answer, and where the burden of persuasion lies with respect to each question.

In *Silver v. New York Stock Exchange*, 373 U.S. 341 (1963), the Court recognized a value in the absence of the use of fraudulent techniques within the New York Stock Exchange and recognized that vindication of this value was the dominant goal of the Exchange. Nevertheless, it found that the means chosen to vindicate the value was not the least restrictive available to achieve substantial vindication. Similarly, in *National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States*, the challenged rule of the Society was "grossly overbroad." 435 U.S. at 699-700 (Blackmun, J., concurring).

We appreciate that the last paragraph of that segment of the rule of reason instructions we have quoted above bears resemblance to the adaptation of the rule we have discussed. It refers to limitation of relationships with chiropractors for the purpose of practicing medicine according to standards deemed necessary or desirable; to principles having that objective and not the objective of barring chiropractic within its licensed limits; and to the absence of "a significant and unnecessarily adverse effect on the chiropractors' ability to carry on their trade." However, if any modification of the single-test rule of reason (promotion versus suppression of competition) is permissible, the modification must be explained to the

jury forthrightly and precisely, and in particular the least restrictive means requirement must be set forth more understandably than by the use of the single word "unnecessarily" in the phrase "significant and unnecessarily adverse effect on the chiropractors' ability to carry on their trade."

There is another important respect in which the instructions were inadequate and prejudicial to plaintiffs: they failed to distinguish sharply enough between the "public interest motive" and the "patient care motive."

The patient care motive could explain nothing more than the refusal by the medical doctors, and the hospitals staffed by medical doctors, to associate with chiropractors in the treatment of patients. It could not explain, for example, defendants' efforts to persuade Congress, state legislatures, and federal and state agencies to enact laws and to promulgate rulings to contain or to eliminate chiropractic. The motive for this "political" activity, the jury must have found, was either the money motive or the generalized public interest motive, or a combination of the two. We will assume, for the moment, that the jury found the political activity to be entirely protected by the first amendment (see III A3, *infra*). A critical question for the jury was whether defendants conspired to contain and to eliminate chiropractic generally, not only by waging constitutionally protected political warfare, but by waging economic warfare; that is, by engaging in aspects of the alleged boycott not limited to a refusal to associate in the care of specific patients. If the jury found that defendants had indeed engaged in economic warfare against chiropractic generally, beyond a refusal to associate in the care of specific patients, it was important that the jury understand that a generalized public interest motive affords no legal excuse for such economic warfare.

Since at least as early as 1941 when *Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC*, 312 U.S. 457, was decided, it has been clear that private persons and entities may not presume to function as "an extra-

governmental agency, which prescribes rules for the regulation and restraint of interstate commerce." *Id.* at 465. It is true that medical doctors are better qualified than most members of the public to form an opinion whether chiropractic poses a threat to public health, safety and welfare. They are free to attempt to persuade legislatures and administrative agencies. But a generalized concern for the health, safety and welfare of members of the public as to whom a medical doctor has assumed no specific professional responsibility, however genuine and well-informed such a concern may be, affords no legal justification for economic measures to diminish competition with some medical doctors by chiropractors.

The jury was instructed that chiropractic was lawful within the limits imposed by Congress and state legislatures; that whether chiropractic poses an impermissible hazard to the health and welfare of the public is for Congress and state legislatures to resolve; and not for the defendants; and that the law will not allow the legislative decision to be overturned. The jury was then told that it is a different question whether medical doctors may limit their own relationships with chiropractors.

Had the jury been instructed that the sole test under the rule of reason was the effect of defendants' conduct on competition and that the jury must disregard evidence both of defendants' public interest motive and of their patient care motive, plaintiffs would have suffered no prejudice, of course. But when the district court ventured to instruct that defendants' concerns with the perceived threat of chiropractic were relevant to the jury's task, it was essential that a line be drawn sharply and unmistakably between evidence of the public interest motive and evidence of the patient care motive. We conclude that such a line was not drawn with sufficient emphasis and clarity.

We conclude that the instructions to the jury were prejudicially erroneous in two respects. The overriding ques-

tion in the case was whether, in applying the rule of reason, the jury was to be allowed to consider any factor whatever beyond the effect of defendants' conduct on competition. The district court elected to permit the jury to go beyond that single test and to consider the defendants' motives. But it failed to confine that consideration sharply to defendants' patient care motive, as contrasted with their generalized public interest motive. And, with respect to the patient care motive, the court failed to convey clearly and understandably the manner in which the jury was to weigh it, particularly as to the least restrictive means requirement.

The verdict and the judgment cannot stand.

### 3. *First amendment*

There was evidence of considerable activity on the part of one or more of the defendants directed to winning or defeating bills in Congress and in state legislatures, and other activity directed to federal and state agencies responsible for administering laws in the health care field.

Plaintiffs assert that two instructions on freedom of speech and association labelled all speech and writing as protected by the Constitution, thus suggesting that defendant AMA's ethical canons could not be a basis for finding a Section 1 violation unless the canons were coercively enforced. The instructions at issue were general descriptions of first amendment rights, merely a part of the court's statements on the relationship between the first amendment and the Sherman Act. Subsequent instructions limited the general instructions on first amendment rights.

The *Noerr-Pennington* doctrine extends protection to businesses and other associations when they join together to petition legislative bodies, administrative agencies, or courts for action that may have anticompetitive effects. *California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited*, 404 U.S. 508 (1972); *United Mine Workers v. Pennington*, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); *Eastern Railroad Presidents*

*Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.*, 365 U.S. 127 (1961). In *California Transport*, the Court created the "sham" exception to the doctrine:

"[A] pattern of baseless, repetitive claims may emerge which leads the factfinder to conclude that the administrative and judicial processes have been abused. That may be a difficult line to discern and draw. But once it is drawn, the case is established that abuse of those processes produced an illegal result, viz., effectively barring respondents from access to the agencies and courts. Insofar as the administrative or judicial processes are involved, actions of that kind cannot acquire immunity by seeking refuge under the umbrella of "political expression."

404 U.S. at 513. See also *Otter Trail Power Co. v. United States*, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) (antitrust liability attaches when repetitive lawsuits raising unsubstantial claims evidence goal of suppressing competition). The sham exception exposes fraudulent and illegitimate petitioning activities to Sherman Act prohibitions.

Plaintiffs complain that the court's explanation substantially distorted the *Noerr-Pennington* doctrine and the sham exception by instructing the jury that defendants' advocacy activity directed to legislative and administrative agencies or bodies was protected if "the defendants undertook such efforts to influence governmental bodies with a sincere purpose to obtain the governmental actions that they sought."

Plaintiffs' contention is without merit. In *Noerr*, the defendants had conducted a publicity campaign which the plaintiffs claimed was distorted and directed to harming the plaintiffs' public image more than to obtaining legislative action. The Court agreed that the publicity campaign fell "far short of the ethical standards generally approved of in this country." 365 U.S. at 140. But as long as the defendants "were making a genuine effort to influence legislation," their actions did not violate the Sherman Act. *Id.* at 144. Thus, the trial court's statement

in this case properly explained an important aspect of the *Noerr-Pennington* doctrine. See *Federal Prescription Service v. American Pharmaceutical Association*, 663 F.2d 253 (D.C. Cir. 1981), *cert. denied*, 455 U.S. 928 (1982).

#### 4. Coercive enforcement

Plaintiffs contend the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury that it could not find the requisite agreement unless the ethical canons at issue were coercively enforced.

It is not essential to a conspiracy under the Sherman Act that the conspirators possess or demonstrate their power to carry out their anticompetitive plan. *United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.*, 310 U.S. 150, 224, n. 59 (1940). In *National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States*, a provision of the society's code of ethics prohibited members from providing price information to potential clients which would permit the latter to make price comparisons among those performing engineering services. The district court found the society had "actively pursue[d] a course of policing adherence to the competitive bid ban through direct and indirect communication with members and prospective clients," and had "engaged in educational campaigns and personal admonitions to members and clients who were suspected of engaging in competitive bidding practices." 389 F. Supp. 1193, 1200 (D.D.C. 1974). In Supreme Court argument, the society claimed it had never enforced the ban on competitive bidding. The Court deemed the lower court's finding sufficient to fulfill the §1 agreement criterion. 435 U.S. at 684, n. 5. In *Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar*, the Court noted the power the state bar association's ethical opinions on minimum-fee schedules exerted over its members:

[The] opinions threatened professional discipline for habitual disregard of fee schedules, and thus attorneys knew their livelihood was in jeopardy if they did so. Even without that threat the opinions would have constituted substantial reason to adhere to the schedules because attorneys could be expected to

comply in order to assure that they did not discredit themselves by departing from professional norms, and perhaps betraying their professional oaths.

421 U.S. at 791, n. 21. Thus, even without coercive enforcement, a court may find that members of an association promulgating guidelines sanctioning conduct in violation of §1 participated in an agreement to engage in an illegal refusal to deal.

Plaintiffs' complaint is specifically addressed to two instructions as given. One stated in pertinent part:

In considering the first element [of a group boycott]—that is, whether there was an agreement to engage in, or to coerce others to engage in, a concerted refusal to deal with chiropractors—you should consider what the evidence shows to be the manner and extent of enforcement of the ethical standards involved in the case.

The effect of an ethical principle in restraining trade, if there is any such effect, depends upon the extent to which it actually operates to limit the freedom of persons to whom it is addressed. An ethical standard may serve as a guideline, advice or recommendation to medical doctors, leaving them free to evaluate the principle and to make their own decisions as to what constitutes sound ethical practice. On the other hand, such a rule may be regarded by doctors as a binding rule which they are required in all circumstances to follow. You must determine, therefore, whether the ethical standards in this case operated only as guidelines or whether they were employed to, and/or had the effect of, controlling the actions of members of the medical profession.

Another instruction given concerned the liability of defendant AHA, and said: "You may not find the AHA liable for any action taken against the plaintiffs by individual hospitals in this case unless plaintiffs have proven that those hospitals are members of the AHA and that AHA intentionally coerced or induced that action."

The district court refused to instruct the jury that proof of coercive enforcement was not required, as requested by plaintiffs:

There need be no assurances among the conspirators, either oral or in writing, to the effect that they would adhere to the plan. Nor is it necessary that there exist a coercive mechanism by which the conspiracy may be enforced. It is enough that a mutual understanding was reached, and that the defendants in fact conformed to the arrangement.

The instructions as given were unfortunately ambiguous, but they did not state that coercive enforcement was required. One mentioned enforcement, but did not imply that coercive enforcement action was necessary. Another mentioned coercive enforcement only in the disjunctive: "coerced or induced." Although plaintiffs' proposed instruction correctly states the law, the court did instruct the jury that:

What the preponderance of the evidence in the case must show, in order to establish proof that a conspiracy existed, is that the members in some way or manner, or through some contrivance, positively or tacitly came to a mutual understanding to try to accomplish a common and unlawful plan.

Sufficiently to avoid the necessity of reversal on this ground, this instruction described the nature of the agreement plaintiffs had to prove.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Plaintiffs contend, also, that the court failed to instruct on one of their conspiracy theories: namely, that the individual members of each defendant organization conspired among themselves. Although not explicit on the point, the instructions as given (e.g., "plaintiffs . . . have alleged that . . . the defendants and their members have agreed . . .") were sufficient to reveal to the jury that this was one of plaintiffs' theories.

### 5. *Apparent authority*

Significant evidence bearing on the conspiratorial conduct of JCAH, AHA, and ISMS related to certain employee conduct, which witnesses testified was unauthorized by those organizations. The district court denied plaintiffs' request for a jury instruction to the effect that an association may be liable for the conduct of employees who have acted with apparent, but not actual, authority. The instruction given stated only that an association is responsible for acts done within the scope of an employee's authority, explaining that the existence of authority may be shown by circumstantial evidence. *American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp.*, 456 U.S. 556 (1982), decided subsequently to the trial in the case before us, holds flatly that apparent authority is sufficient to support civil antitrust liability on the part of a standard-setting organization. The evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to find that JCAH and AHA—and ISMS in association with JCAH and AHA—were standard-setting organizations. The factual record requires us to hold that with respect to defendants JCAH, AHA and ISMS, plaintiffs were prejudiced by the district court's erroneous refusal to instruct the jury on the significance of apparent authority of employees.

### B. *Admission of evidence*

Even if reversal were not required by reason of error in the jury instructions, we would be obliged to reverse by reason of the ruling receiving in evidence the volume of evidence about the Parker School of Chiropractic and about the plaintiff Bryden's one-time arrangement with a furniture store on the sale of mattresses to Bryden's patients. We would do so with great reluctance, recognizing keenly the difficulties encountered by a trial judge in a trial of this length and complexity. The evidence was relevant to the genuineness of the defendants' belief that chiropractic is quackery. That is, evidence tending to show that chiropractic is in fact quackery is probative

that defendants genuinely entertained the belief that it is quackery. But the genuineness of defendants' beliefs on that subject, whatever its proper legal significance in the trial, is a subject that could have been addressed with a less extravagant volume of evidence, and with far less emphasis upon alleged financial greed. The items we have specified created such a danger of unfair prejudice and confusion of issues that it was an abuse of discretion not to exclude it under Fed. R. Evid. 403.

### C. *Unclean hands*

Before trial, the district court correctly granted plaintiffs' motion to strike the affirmative defense of unclean hands, thus barring evidence that plaintiffs had themselves violated the antitrust laws. See *Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.*, 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968), and *Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons*, 340 U.S. 211, 214 (1951). As the cross-examination of plaintiff Bryden was about to commence, plaintiff's counsel moved for an order barring defendants from inquiring of him about an arrangement Bryden had had with a furniture store for a payment to Bryden when, upon his recommendation, a patient purchased a certain type of mattress. The district court denied the motion on the ground that such testimony would be relevant to the genuineness of defendants' belief that chiropractic is quackery.

On cross-examination, Bryden acknowledged that, without the knowledge of his patients, he had had such an arrangement with the store. Asked by defendants' counsel whether he considered it ethical, Bryden responded: "It is probably as ethical as MDs owning pharmacies . . . ." Apparently to lessen the effect of Bryden's remark, examining defense counsel immediately referred, ambiguously, to a version of AMA's Principles of Ethics, already in evidence, and he suggested that it is unethical for medical doctors to own drug stores. From discussion out of the jury's hearing, it developed that such ownership is not unethical, if patients are not exploited.

Controversy developed with respect both to the mattresses and to the physician-owned drug stores, and eventually the court permitted the testimony about the mattresses to stand, instructed the jury to disregard defense counsel's attempt to describe what the AMA Principles say about physician-owned drug stores, and denied plaintiff's motion for a mistrial. In closing argument, defendants referred to Bryden's involvement in the arrangement "whereby in exchange for their endorsement and promotion of the firm's mattresses, the chiropractors would get a rake-off on each one sold." The trial court refused to give plaintiff's proposed instruction that unclean hands was not a defense in this case.

For reasons set forth in III B, above, we have concluded that plaintiffs were prejudiced by the volume and nature of the evidence which defendants were permitted to present, impugning the validity of chiropractic and the integrity of chiropractors. We believe that this prejudice could not have been overcome by an instruction to the effect that the clean hands defense was unavailable, and so we refrain from comment whether the failure to give such an instruction was error. Viewed in isolation, however, the episode concerning the mattresses and physician-owned drug stores did not require the district court to grant a mistrial.

#### *D. Reopening of Discovery*

Plaintiffs sought to reopen discovery to investigate whether some defendants had attempted to prevent unilateral settlements in this case, contending that such attempts could constitute an independent violation of the Sherman Act. Defendants were granted a protective order barring the discovery. The trial court did not abuse its discretion, especially when discovery had continued for nearly four years and trial was imminent.

#### *E. Involvement of JCAH, AHA, ACP, ACS and ISMS*

The evidence summarized under "Facts" in part II, above, clearly supports findings that there was con-

siderable communication on the subject of chiropractic between the AMA, on the one hand, and, on the other, each of the five organizations which moved for a directed verdict; that this communication revealed acquiescence by all five organizations in the AMA view that chiropractic is quackery and cultism; that JCAH and AHA cooperated to give practical effect to this view by discouraging hospitals from permitting use of their facilities by chiropractors; that by their direct, formal and significant organizational participation in JCAH and by their own activities, ACP and ACS endeavored both to discourage hospitals from permitting use of their facilities by chiropractors and to discourage medical doctors from professional association with chiropractors; and that by adopting the AMA Principles of Medical Ethics and by embodying the Principles in its own policy manual, ISMS endeavored to discourage medical doctors from professional association with chiropractors. Had a reasonable jury made these findings, as it would have been free to do, the findings were sufficient to permit, although not to require, a finding that JCAH, AHA, ACP, ACS and ISMS each knew that concerted action in a scheme was contemplated and invited and that each acquiesced and participated in that scheme. Such a finding would have provided sufficient footing for liability in this civil antitrust action. See *Theater Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp.*, 346 U.S. 537, 540 (1954); *Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States*, 306 U.S. 208, 226-227 (1939). The district court did not err in denying the motions for directed verdicts in favor of these five defendants.

#### F. The Section 2 Claim

The plaintiffs' asserted cause of action based on Section 2 of the Sherman Act was somewhat muted at trial and was virtually ignored on this appeal. Because of the rulings we have made on the Section 1 claim, relating to the admission of prejudicial evidence and to the legal significance of apparent authority, we reverse the judg-

ment as to the Section 2 claim. We refrain from expressing an opinion with respect to any other matters as they bear on the Section 2 claim.

#### IV. ORDER

The judgment appealed from is reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial.<sup>11</sup>

A true Copy:

Teste:

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*Clerk of the United States Court of  
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit*

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<sup>11</sup> The motion by the Health Care Equalization Committee of the Iowa Chiropractic Society, pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 27, for the limited purpose of obtaining access to discovery, is denied.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
For the Northern District of Illinois  
Eastern Division

Civil Action File No. 76 C 3777

CHESTER A. WILK, et al

vs.

AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,  
et al

JUDGMENT

This action came on for trial before the Court and a jury, Honorable Nicholas J. Bua, United States District Judge, presiding, and the issues having been duly tried and the jury having duly rendered its verdict,

It is Ordered and Adjudged that plaintiffs take nothing and action is dismissed on the merits.

Dated at Chicago, Illinois, this 30th day of January, 1981.

H. STUART CUNNINGHAM  
Clerk of Court

3  
No. 90-542

OCT 24 1990  
JOSEPH F. SPANIOLO, JR.  
CLERK

IN THE  
**Supreme Court of the United States**  
OCTOBER TERM, 1990

AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,

*Petitioner,*

v.

CHESTER A. WILK, D.C.,  
JAMES W. BRYDEN, D.C.,  
PATRICIA B. ARTHUR, D.C., and  
MICHAEL D. PEDIGO, D.C.,

*Respondents.*

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The United  
States Court Of Appeals For The Seventh Circuit

OPPOSITION TO  
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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## QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The petitioner does not challenge the facts found and affirmed by the courts below, yet the petitioner's "questions presented" are *founded entirely* on purported "facts" that sharply conflict with the findings affirmed below. The petitioner's "questions presented" are therefore not issues in this case. The real questions presented by the Petition are:

1. Whether a horizontal boycott, organized by a trade association with substantial market power, and for the purpose of destroying a competitive profession, is outside the *per se* rule because the conduct is undertaken by a learned profession and purports to be motivated by health, safety, or quality of care concerns.

2. Whether a medical trade association's anticompetitive "ethics" boycott, designed to eliminate the entire competitive profession of chiropractic (licensed in all fifty States), can escape Rule of Reason liability on the basis of a public health, safety, and welfare affirmative defense.

3. Whether the district court abused its discretion, by requiring the AMA to unequivocally advise its members that (i) the AMA's ethics boycott of the chiropractic profession was illegal and is over, and (ii) it is ethical for a medical doctor to associate with chiropractors and their patients, because the AMA had, among other things:

a. organized and financed the decades-old, nationwide, anticompetitive ethics boycott of all chiropractors;

b. purportedly ended the boycott years after the suit was filed but had never so informed its members and had instead told them nothing had changed in the rules regarding chiropractors; and

c. continued to send its members outdated anti-chiropractic literature and at their behest worked with a private, M.D. dominated hospital accreditation association to retain access to all hospital facilities under the control of medical doctors.

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## OPINIONS BELOW

Respondents add that: 1) the Seventh Circuit supplemented its *Wilk I* opinion, 719 F.2d 207 (1983), by an opinion denying certain defendants' petition for rehearing, 735 F.2d 217 (1983); and 2) this Court then denied the plaintiff's petition for certiorari in *Wilk I*, 467 U.S. 1210 (1984). Subsequent to remand the district court issued its *Wilk II* opinion, 671 F. Supp. 1465 (1988), and the Seventh Circuit issued its *Wilk II* opinion, 895 F.2d 352 (1989).

## STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The petitioner's statement of the case is factually incorrect and incomplete in important respects. S. Ct. R. 15.1. The following is a statement of the facts found and affirmed and the legal rulings of the courts below.

### A. History Of The Litigation

This is an antitrust suit brought by respondents pursuant to §1 of the Sherman Act for injunctive relief only. The respondents, four doctors of chiropractic, filed suit against the American Medical Association ("AMA"), and a number of other medical associations<sup>1</sup> alleging they had

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<sup>1</sup> The other defendants were the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals ("JACH"), the American Hospital Association ("AHA"), the American College of Surgeons ("ACS"), the American College of Physicians ("ACP"), the American College of Radiology ("ACR"), the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons ("AAOS"), the American Osteopathic Association ("AOA"), the American Academy of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation ("AAPMR"), the Illinois State Medical Society ("ISMS"), the Chicago Medical Society ("CMS"), and a number of individuals. The AAPMR, AOA, ISMS, CMS, and AHA settled prior to the close of the second trial. The AAOS, ACR, and ACS settled after the district court (second trial) issued its opinion finding that they had joined in the AMA's illegal conspiracy in violation of the antitrust laws. *Wilk v. AMA*, 1987-2 Trade Cases ¶ 67,689 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (pre-settlement op.).

entered into a nation-wide conspiracy to prevent chiropractors from competing against medical doctors.

Following an eight week trial, a jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants in January, 1981. The Seventh Circuit reversed the judgment due to substantial trial and jury instruction errors, and remanded for re-trial in 1983. *Wilk I*, 719 F.2d 207 (144a-90a.), *supp. op. denying rehearing*, 735 F.2d 217 (7th Cir. 1983).

The case was re-tried in a bench trial and, in September, 1987, the district court held that the AMA, and a number of other defendants, violated §1 of the Sherman Act. 1987-2 Trade Cases at ¶ 67,689 (pre-settlement op.). After modifying its opinion pursuant to settlement by several defendants, the district court granted the injunctive relief against the AMA now in issue. (136a-43a.)

In February, 1990, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment against the AMA. (1a.) The AMA petitioned for rehearing, which the Seventh Circuit denied on April 27, 1990. (52a.)

In September, 1990, the AMA filed the present Petition seeking review of the Seventh Circuit affirmance. Respondents *agree* that this Court should grant certiorari, *but only* as to the real issues in this case, to clarify critically important law. (See "Questions Presented" *supra*.)

## **B. The Real Facts Found And Affirmed**

### **1. The AMA And Its Market Power**

The AMA is an association of medical physicians. (11a, 74a.) The trial court found and the appellate court affirmed that the AMA's members compete against chiropractors in the market for providing health care services, particularly services for "the treatment of musculoskeletal problems." (73a, 11a.) The lower courts also found that the AMA enjoyed "substantial market power" which, in con-

junction with the barriers to entry in the health care market, allowed the AMA to "adversely affect competition." (11a-12a.)

The opinions below cite numerous examples of how the AMA exercised its market power to exclude chiropractors from the market. (3a-49a, 57a-135a.) One notable example is the AMA's "manipulation" of the JCAH, a private hospital accreditation agency, to enact accreditation standards requiring total exclusion of all chiropractors from all accredited hospitals in the United States and even precluding chiropractic access to hospital laboratory, x-ray, and educational services. (8a, 37a-40a, 43a.)

## **2. Chiropractic And The AMA's Knowledge Of Its Efficacy**

Chiropractors, including the respondents, are health care providers who specialize in the treatment of musculoskeletal ailments, particularly those associated with neuromechanical problems of the musculoskeletal system. (18a, 73a.) Many medical physicians treat these same conditions and are in direct competition with chiropractors. (*Id.*, 121a, 130a.) Despite the AMA's efforts, chiropractic has become licensed in all 50 states, and there are now more than 30,000 chiropractors nationwide. (4a, 34a.)

The AMA knew at an early date that chiropractic was licensed, effective, desired by many millions of consumers, and a competitive threat to medical physicians. As the Seventh Circuit explained:

[A]ccording to the district court (and this is unchallenged), at the same time [during the period the AMA was conspiring to eliminate chiropractic], there was evidence before the Committee that chiropractic was effective, indeed more effective than the medical profession, in treating certain kinds of problems, such as back injuries. The Committee was also aware, the court found, that some medical physicians believed

chiropractic could be effective and that chiropractors were better trained to deal with musculoskeletal problems than most medical physicians. (18a.)

Numerous studies conducted by, and expert opinions from, *medical physicians* confirm that chiropractors were *at least* as well qualified as, and probably *more* qualified than, medical physicians in treating the most common ailment of mankind: back pain. For example:

- In 1966, *AMA Trustee* Dr. Hendryson, an orthopedic surgeon and Professor of Medicine, reported to the AMA that he had conducted random tests of chiropractic during World War II. He explained that he “attempted objectivity in relation to manipulating techniques of chiropractic evaluated against those ordinary methods that are commonly in use by our own [medical] profession.” He found that chiropractic was “impressive” and as effective as and sometimes superior to medical treatment for back pain.

He cited the case of a service man who was “completely incapacitated” while under traditional medical care but upon receiving manipulation “was able to get off the table and say, ‘This is the best I’ve felt in days.’ ” He reported that chiropractic manipulation of women in their third trimester of pregnancy “has given these women a great deal of physical relief” from back pain. He stated: “I must say quite honestly that there are still aspects of the manipulative therapy itself which impress me and which I feel practicing physicians should be using in the management of low back pain.” (PX 241.)

Dr. Henryson requested a follow-up study, but the AMA Committee on Quackery suppressed his report claiming it might be “misconstrued.” (PX 240.)

- In 1967, Dr. Wilson, chairman of the AMA’s Section on Orthopaedic Surgery and later President of a co-conspirator, the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons,

explained in the *Journal of the American Medical Association* that medical doctors were essentially ignorant of the causes or corrections of low back problems:

The teaching in our medical schools of the etiology, natural history, and treatment of low back pain is inconsistent and less than minimal. The student may or may not have heard a lecture on the subject, he may have been instructed solely by a neurosurgeon, or the curriculum committee may have decided that clinical lectures are "out" and more basic sciences "in." The orthopedic surgeon, to his distress, often sees his hours in the curriculum pared to the barest minimum.

A survey of orthopedic residents graduating from an approved program in a large urban area disclosed several alarming deficiencies in their training. They know very little about the natural history of degenerative disc disease in the lower part of the spine. . . . They were too unsure of the technique of careful lumbar spine examination to include a search for early stages of neurologic deficit. . . . They knew least when to use a particular surgical procedure.

At the postgraduate level, symposia and courses concerning the cause and treatment of low back and sciatic pain are often ineffective because of prejudices and controversy.

These inconsistencies spawn disastrous sequelae:

- (1) patients operated upon after inadequate evaluation;
- (2) reliance by physicians on poor quality x-ray films;
- (3) surgery done only because of an abnormality in a myelogram without reference to plain films of the lower spine;
- (4) exploratory surgery upon the lower back done without sufficient clinical basis; . . .
- (8) extensive removal of posterior vertebral elements by neurosurgeons, making stabilization of the lower portion of the spine technically difficult if not impossible. (PX 289a.)

- In 1967, Dr. Rudd, M.D., published "Medical Aspects of Manipulation Therapy: Passive Stretching" in the *Military Medicine Journal*. He explained that traditional medicine had long recognized that "there is a place for manipulative therapy"—provided that the manipulation was done by medical physicians and not chiropractors. He reported, however, that he had observed independent chiropractors utilize these maneuvers with great success, and he recommended that medical schools begin teaching these same manipulative techniques. (PX 184.)

- In 1971, Dr. Martin, M.D., the medical director of the Oregon Workmen's Compensation Board, published "A Study of Time Loss Back Claims." He concluded that chiropractors were twice as effective as medical physicians in returning the injured to work:

Examining the forms of conservative therapy the majority received, it is interesting to note the results of those treated by chiropractic physicians. A total of twenty-nine claimants were treated by no other physician than a chiropractor. 82% of these workmen resumed work after one week of time loss. Their claims were closed without a disability award. Examining claims treated by the M.D., in which the diagnosis seems comparable to the type of injury suffered by the workmen treated by the chiropractor, 41% of these workmen resumed work after one week of time loss. (PX 193.)

- In 1971, Mr. Oberfield of the Sinai School of Medicine published an article about the favorable experiences that medical physicians had with chiropractic. (PX 1471.) A member of the AMA's Committee on Quackery responded by (1) sternly criticizing Mr. Oberfield for favorably reporting on the "cult of chiropractic," and (2) sending a copy of the criticism to Mr. Oberfield's colleagues. (PX 1472.)

- In 1972, Dr. Healy, M.D., implored the medical profession to recognize the efficacy and possible superiority of

chiropractic and to stop "ignor[ing] what is happening." Dr. Healy protested that he could not agree with the AMA that chiropractors were "quacks." He recited instances of patients who were helped by chiropractors and explained how "A colleague at medical school told me of what his chiropractor father could do for tension headache and ankle sprains." He stated:

Then I met [a chiropractor.] He didn't look like a charlatan. He looked like me. . . . A thoughtful labor leader pointed out to me that most people don't care what the chiropractic theory is, . . . they know that doctors of chiropractic help their backaches and muscle pains. . . . They offer something more where we fail. (PX 1476.)

- In 1974, five medical physicians from the University of Utah's College of Medicine published a study entitled "Manipulating the Patient" in the prestigious British medical journal, *Lancet*. Their study concluded:

the intervention of a chiropractor in problems around the neck was at least as effective as that of a physician, in terms of restoring a patient's function and satisfying the patient. . . . As the storm clouds darken in the clash between organized medicine and chiropractic, it is imperative that definitive data replace impassioned statements. (PX 192.)

- In 1975, Dr. Wolf, M.D., published a study of 629 workmen's compensation cases in California. This study showed that doctors of chiropractic were twice as effective as medical physicians in returning injured employees to work:

Average lost time per employee—32 days in the M.D.-treated group, 15.6 days in the chiropractor-treated group. Employees reporting no lost time—21% in the M.D.-treated group, 47.9% in the chiropractor-treated group. Employees reporting lost time in excess of 60 days—13.2% in the M.D.-treated group, 6.7% in the chiropractor-treated group. (PX 194.)

- In 1979, a Royal Commission of Inquiry On Chiropractic in New Zealand published an in-depth study on chiropractic. Soon after it issued, the AMA was aware that this report stated:

34. The Commission has found it established beyond any reasonable degree of doubt that chiropractors have a more thorough training in spinal mechanics and spinal manual therapy than any other health professional. It would therefore be astonishing to contemplate that a chiropractor, in those areas of expertise, should be subject to the directions of a medical practitioner *who is largely ignorant of those matters simply because he has had no training in them. . . .* (PX 1829, emphasis added.)

- In 1982, the AMA's Family Medical Guide reported that pressure on the nerves in the neck may result in a diseased bladder. (PX 7081.) An AMA orthopedic surgeon witness (Dr. Stevens) admitted that "the ultimate solution to the problem" of recurrent bladder infections is "to remove the pressure on the nerve in the neck." (Tr. 2134.)
- In 1987, Dr. Freitag, M.D., Ph.D. in Anatomy, and Professor of Orthopaedic Surgery at Northwestern Medical School, testified regarding his substantial experience with chiropractors who had been recently added to the staff of a Chicago hospital. He explained that the average hospital stay of orthopedic patients was *cut in half* when they received in-hospital chiropractic care. (85a; Tr. 812.)
- At trial, Dr. Mennell, M.D., world renowned orthopedist, and Professor of Physiatry, testified: 1) the musculoskeletal system receives "scant attention" in American medical schools; 2) joint dysfunction in the musculoskeletal system may cause organic dysfunction and pain that can and should be cured by manipulation; 3) he is aware of reports that, for patients with non-life threatening injuries, chiropractic treatment can cure and return the patients to work quicker and at less cost than medical treatment; 4) chiropractic

is safe; 5) chiropractors and medical doctors see “the same patient groups with the same subjective symptoms”; and 6) at some point in their lives 80% of all people experience musculoskeletal pain susceptible to chiropractic care. (5a; Tr. 11, 34, 35, 41, 59.)

- At trial, “the AMA lawyers and Dr. Alan R. Nelson [, then] Chairman of the AMA’s Board of Trustees, [recognized] chiropractic as a valid health care service.” (67a.) “Even the defendants’ economic expert, Mr. Lynk, assumed that chiropractors outperformed medical physicians in the treatment of certain conditions, and he believed that was a reasonable assumption.”<sup>2</sup> (85a.)

- Finally, in 1990 the *British Medical Journal* published the results of an extensive, controlled, prospective study by British medical physicians, entitled: “Low Back Pain of Mechanical Origin: Randomized Comparison of Chiro-

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<sup>2</sup> The AMA’s contention that the trial court found chiropractic or the plaintiffs to be unscientific, is malicious and untrue. The trial court held that, in order to conclusively determine whether chiropractic is scientific, one would have to conduct a controlled study of a type that had not yet been performed. (84a-85a.) On the basis of voluminous additional evidence, however, the court found that chiropractic is therapeutic. The court even noted, “most defense witnesses agree that chiropractic treatment is therapeutic” (84a), and as noted above, the Chairman of the AMA testified that chiropractic services “includes some forms of manipulation that do have a scientific basis.” (83a; *see also* 67a-68a.) Dr. Epps, a member of the AMA Judicial Council, also admitted that some chiropractic manipulation has a scientific basis. (83a-84a.) Dr. Dickey, another AMA witness, testified to the same effect. (E.g., Tr. 2982-83.) Thus, as the appellate court held, “the district court did not agree with the AMA that the plaintiffs were ‘unscientific’ practitioners.” (21a.) In fact, despite the AMA’s misleading statements to the contrary, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the finding that “no one involved in the case, including the plaintiffs, believed that chiropractic treatment should be used for treatment of diseases such as cancer, diabetes, heart disease, high blood pressure, and infections.” (22a.)

practic and Hospital Outpatient Treatment," *British Medical Journal* (June 22, 1990).<sup>3</sup> The study states:

Objective—To compare chiropractic and hospital outpatient treatment for managing low back pain of mechanical origin.

Design—Randomized controlled trial. Allocation to chiropractic or hospital management by minimization to establish groups for analysis of results according to initial referral clinic, length of current episode, history, and severity of back pain. Patients were followed up for up to two years.

Setting—Chiropractic and hospital outpatient clinics in 11 centers.

Patients—741 Patients aged 18-65 who had no contraindications to manipulation and who had not been treated within the past month. . . .

Results—Chiropractic treatment was more effective than hospital outpatient management, mainly for patients with chronic or severe back pain. *A benefit of about 7% points on the Oswestry scale was seen at two years. The benefit of chiropractic treatment became more evident throughout the follow up period. Secondary outcome measures also showed that chiropractic was more beneficial.*

Conclusions—For patients with low back pain in whom manipulation is not contraindicated *chiroprac-*

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<sup>3</sup> Respondents request judicial notice of this recent article from a world renowned *medical* journal. The article demonstrates how the elimination of chiropractic could *never* have been either objectively reasonable or in furtherance of public welfare. The article is the type of nonrecord scientific report that the Court has judicially noticed to determine the impact of laws on public welfare. Advisory Committee Note to Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). See *Roe v. Wade*, 410 U.S. 113, 160 n. 59 & 60 (1973); *Muller v. Oregon*, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908). The article reports the type of "controlled" study the district court suggested should be undertaken. (84a-85a.)

*tic almost certainly confers worthwhile, long term benefit in comparison with hospital outpatient management. The benefit is seen mainly in those with chronic or severe pain. Introducing chiropractic into NHS practice should be considered. (Emphasis added.)*

Under "Economic Implications" the authors concluded:

The potential economic, resource, and policy implications of our results are extensive. The average cost of chiropractic investigation and treatment at 1988-9 prices was \$273.90 per patient compared with \$184.26 for hospital treatment. Some 300,000 patients are referred to hospital for back pain each year, "of whom about 72,000 would be expected to have no contraindications to manipulation." If all these patients were referred for chiropractic instead of hospital treatment the annual cost would be about \$6,640,000. *Our results suggest that there might be a reduction of some 290,000 days in sickness absence during two years, saving about \$21,580,000 in output and \$4,814,000 in social security payments. . . . There is, therefore, economic support for use of chiropractic in low back pain, though the obvious clinical improvement in pain and disability attributable to chiropractic treatment is in itself an adequate reason for considering the use of chiropractic. (Emphasis added.)*

As explained below, joint studies such as this recent British medical study were proscribed in this country as unethical by the AMA.

### 3. The AMA Conspired To "Contain And Eliminate" The Entire Licensed Profession Of Chiropractic

From 1963 until at least 1980 (four years *after* this litigation began) the AMA engaged in a nationwide conspiracy that had as its explicit goal, "the containment of chiropractic and ultimately, the elimination of chiropractic." (7a, 19a.) In reciting only a small number of the AMA's exten-

sive activities in furtherance of the conspiracy, the Court of Appeals explained:

In 1963, the AMA formed its Committee on Quackery ("Committee"). The Committee worked diligently to eliminate chiropractic. A primary method to achieve this goal was to make it unethical for medical physicians to professionally associate with chiropractors. Under former [AMA] Principle [of Medical Ethics] 3, it was unethical for medical physicians to associate with 'unscientific practitioners.' In 1966, the AMA's House of Delegates passed a resolution labelling chiropractic as an unscientific cult.

The district court found the AMA's purpose in all of this was to prevent medical physicians from referring patients to chiropractors and from accepting referrals of patients from chiropractors, so as to prevent chiropractors from obtaining access to hospital diagnostic services and membership on hospital medical staffs, to prevent medical physicians from teaching at chiropractic colleges or engaging in any joint research, and to prevent any cooperation between the two groups in the delivery of health care services. Despite the Committee's efforts, chiropractic ultimately became licensed in all 50 states. . . .

In 1980 [*years after this lawsuit began*], the AMA revised its Principles of Medical Ethics, eliminating Principle 3. With this gesture, the district court found, the AMA's boycott ended.<sup>4</sup> (3a-4a; *emph. added.*)

The Seventh Circuit also affirmed the district court's findings that the AMA's goal was "keeping chiropractors out of hospitals" and "destroy[ing] a competitor, namely, chiropractors." (14a.) The Seventh Circuit noted the district court's doubt that this was done out of a concern

<sup>4</sup> In fact, the district court made *extensive findings* that, though relaxed, at least a large portion of the boycott, which the AMA started, continued through the date of trial in the form of the ACR, AAOS, ACS, and others. (117a-134a; *Wilk*, 1987-2 Trade Cases at ¶ 67,689.)

for "scientific method in patient care" and agreed that "there are too many references in the record to chiropractors as competitors to ignore."<sup>5</sup> (17a-18a, 85a.)

Nevertheless, the courts below found that there was sufficient evidence of concern for patient welfare underlying the AMA's intent to destroy all of its chiropractic competitors. Both courts agreed, however, that this purported concern for patient welfare was "objectively unreasonable" and closed minded. (17a-18a.)

#### **4. The AMA's Unreasonable Restraint Of Trade And Need For An Injunction**

The district court found that the AMA and its Committee on Quackery had succeeded in impeding the growth of chiropractic (74a-75a); raising chiropractors' costs; interfering with consumers' freedom of choice; preventing medical physicians from referring patients to chiropractors; preventing chiropractors from improving their professional education (75a-76a, 127a-28a); reducing demand for chiropractic services; adversely affecting income of chiropractors; and injuring the professional reputation of chiropractors. (77a-79a.) The Seventh Circuit affirmed these findings. (3a-4a, 5a, 11a-13a, 16a, 20a-22a.)

Both lower courts held that these effects were unreasonably anticompetitive and violative of the Rule of Reason. (12a-16a, 73a-77a.) Both courts also held that: (1) even though the AMA boycott ended in 1980 (four years *after* this case was filed), the boycott continued to have lingering anticompetitive effects through the date of trial, and (2) without an injunction, there was a dangerous likelihood that the AMA would repeat its illegal assault on chiro-

<sup>5</sup> For example, one member of the Committee on Quackery stated in a speech to medical physicians, "it would be well to get across the point [to young physicians] that the doctor of chiropractic is stealing [the young medical physician's] money." (73a-74a.)

practic. (26a-29a, 30a-32a, 93a-98a, 140a-41a.) The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's order requiring the AMA to: (1) inform its members that the boycott was unlawful and over, and (2) amend its ethics rules to state the AMA's present position (which the AMA stated in court but had never told its members): that a medical doctor is ethically free to professionally associate with a chiropractor provided it is believed to be in the best interest of the patient. (23a-35a, 142a-43a, 137a-38a.)

While unrelated to the AMA's questions presented, the AMA discusses and overstates the effect of settlements in other chiropractic lawsuits. Consider these settlements in context.

In 1982, two years *after* the boycott supposedly ended and six years *after* this litigation began, the President of the AMA, Dr. Cloud, publicly denied that the 1980 ethics code had changed the AMA's position on chiropractic. (69a.) In 1985, when the Illinois State Medical Society settled with respondents by publicly explaining that it is ethical to associate with chiropractors, the AMA responded with a four column headline in the AMA News stating: "ILLINOIS ACTION ON CHIROPRACTIC CONDEMNED." (PX 7189.) At trial, Dr. Meany, a longstanding AMA member and Chancellor of the co-conspirator American College of Radiology, admitted that even *he did not know* of any change in the AMA's ban on associations with chiropractors. (95a-96a.) The evidence was clear that the AMA members did not and could not know the boycott was purportedly over. (94a-98a.)

The settlements the AMA refers to do not state that the boycott was illegal or that it was over. (29a, 69a-70a, 96a-97a.) Indeed, they do not state that it is ethical to associate with chiropractors when deemed to be in the patient's best interest. (*Id.*) They cannot be enforced by the respondents at all, and not even by the signatories except in New York, Pennsylvania, and Iowa. (96a.) Final-

ly, these settlements do not preclude the wide array of anticompetitive devices the AMA aimed at chiropractors. (29a, 69a-70a, 96a-97a.) For these and other reasons, both lower courts rejected the AMA's arguments based on these settlements. (69a-70a, 96a-97a, 28a.)

## REASONS FOR GRANTING A WRIT

Respondents believe issuance of a writ is appropriate, but not on the questions presented by the AMA. Below respondents explain why the petitioner's questions are not issues in this case and why the issues framed by respondents should be reviewed by this Court.

### I. The AMA's Petition Is Based On Misstated Facts And Law

#### A. The AMA's Boycott Was Anticompetitive

According to the AMA, its nationwide boycott of all chiropractors did not affect price or output in any market, only indirectly affected a few individual competitors, and contained expressive components that were procompetitive. (AMA Pet. 1, 3, 12, 14, 15, 18, 20, 21.) As a legal matter, this Court has already explained that, to accept an argument that an effective boycott is procompetitive because of an expressive component—the “hallmark of every effective boycott”—would create “a gaping hole in the fabric of the [antitrust] law.” *F.T.C. v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Assoc.*, 110 S.Ct. 768, 779-80 (1990). More fundamentally, however, the AMA's version of the facts has been twice rejected by the courts below as completely meritless.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>6</sup> In response to the AMA's contention that its ethical canons were merely “precatory guidelines,” the lower courts held that the AMA's ethical canons were inherently coercive since “no honest professional wants to risk the stigma of being labeled unethical.” (75a.)

The respondents' economist, Professor Stano, *and* petitioners' economist, Mr. Lynk, agreed, and the lower courts found, that the AMA's boycott activity reduced total demand for chiropractic services, reduced income for all chiropractors, reduced the output of chiropractic services, misallocated economic resources, and caused economic inefficiencies. (11a-15a; 75a-79a; Tr. 1409-22, 1290-1346, 1417-31, 401-02, 441-43.) Similarly, the economists agreed and the lower courts found that the boycott was injurious to chiropractors' professional reputations and that such an injury would further "constitute an anticompetitive effect of the boycott." (79a; Tr. 410-11, 1456-59.) Lastly, the lower courts found the AMA's assertion of procompetitive effects from an expressive component of the boycott to be unfounded and, as its expert admitted, completely speculative at best. (77a, 14a-16a.)

The evidence also showed that chiropractors provide more competition for medical doctors than any other group. (PX 7331 at 17, 36.) Competition between chiropractors and medical doctors is particularly acute with regard to the treatment of low back pain. (PX 8069 at 266; PX 7331 at 36.) Thus, in light of the substantial competition between chiropractors and medical doctors and the AMA's substantial market power (11a-13a, 73a-74a), it is hardly surprising that a conspiracy to destroy the entire chiropractic profession had an adverse affect on competition.

The AMA argues, however, that chiropractic grew despite the boycott and that the illegal conduct therefore could not have had an anticompetitive impact. (Pet. 12, 14, 20.) This argument simply ignores that both lower courts found that chiropractic would have grown even more had it not been for the AMA boycott. (20a-23a, 66a; PX 253.) Indeed, the AMA repeatedly *admitted* that its actions succeeded in retarding the growth chiropractic would have enjoyed in an unfettered market. (66a, 92a; PX 253, 464.) The trial court found that, without the boycott, there would have been more chiropractic schools,

chiropractors, and chiropractic patient visits. (66a, 74a-76a.) In light of these findings, the AMA's contention that its conduct only affected certain individual chiropractors is plainly without merit. (Pet. 3, 15; 20a-23a.)

Respondents also proved through the use of an econometric model that the AMA's boycott reduced total demand for chiropractic services and suppressed the income of all chiropractors. (78a-79a, 94a.) When the AMA boycott was relaxed in 1980, the total market demand for chiropractic services, and chiropractic income, jumped a statistically significant amount (78a-79a; Tr. 458-61; PX 7349), although it remained below the level it would have attained had it not been for the boycott. (78a; PX 7349.) This artificial reduction in demand for chiropractic services is particularly anticompetitive in view of the fact that chiropractic services are lower in price (PX 7333, 7334) and, for some conditions, higher in quality and more effective than medical services. (82a, 85a; Tr. 1109-36, 812.) Indeed, the AMA's economist, after studying the market, believed it *reasonable to conclude* that chiropractors outperform medical physicians in the treatment of certain ailments. (85a; Tr. 1414-15; see pp. 3-11 *supra*.)

The foregoing economic facts were proved by the evidence, found by the trial court, and affirmed on appeal. The AMA does not attack these findings as clearly erroneous and, in light of Mr. Lynk's numerous admissions, it clearly cannot. Rather, the AMA simply ignores these facts and claims that the courts below found only minimal anticompetitive effects which, at most, indirectly impacted a few individual chiropractors. This is not in keeping with the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 15.1.

#### **B. The Affect On Chiropractic Was Direct And Intended**

The AMA asserts that its conduct had "only incidental, indirect or ancillary effects" on chiropractors. (Pet. i, 3,

15, 16, 20, 21, 22.) This is an astounding contention never before advanced during the fifteen year history of this case. It is factually wrong and legally irrelevant.

First, it is simply not true that the AMA's conduct had only an indirect, incidental, or ancillary impact on chiropractors. The AMA's boycott banned all referrals to or from chiropractors. No diagnostic, radiology, laboratory, or consultative services could be provided to a chiropractor. No hospital privileges could be extended to a chiropractor, and no medical physician could engage in a partnership or group practice with a chiropractor. Even teaching at a chiropractic school was prohibited. While medical physicians were able to use hospital diagnostic equipment free of charge, doctors of chiropractic had to purchase their own. (3a-4a, 63a-64a, 74a-76a, 127a-28a.)

As intended, this ban on association with chiropractors reduced the demand for chiropractic services and made it more expensive for chiropractors to offer health care services. As stated, chiropractors had to buy their own x-ray and laboratory equipment. Even the quality of chiropractic education was suppressed. How these effects could be deemed "indirect," "incidental," or "ancillary" is a mystery. Clearly, these were the specifically intended effects on chiropractic of conduct undertaken "to contain and eliminate the entire chiropractic profession." (74a.)

Furthermore, the cases permitting ancillary restraints of trade involve a *lawful* transaction (such as the sale of a business) and an ancillary restraint (such as a covenant by the seller not to compete against the buyer) that is necessary to allow the lawful transaction to take place. See *N.C.A.A. v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma*, 104 S.Ct. 2948, 2960-61 & n. 24 (1984); *Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co.*, 660 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1981). Here, there was no lawful transaction much less one requiring an ancillary restraint in order to go forward. Here,

the *only* transaction in issue was the AMA's conspiracy to destroy an entire licensed competitive profession.

### C. The AMA's Boycott Was Not Legislative

The AMA claims that its efforts to "contain and ultimately eliminate" the entire chiropractic profession were pursued only through legislative activity and the dissemination of public information. (Pet. 5, 6-7.) The AMA neglects to mention that this factual contention was rejected by both the district and appellate courts. (6a-8a, 62a-64a.)

The district court noted that the AMA's Committee on Quackery had engaged in a limited amount of legislative and informational activities. (*Id.*) Accordingly, the district court stated, "I have not relied on any such conduct in reaching any conclusion in this case." (*Id.* n. 2.)

The Seventh Circuit similarly noted that the *Noerr-Pennington* doctrine "does not . . . protect purely private action, not genuinely aimed at prompting governmental action." (6a.) It also held that most of the AMA's conduct was not governmental but was aimed at promulgating "ethical" rules for private associations which required hospitals, physicians, and laboratories to engage in a private boycott of chiropractors, their schools, and their patients.<sup>7</sup> (7a-8a.) Far from being part of public legislative debate, the court pointed out that much of the AMA's conduct was intended to be secret and hidden from public view. (8a.) Indeed, by 1962 the AMA had decided that a legislative solution to its antichiropractic goal was not practical. (PX 172.) As a result, a year later the AMA created the Committee on Quackery and resorted to a private commercial boycott found illegal below. (*Id.*)

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<sup>7</sup> "[T]he boycott in *Wilk* [thus] denied to the patients of chiropractors the benefits of the very scientific medicine that the physicians touted so highly." Havighurst, *Doctors and Hospitals: An Antitrust Perspective on Traditional Relationships*, 1984 Duke L.J. 1071, 1103 n.101 (1984).

**D. The Courts Below Did Not Rely On  
Protected Speech To Find Liability**

The court of appeals clearly explained that neither it nor the district court relied on any activities protected by the First Amendment:

The AMA contends that its statements regarding chiropractors were either statements about chiropractic's deficiencies or bona fide opinions in matters of public interest. The district court acknowledged the AMA's claim and, to the extent that the Committee's work regarding influencing legislation on the state and federal levels or in informational activities to inform the public on the nature of chiropractic was involved, it did not consider such conduct in reaching its decision. *Wilk*, 671 F. Supp. at 1473-77. But apart from the protected activity, the district court found substantial evidence of acts aimed at achieving the boycott's goals, not legislative action. *Id.* at 1473-77. (7a.)

Nonetheless, the AMA argues that private conduct that injures competition is protected by the First Amendment if one of its goals is to influence the legislature or inform the public. (Pet. 25-26.) This Court rejected precisely that argument in *Trial Lawyers*, 110 S.Ct. at 776:

Respondents agreement [to boycott indigent clients] is not outside the coverage of the Sherman Act simply because its objective was the enactment of favorable legislation. . . . It of course remains true that 'no violation of the Act can be predicated upon mere attempts to influence the passage or enforcement of laws,' [citation omitted], even if the defendants' sole purpose is to impose a restraint upon the trade of their competitors [citations omitted]. But in the *Noerr* case the alleged restraint of trade was the intended *consequence* of public action; in this case the boycott was the *means* by which respondents sought to obtain favorable legislation.

*Accord Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc.*, 486 U.S. 492, 108 S.Ct. 1931, 1938 (1988).

## II. There Is Nothing Unconstitutional In Finding The AMA's Post-Boycott Anti-Chiropractic Activities Indicated Possible Recurrence Of The Boycott Unless Enjoined

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's consideration of the AMA's *post-boycott* anti-chiropractic activities, including its 1983 efforts to keep chiropractors out of hospitals, in determining whether there was a danger of the illegal acts recurring. (26a-28a.) Having found a substantial likelihood that the illegal acts would recur, and substantial uneradicated anticompetitive effects from the boycott, the district court fashioned relief enjoining recurrence of the *private boycott* and ordering corrective action to eradicate its lingering anticompetitive effects. (87a-98a, 136a-43a.) The district court's order also provides that the injunction should not be construed to "restrict" or "interfere" with the AMA's "right to take positions on any issue, including chiropractic" or its "right to petition . . . on any legislative or regulatory measure. . . ." (142a.)

In these circumstances, there was nothing wrong, much less unconstitutional, in considering the AMA's *post-boycott* activities to determine whether it was likely to reinstitute its illegal and anticompetitive boycott. (26a-28a.) The AMA has cited no case to the contrary.

This Court has held that "[c]ivil suits under the Sherman Act would indeed be idle gestures if the injunction did not run against the continuation or *resumption* of the unlawful practice." *U.S. v. Crescent Amusement Co.*, 323 U.S. 173, 188, 65 S.Ct. 254, 261 (1944). Indeed, having found an illegal conspiracy, the trial court had "the duty to compel action by the conspirators that will, so far as practicable, cure the ill effects of the illegal conduct, and assure the public freedom from its continuance." *United States v. United States Gypsum Co.*, 340 U.S. 76, 88, 71 S.Ct. 160, 169 (1950). "A trial court's wide discretion in fashioning remedies is not to be exercised to deny relief

altogether by lightly inferring an abandonment of the unlawful activities from a cessation which seems timed to anticipate suit.”<sup>8</sup> *U.S. v. Parke, Davis and Co.*, 362 U.S. 29, 48, 80 S.Ct. 503, 514 (1960). See also *U.S. v. Oregon State Medical Soc.*, 343 U.S. 326, 328 (1952). Particularly where, as here, the AMA refuses to recognize the wrongfulness of the illegal activity and continued that activity until sued, “the likelihood of future violations, if not restrained, is clear.” *Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. British Am. Commodity Options Corp.*, 560 F.2d 135, 142 (2d Cir. 1977). (See 29a-30a.)

Thus, the trial court had an absolute *duty* to frame an injunction to prevent any recurrence of the violation which was ongoing when this action was filed. Equally important, the trial court had an absolute *duty* to frame an injunction so as to eradicate the anticompetitive effects from a lengthy, institutionalized, nationwide boycott.

This is particularly so in the current case where the respondent, the AMA, has been convicted twice before of unlawfully restraining competition. See *A.M.A. v. U.S.*, 130 F.2d 233, 248-49 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (*criminal* antitrust violation finding that the AMA has no right to act as a “vigilante”), *aff’d* 317 U.S. 519 (1943); *In re AMA*, 94 F.T.C. 701 (1979) (rejecting many of the same arguments made in the AMA’s Petition), *aff’d* 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir.

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<sup>8</sup> The courts below held that, “In 1977 the AMA began to change its position on chiropractic” but did not end the boycott until at least 1980. *But see* n.4 *supra*. The AMA contends that it ended the boycott in 1977 because of this Court’s decision in *Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar*, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). This suit was filed in October of 1976. The AMA’s changes were stimulated by *this* lawsuit—not *Goldfarb*—and there is *not one shred* of evidence to the contrary. (See, e.g., Tr. 1666; n.4 *supra*.) Those changes are “post *Goldfarb*” only in the chronological sense that they are also post World War II. The AMA’s fiction that *Goldfarb* gave it religion was described by the court at trial as “a boldface misstatement.” (Tr. 2942, 3031-32; for rejection of same AMA argument, see *In re AMA*, *infra*, 94 F.T.C. at 1018-19.)

1980), *aff'd* 455 U.S. 676 (1982). The AMA's private actions prejudice the public as well as its competitors.

### III. The True Legal Issues Worthy Of Review

#### A. There Is No Health, Safety, Or Welfare Affirmative Defense

The AMA claims that it could not have violated the anti-trust laws because its purpose was to promote health, safety, and the quality of professional services. (Pet. 3, 15, 17, 18-20, 21-23.) This Court has repeatedly held that anticompetitive conduct cannot be justified on the ground that it was undertaken to improve health, safety, or welfare. Accordingly, the affirmative defense that the AMA claims was unduly burdensome was actually far more lenient than anything to which the AMA was entitled.

In *Wilk I*, the respondent-chiropractors argued that the sole inquiry under the Rule of Reason is whether the challenged conduct unreasonably effects competition. The Seventh Circuit agreed that under the traditional Rule of Reason, the "single standard is whether the challenged agreement is one that promotes competition." (170a-71a.) See *National Soc. of Professional Engineers v. U.S.*, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978) ("for sixty years this Court has adhered to the position that the inquiry mandated by the Rule of Reason is whether the challenged agreement is one that promotes competition or one that suppresses competition.) Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit held:

We hold that the district court and we are free to modify the rule of reason test in a case involving a certain kind of question of ethics for the medical profession. . . . A value independent of the values attributed to unrestrained competition must enter the equation. (175a-77a.)

Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit announced a previously unknown affirmative defense allowing the AMA to escape

liability even though it unreasonably injured competition, if it could prove:

(1) that they genuinely entertained a concern for what they perceive as scientific method in the care of each person with whom they have entered into a doctor-patient relationship; (2) that this concern is objectively reasonable; (3) that this concern has been the dominant motivating factor in defendants' promulgation of Principle 3 and in the conduct intended to implement it; and (4) that this concern for scientific method in patient care could not have been adequately satisfied in a manner less restrictive of competition. (177a.)

Upon retrial, the courts below both held that the AMA failed to prove elements 2 and 4 of this defense. Specifically, the courts held that the AMA had failed to prove that its negative view of chiropractic was "objectively reasonable" and that its alleged concern for patient care could have been satisfied by less restrictive alternatives. (16a-20a, 81a-87a.) The AMA now claims it should not have been subjected to these tests. The AMA was not entitled to the benefit of the defense at all. The AMA is not a vigilante; and it has not been designated by the people, either legislatively or otherwise, to determine which of its competitors should be allowed to stay in business.

The seminal case is *Professional Engineers*, 435 U.S. at 679. There, a professional association promulgated ethical canons making it unethical for an engineer to negotiate a fee until after he had been selected by the client for the project. The association claimed that this restraint was not unlawful because it was "necessary to the public health, safety and welfare," and because elimination of the canon would "adversely affect the quality of engineering." *Id.* at 685. The issue before this Court was "whether [a professional] canon may be justified . . . because it was adopted by members of a learned profession for the purpose of minimizing the risk [of] . . . inferior work endanger-

ing the public safety." *Id.* at 681. This Court held that the anticompetitive ethical canon could not be justified by health, safety, or welfare concerns:

The society nonetheless invokes the Rule of Reason, arguing that its restraint on price competition ultimately inures to the public benefit by preventing the production of inferior work and by insuring ethical behavior. As the preceding discussion of the Rule of Reason reveals, this court has never accepted such an argument. . . .

The Sherman Act reflects a legislative judgment that ultimately competition will not only produce lower prices, but also better goods and services. 'The heart of our national economic policy long has been faith in the value of competition.' *Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Commission*, 340 U.S. 231, 248, 71 S.Ct. 240, 249, 95 L.Ed. 239. The assumption that competition is the best method of allocating resources in a free market recognizes that all elements of a bargain—quality, service, safety, and durability—and not just the immediate cost, are favorably affected by free opportunity to select among alternative offers. Even assuming occasional exceptions to the presumed consequences of competition, the statutory policy precludes inquiry into the question whether competition is good or bad. (*Id.* at 695.)

Further, this Court declined to draw any exceptions for goods or services which, if inferior in quality, would be particularly harmful to public health, safety, and welfare:

The fact that engineers are often involved in large-scale projects significantly affecting the public safety does not alter our analysis. Exceptions to the Sherman Act for potentially dangerous goods and services would be tantamount to a repeal of the statute. In our complex economy the number of items that may cause serious harm is almost endless—automobiles, drugs, foods, aircraft components, heavy equipment, and countless others, cause serious harm to individuals or to the public at large if defectively made. The judiciary cannot indirectly protect the public against

this harm by conferring monopoly privileges on the manufacturers. (*Id.* at 695-96.)

Subsequently, this Court reaffirmed that medical doctors and other professionals are not entitled to a "patient care" or health, safety, and welfare defense. In *Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde*, 466 U.S. 2 (1984), the Court held that tying anesthesiology services to hospital services would be *per se* illegal if defendant had market power over the tying product. In doing so this Court stated: "we reject the view . . . that the legality of an arrangement of this kind turns on whether it was adopted for the purpose of improving patient care." 466 U.S. at 25 n. 41.

Similarly, in *Indiana Federation of Dentists v. F.T.C.*, 106 S.Ct. 2009, 2020 (1986), the defendant dental association argued that the F.T.C. had erred in refusing to consider its "non-competitive 'quality of care' justification" for its anticompetitive "ethical policy." This Court rejected the proffered "patient care" defense as amounting to "nothing less than a frontal assault on the basic policy of the Sherman Act" and pointed out that precisely such a defense had been "rejected as illegitimate in the *Society of Professional Engineers*." *Id.* Accord, *Patrick v. Burdget*, 486 S.Ct. 94 (1988) ("This argument, [based on promoting quality of medical care] essentially challenges the wisdom of applying the antitrust laws to the sphere of medical care, and as such is properly directed to the legislative branch."); *F.T.C. v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association*, 110 S.Ct. 768 (1990) (desire to improve the quality of legal services held no justification for anticompetitive conduct because "the Sherman Act reflects a legislative judgment that ultimately competition will produce not only lower prices, but also better goods and services.")<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup> The AMA contends *Neeld v. National Hockey League*, 594 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1979), *Hatley v. American Quarter Horse Assoc.*,

(Footnote continued on following page)

The health, safety, and welfare affirmative defense announced by the Seventh Circuit is in sharp conflict with the rulings of this Court. The supposed defense has also been vigorously criticized by legal commentators.<sup>10</sup> The

<sup>9</sup> *continued*

552 F.2d 646 (5th Cir. 1977), and *Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp.*, 425 F.2d 932 (3rd Cir. 1970), support its position that boycotts are lawful when "their primary purpose is to promote safety and product quality." (Pet. 21-23.) These cases support no such argument. In *Neeld*, the court held only that the *per se* rule was inapplicable because the challenged conduct (a rule promoting safety to those playing the game) was not for the purpose of stifling competition. No Rule of Reason violation was found because the alleged restraint was "at most de minimis." 594 F.2d at 1299-1300. In *Hatley*, the court similarly held the *per se* rule was inapplicable because defendants' purpose was to promote the product—quarter horse racing. 552 F.2d at 653-54. As this Court has explained, both *Neeld* and *Hatley* involve professional sports where there could be *no sports product at all* unless uniform rules could be agreed upon by the competitors. *N.C.A.A.*, 104 S.Ct. at 2961 n.24. Finally, in *Tripoli*, the court held only that a vertical restraint preventing a wholesaler from selling a dangerous product to consumers could have no anticompetitive effects if the product faced adequate interbrand competition. 425 F.2d at 938-39. No affirmative defense was even involved in the decision.

<sup>10</sup> For a small sampling of the authorities to this effect, see: Havighurst & King, *Private Credentialing of Health Care Personnel*, 9 Am. J. L. & Med. 263, 289-90 and n. 79 (1984) ("the [Wilk] opinion . . . departs sharply from the general rule that compatibility with competition is the controlling question in a restraint of trade case."); Kissam, *Antitrust Boycott Doctrine*, 69 Iowa L. Rev. 1165, 1214-16 (1984) (the patient care defense "would allow professional boycotts to destroy competition in order to enforce some professionals' ideas about high quality of care . . . [T]he professions neither need nor deserve this special rule."); Havighurst, *Doctors and Hospitals; An Antitrust Perspective on Traditional Relationships*, 1984 Duke L.J. 1071, 1103 n. 101 (1984) (In view of the *Wilk* decision, "The need to reexamine boycott doctrine in light of the crucial importance of decentralized decision-making would seem to be acute."); Note, *Denial of Hospital Admitting Privileges for Non-Physician Providers—A Per Se Antitrust Violation?* 60 Notre Dame L. Rev. 724, 738-43 (1985) (criticizing *Wilk* as contrary to both Supreme Court law and consumer welfare); Comment, *Group Boycotts by Health Care Professionals; Is the Per Se Rule an Appropriate Standard of Antitrust Analysis Under the Sherman Act*,

(Footnote continued on following page)

issue worthy of review by this Court is not whether the AMA was saddled with an unduly burdensome affirmative defense, but whether that affirmative defense exists *at all*. Respondents urge the Court to review that issue. It has potential for both vast mischief and damage to our free market economy and should be renounced. See n.12 *supra*.

### B. The *Per Se* Rule Should Have Been Applied

A restraint of trade<sup>10</sup> may be illegal under either the Rule of Reason or the *per se* rule. *Indiana Dentists*, 106 S.Ct. at 2017. If the conduct fits within the *per se* category, there is no need to prove unreasonable effect on competition because the “pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed.” *Northwestern Pac. Rwy. Co. v. U.S.*, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).

Since the inception of this case in 1976, the respondents have claimed that the AMA’s conduct was *per se* unlawful. Because no court has so ruled, this case has required over a hundred and fifty depositions, two lengthy Rule of Reason trials, five appeals, four petitions for certiorari, and fifteen years of litigation. All this even though there has never been *any* redeeming virtue to the AMA’s malicious actions.

The Seventh Circuit recently refused to apply the *per se* rule because this case involves a “learned profession” and medical ethics for which anticompetitive effects are too uncertain to predict. (10a-11a.) Neither reason has merit,

<sup>10</sup> *continued*

11 U. Dayton L. Rev. 45, 83, 90-91 (1985) (“The standard employed by the *Wilk* court does not place enough emphasis on the competitive considerations mandated by the Supreme Court in rule of reason inquiries and will ultimately, therefore, prove to be unworkable.”); Havighurst, *Legal Implications of Health Care Cost Containment*, 36 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1117 (1986) (*Wilk* “has made a questionable exception for physician boycotts of competitors for patient care motives.”).

and the AMA's conduct should have been held *per se* unlawful years ago.

This Court addressed the application of the *per se* rule to a horizontal group boycott in *Northwest Wholesale Stationery, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery and Printing Co.*, 105 S.Ct. 2613, 2619 (1985). There, this Court confirmed that the *per se* rule is applicable to boycotts where the defendant enjoys a "dominant position" in the market or possesses market power and the boycott is intended "to disadvantage competitors by either directly damaging or persuading or coercing suppliers or customers to deny relationships the competitors need in the competitive struggle." *Id.* at 2619.

Here, the AMA enjoyed substantial market power and organized a horizontal group boycott to coerce (74a-75a) or persuade hospitals, physicians, laboratories, and patients to deny its competitors (i.e., chiropractors) the commercial relationships needed to effectively compete, particularly in the hospital setting. That is the very definition of a *per se* violation.

Nor is there merit to the contention that the *per se* rule does not or should not apply to the medical profession or to canons of medical ethics. In *Jefferson Parish* this Court declined to impose the *per se* rule for lack of evidence of market power over the tying product. In doing so, however, this Court suggested that the *per se* rule would otherwise have applied to medical services, stating that, "with such evidence, the *per se* rule against tying may apply." 466 U.S. at 25 n. 41. Moreover, this Court rejected the argument that the applicability of the *per se* rule "turns on whether [the challenged conduct] was adopted for the purpose of improving patient care." *Id.*

Similarly, in *Indiana Dentists* this Court found the threshold criteria required by *Northwest Wholesalers* for the application of the *per se* rule to be unsatisfied; but it declined to create an exception for boycotts designed

to promote “patient care,” despite its assertion by the defendant. 106 S.Ct. at 2020. In addition, the Court explained that the *per se* rule generally applies “to cases in which firms [e.g., the AMA and its members] boycott suppliers [nonconforming hospitals and doctors] or customers [patients] in order to discourage them from doing business with a competitor [chiropractors].” *Id.* at 2018.

Most recently, in *Trial Lawyers*, this Court again declined to create an exception to the *per se* rule for a boycott by members of a learned profession. 110 S.Ct. at 774. The Court applied the *per se* rule even though the boycott was purportedly in the public interest, for the purpose of obtaining “better legal representation for indigent defendants.” *Id.*

The failure of the courts below to follow the decisions of this Court and apply a *per se* rule has needlessly extended and complicated this litigation. It has given the AMA the opportunity to endlessly litigate minutiae and the possibility of prevailing where none should have been allowed. The AMA had no justification whatsoever for its direct but private challenge to the fifty state legislatures that licensed chiropractic. Might does not make right in this nation. Millions have suffered and continue to suffer because of the AMA’s arrogant assumption of power. A Rule of Reason test (particularly one that allows the non-competitive patient care defense) fails to send a signal to health care practitioners and other professionals that obviously pernicious boycotts to exclude competitors will face *per se* condemnation and prompt liability. (See n. 10 *supra*.) If this Court decides to review this case, respondents respectfully suggest that the proper application of the *per se* rule be considered.

## CONCLUSION

The Petition should be granted, provided that review is limited to the real issues in this case as framed above in this Opposition.

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No. 90-542

Supreme Court, U.S.

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IN THE  
**Supreme Court of the United States**

OCTOBER TERM, 1990

AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,

*Petitioner,*

v.

CHESTER A. WILK, D.C.,  
JAMES W. BRYDEN, D.C.,  
PATRICIA B. ARTHUR, D.C. and  
MICHAEL D. PEDIGO, D.C.,

*Respondents.*

Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To  
The United States Court Of Appeals For The Seventh Circuit

**REPLY TO OPPOSITION  
TO PETITION FOR CERTIORARI**

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Respondents' opposition agrees that the Seventh Circuit's decision should be reviewed. Opp. 2 & 23-30. Respondents agree that the courts of appeals are deeply divided on the standards that apply to antitrust challenges to activities of professional associations, trade associations, and standard-setting bodies. They further agree that it is a matter of national importance that the Court resolve the conflict in this case.

For this reason, this Reply will be confined to addressing respondents' suggestion that the case presents somewhat different questions than are presented in the petition. Respondents are confused. Although they may defend their judgment on any ground that they choose, the questions presented in the Petition

rest on two explicit lower court findings that would have required entry of judgment for the AMA if this case had arisen in the Third, Fifth, or Ninth Circuits. Indeed, in urging reformulation of these questions, respondents are simply challenging these findings and otherwise arguing that the Seventh Circuit reached the right result for the wrong reasons. Opp. 3-8, 15-17 & 23-30.

1. The first question that the Petition presents is whether a professional ethical guideline against the use of unscientific, dangerous, or fraudulent practices can be held to violate the Sherman Act simply because it has an adverse effect on the unscientific practitioners.

Here, it is undisputed that the AMA ethical guidelines at issue had no effect on the pricing of physicians' services (or health care services generally). Thus, contrary to respondents' claim (Opp. 23-26), the guideline is the antithesis of the "naked" restraints on price that this Court condemned in *National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States*, 435 U.S. 679 (1978), and *FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Assn*, 110 S. Ct. 768 (1990). As the lower courts stated (App. 76a), plaintiffs did not offer—and could not offer—any evidence that the guidelines adversely affected industry-wide output.<sup>1</sup>

Two lower courts findings are thus critical: (1) that the guideline was adopted and maintained for the "primary purpose" of promoting the quality and reliability of services that physicians *compete* to provide to patients and of *thereby promoting the more*

<sup>1</sup>The only effect of the AMA guidelines was that M.D.'s would refer patients needing manipulative therapy to physical therapists, osteopaths, and others—such that demand for services was merely shifted to non-M.D.'s other than chiropractors and that there was no effect on industry-wide output. Correlatively, the guidelines concededly had no effect on the pricing of services by the nation's over 500,000 physicians (who compete vigorously with each other) or on the pricing of services by osteopaths, physical therapists, and other providers of manipulative therapies.

efficient functioning of the market (App. 81a & 86a),<sup>2</sup> and (2) that any adverse effects on chiropractors were entirely incidental to physicians' adherence to guidelines elevating the quality of their own services (App. 166a; see App. 74a).

As respondents cannot seriously dispute, these two findings would have required the entry of judgment for the AMA under the rule of reason holdings of the Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits.<sup>3</sup> These courts follow Professors Bork, Areeda, and Sullivan.<sup>4</sup> They unequivocally reject the Seventh Circuit's holding that

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<sup>2</sup>Contrary to respondents' claim (Opp. 23), the AMA does not assert "that it could not have violated the antitrust laws because its purpose was to promote health, safety, and the quality of professional service." Rather, the AMA submits that given these purposes—and the fact that such non-price guidelines can promote the efficient functioning of markets—its guidelines may not be condemned absent proof of adverse effect on competition in a relevant market.

<sup>3</sup>See, e.g., *Neeld v. National Hockey League*, 594 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1979); *Hatley v. American Quarter Horse Ass'n*, 552 F.2d 646 (5th Cir. 1977); *Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp.*, 425 F.2d 932 (3d Cir. 1970) (en banc).

Contrary to respondents' perfunctory attempts to distinguish these cases (Opp. 26 n.9), they did not merely reject application of a *per se* rule to the "boycotts" at issue. Each decision went on to hold that, under the rule of reason, non-price restraints are valid when, as there and as here, their "primary purpose" is to improve the quality and marketability of a product and any adverse effects on individual competitors are "incidental" to the operation of guidelines that attain that purpose. See *Neelá*, 594 F.2d at 1300; *Hatley*, 552 F.2d at 653; *Tripoli*, 425 F.2d at 936; Petition, pp. 15-23.

Similarly, there is no substance to respondents' suggestion that this rule is limited to "sport leagues." Opp. 26 n.9. As Judge Bork has stated—and this Court has recognized—activities that promote the quality or reliability of services without affecting price are beneficial and the principle that upholds such conduct is "by no means confined to sports." R. Bork, *The Antitrust Paradox*, p. 338 (1978); see Petition, pp. 17-19 (discussing *Professional Engineers* and other decisions of this Court).

<sup>4</sup>R. Bork, *The Antitrust Paradox*, pp. 330-46 (1978); P. Areeda, *Antitrust Law*, Vol. VII, ¶¶ 1500-1511 (1986); L. Sullivan, *Antitrust*, pp. 275-82 (1977); see Petition, pp. 15-23.

the adverse effects of guidelines on the costs and demand for services of one group of *competitors* can establish harm to *competition* and justify a "modified" rule of reason in which the defendant must bear the nearly impossible burden of proving, *inter alia*, that its action was the "least restrictive" alternative.<sup>5</sup>

Respondents' arguments that the questions should be reformulated, in turn, are simply challenges to the factual findings that would entitle the AMA to judgment under the decisions of this Court and the holdings of the Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits. There is no substance to respondents' claims.

First, the Opposition (pp. 3-8) makes a series of allegations that the AMA guidelines were not designed to improve the quality of physicians' care and to "creat[e] efficiency," but were a sham and a "disguised naked restraint" aimed at "destroying or coercing rivals by means that do not benefit consumers." R. Bork, *The Antitrust Paradox*, p. 334. However, the District Court rejected these allegations and found that the AMA genuinely believed chiropractic was dangerous quackery and that its predominant purpose was to improve the quality of physicians' services and to promote efficiency. App. 81a, 86a.

In this regard, respondents misstate the record in suggesting (Opp. 3-8) that the challenged guideline had something to do with the efficacy of manipulative therapy for back and musculoskeletal ailments, for the AMA guidelines have long authorized referral and other joint practice relationships with physical therapists, osteopaths, and other scientific practitioners of these treatments.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>While respondents do not agree with the rule that other courts have adopted, they acknowledge that the Seventh Circuit's "modified" rule of reason is "in sharp conflict with the rulings of the Court" and the holdings of other courts of appeals. Opp. 27.

<sup>6</sup>Indeed, AMA witnesses testified at trial that they have no problem with chiropractors who confine themselves to accepted physical therapy treatments for musculoskeletal conditions and that the AMA eliminated

The sole reason the former guidelines treated chiropractors differently was that all or virtually all chiropractors then adhered to the patently unscientific theory that misalignments of the spinal column cause disease and held themselves out as "family doctors" who can diagnose, prevent, and cure polio, heart disease, diabetes, and other diseases by manipulating the spine. See Petition, pp. 4-5, 6-7 & n.3.

Second, respondents also argue at length that the adverse effects on chiropractors' incomes were not "indirect" and "incidental," but that the guidelines operated "to exclude chiropractors from the market" by "persuading or coercing suppliers or customers to deny relationships the [chiropractors] need in the competitive struggle." Opp. 17-19 & 29 (citations omitted). Again, the lower courts found precisely the opposite. They found that the effects on chiropractors' incomes were incidental to the AMA members' adherence to guidelines designed to promote the quality of their own services and that those guidelines thus had no effect on chiropractors' ability to obtain "inputs" from suppliers (e.g., providers of x-ray machines) or to attract patients. App. 166a; see Petition p. 20.

The fact that the adherence of AMA members to ethical guidelines could not exclude chiropractors from the market is conclusively demonstrated by the lower courts' findings that chiropractic grew rapidly, by any measure, during the period of the so-called boycott. See App. 74a. Indeed, the guidelines merely placed chiropractors in the same position they would have occupied if the medical profession did not exist.

Finally, the Opposition extensively relies (e.g. Opp. 17-19) on the findings that the guidelines raised chiropractors' costs, re-

*(Footnote continued from previous page)*

its ethical ban following the emergence of a small group of reform chiropractors who renounced the tenets of chiropractic and so confine their practices (Tr. 1975-79, 2029-30)—as the four plaintiffs have not. E.g., Tr. 1933-69, 1032-39; Petition, pp. 4-5.

duced the "efficiency" of their operations, and decreased demand for their services. They claim that these adverse effects establish harm to competition and an antitrust violation, despite the conceded absence of adverse effects on price or output. *See* p. 2 n.1, *supra*. This is wrong as a matter of law. *See* Petition 21 & 23 n.14.

The reality is that any ethical guideline, standard, or statement against the use of an unscientific or dangerous practice will raise costs, reduce demand, and reduce incomes of proponents of that practice. This is so whether the practice is the use of Laetrile to treat cancer, the use of faith healing to cure heart disease, or the use of a standard in the manufacturing of screws. *See* R. Bork, *The Antitrust Paradox*, p. 333. If proof of adverse impact on a class of individuals were sufficient to establish an antitrust violation or even to shift the burden of proof to defendant, no ethical guideline or private standard could survive antitrust scrutiny. That would altogether prevent the efficiencies, and consumer welfare benefits, that these arrangements indisputably can offer. *See id.*

2. The second question presented in the Petition is whether the First Amendment permits a court to rely on informational and legislative activities in finding either a past antitrust violation or a sufficient risk of recurrence to justify an injunction.

Contrary to respondents' misstatements (Opp. 15-16, 20), the AMA has never contended that the First Amendment protects the ethical guidelines that were here found to constitute evidence of a "conspiracy" among AMA members. Rather, the basis for the First Amendment claim is that the courts below relied on the AMA's wholly separate public information and legislative campaign that was directed at legislators, consumers, and voters and that was designed to obtain legislation containing and ultimately eliminating chiropractic.

Notably, respondents do not dispute that the lower courts pervasively relied on this campaign in finding liability and justifying

an injunction and that this is contrary to the holdings of other courts of appeals. *Compare* Opp. 21-23, *with* Petition, 25-28. In particular, respondents do not dispute that the courts relied on pure speech: the AMA's statements criticizing chiropractic and its failure to "retract" these statements.

For these reasons, the Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

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